warrant-verify 0.7.0

Verify what an AI agent decided — signed, hash-addressed decision records with reasons you can re-run on your own machine.

Warrant

A decision record for AI agents. Signed, hash-addressed, with reasons you can re-run.

When an agent accepts, rejects, or proposes something, it writes a warrant: a small JSON record that says what was decided, under which policy, because of which reasons, based on which evidence — signed by the actor, addressed by its own hash, linked to the decisions that came before it.

{
  "decision": "reject",
  "subject":  { "hash": "d5cf37…", "note": "PR-42" },
  "under":    [ "cb3a0a…  (policy in force, by hash)" ],
  "because":  [
    { "kind": "check", "check": "05d234…", "runtime": "cmd@v1",
      "verdict": "fail", "transcript": "9dc0c3…" },
    { "kind": "prose", "text": "policy clause 1: coverage drops 87.0 -> 84.2" }
  ],
  "evidence": [ "9dc0c3…" ],
  "actor":    { "id": "agent-b@vendor2" },
  "prior":    [ "00f79f…" ],
  "ts":       1751677200
}

The record's hash is its identity. Change one byte of the decision, the policy reference, or the reasons — the hash changes, and every later record that cited it stops resolving. Nothing can be quietly edited after the fact.

Why not just logs?

A trace tells you what an agent did. A warrant proves why it was allowed to — and the proof survives the agent. Logs are mutable, vendor-shaped prose. Warrants are:

• Immutable — identity is the hash of the content.
• Signed — you know which actor decided.
• Anchored — under pins the exact bytes of the policy that was in force, not "the policy" in someone's memory.
• Re-checkable — a reason can be an executable check. Anyone can re-run it and get the same verdict.
• Linked — prior makes decisions a chain: propose → reject (with reasons) → revise → accept. warrant why <hash> walks the whole chain.

A rejection is a first-class record, not an absence. This is the part that matters as agents get autonomy: the "no, because" survives, gets cited by hash, and stops the same argument from being re-had from scratch.

Ten minutes

pipx install warrant-verify   # or: pip install warrant-verify

Installs the warrant verifier and the warrant-mcp sealer. ski@v1 reasons re-run offline — the Σ-GLYPH Book I check engine ships inside the package, so no separate clone is needed. (From a checkout: git clone … && pip install ..)

The current release is 0.6.0 (2026-07-31, tag v0.6.0), which is what that line installs; CHANGELOG.md lists the four releases on PyPI. That it installs and runs has been checked in a clean venv by the maintainer — it is not a claim that anyone else has installed it.

warrant init                          # .warrants/ store in your repo
warrant keygen --out me.key           # Ed25519; prints your pubkey
printf 'demo diff\n' > diff.patch     # the thing being decided about
POL=$(warrant policy add examples/policy.txt)   # pin the rules in force -> hash

P=$(warrant propose --subject diff.patch --under $POL \
      --reason "utility fns needed" --actor me@host --key me.key)
R=$(warrant reject $P --check examples/check.sh --verdict fail \
      --reason "clause 1: coverage drop" --actor me@host --key me.key)
A=$(warrant accept $R --check examples/check.sh --verdict pass \
      --actor me@host --key me.key)

warrant why $A                        # decision -> reasons -> checks -> policy, verified
warrant verify                        # every hash, signature, and link in the store

The store is plain files, content-addressed, git-friendly. No server, no vendor, no account.

Machine-readable output (--json)

Requires warrant-verify 0.5.0 or newer. 0.4.0 (2026-07-16) predates this boundary, so against that release the commands below give error: unrecognized arguments: --store-mode --json. That gap — the README documenting a surface no published artifact had — is now a release gate: tools/check_release_surface.py runs in CI against the checkout and in the publish workflow against the built wheel, so a release that cannot do what this file promises fails to publish.

For CI, MCP, or an agent framework, add --json to verify and get exactly one warrant.verify-report@v0 object (one physical line) on stdout — no human text to parse. Add --store-mode so a path that is not an initialized store fails closed (ok:false) instead of being silently treated as an empty verification — this is what makes .ok a safe store-verification predicate. The Python CLI takes the store via the global --store; the Go CLI takes it as a positional argument. An Evidence Pack's store is its .warrants/ directory:

warrant --store ./evidence-pack/.warrants verify --store-mode --json | jq -e '.ok'
warrant-go verify --store-mode --json ./evidence-pack/.warrants | jq -e '.ok'   # Go: positional store

{"report":"warrant.verify-report@v0","grade":"base","ok":true,
 "records":3,"errors":0,"warnings":1,
 "findings":[{"level":"WARN","subject":"<WarrantID>","message":"..."}]}

ok == (errors == 0); the counts and exit status are identical to text mode. Under --store-mode a missing/uninitialized store fails closed (ok:false, one ERR with subject store) in both implementations, so Python and Go agree on the normative fields — report, grade, ok, records, errors, warnings, and the set of (level, subject) findings; branch on those. A finding's message is human-oriented prose and may differ between the two implementations (do not branch on it). Without --store-mode, the Go CLI keeps a legacy flat-directory mode for loose example files — pass --store-mode. The report is not a Warrant: it is unsigned and carries no settlement authority.

Two guarantees a consumer may rely on (surfaced by the first external consumer):

• Counts bind the findings. errors equals the number of ERR findings and warnings equals the number of WARN findings — always, in both implementations. findings carries every ERR/WARN event (never INFO), so a consumer may cross-check errors/warnings against the finding levels and reject a report where they disagree.
• warrant.verify-report@v0 is a CLOSED schema. Exactly the seven top-level keys above, and exactly {level, subject, message} per finding — no more. Any future additive field ships under a new tag (@v1), never inside @v0, so a strict consumer that rejects an unknown top-level or finding key stays correct across Warrant versions. Gate on the exact report tag you understand.

The contract is specified in SPEC.md §11, not here. This section is the tour; §11 is what a producer commits to by printing the tag and what a consumer may rely on when it reads it, with schemas/verify-report-v0.schema.json alongside. Until 2026-07-30 §11 did not exist and this README was the only statement of a contract a CI system branches on — a machine boundary specified in a marketing document.

Try it on a real case

Verify what an AI agent decided — the Air Canada chatbot case, as the record the airline never had. No clone, no build, no account. Download the pack, check it, and re-run the reason yourself:

pipx install warrant-verify
curl -LO https://github.com/s0fractal/warrant/releases/latest/download/air-canada-pack.zip
unzip air-canada-pack.zip

warrant --store air-canada-pack/.warrants verify        # every hash, signature, link
warrant --store air-canada-pack/.warrants why  9084cd23f205cdd6e013deb6c6e2a84e4a5f4f469fb8f77ba443dfed44716f5a
warrant --store air-canada-pack/.warrants check b423b6a82c3451bfbd75563b39e6391093a64db57941d9247a61a6c620bd997f

That last line is the part nothing else does: it re-executes the reason on your machine — a content-addressed, budget-bounded Σ-GLYPH term — and prints pass result=65cd957fee7e… atp_spent=17. The same bytes give the same verdict for anyone, forever. You are not trusting a log; you are recomputing the argument.

The walkthrough is in demos/air-canada/; the packs are built by tools/build_release_packs.sh, which refuses to ship a pack containing anything key-shaped and verifies each zip the way a stranger will — unzipped, in an empty directory, with no repo on the path — before it is attached to a release. Packs ship from 0.5.0 onward; the release process is in PUBLISHING.md. The portable bundle format is specified in EVIDENCE-PACK.md.

Use it as a CI gate

- uses: s0fractal/warrant@v0.6.0     # or @master to track HEAD
  with:
    store: ./evidence-pack           # a pack, or a .warrants store
    version: '0.6.0'                 # pin the verifier for a reproducible gate

Pin 0.6.0 or newer. 0.6.0 is the domain-separation flag day (below): a 0.5.0 verifier does not accept a warrant-sig-v1 signature, so pinning an older version against a store signed today fails every signature — the reverse of the 0.4.0/--json gap, and just as invisible until it fires.

Installs the verifier, verifies the store, fails the job on any error, and writes a summary. Outputs ok, records, errors, warnings, and the full warrant.verify-report@v0 object. See action.yml.

The action does a capability check, not a version check: it asks the installed verifier whether it actually offers verify --store-mode --json and fails with that sentence if it does not, rather than letting you discover it as an argparse error three steps later.

What it is not

Not an agent framework. Not a blockchain. Not observability. It is one file format and five verbs, designed to be boring: any language can implement it from the spec in an afternoon, and two implementations agree on every hash.

Spec and status

SPEC.md — the format (v0.4 draft: the v0.1/v0.2 body schema plus v0.3 settlement, key-state and multi-root rules, plus v0.4's domain-separated signature message), canonicalization rules, and worked test vectors with real hashes and signatures (examples/). Reason runtimes: prose, cmd@v1 (a check command run in a container), and — new in v0.2 — ski@v1: a portable, deterministic, budget-bounded check. The check is a content-addressed SKI term evaluated per Σ-GLYPH Book I; the verdict is a hash comparison; work AND peak memory are bounded by the ATP budget, so re-verifying a stranger's reason is safe by construction. warrant check <hash> re-runs one.

docs/authoring-checks.md — how to write a ski@v1 check without knowing what a combinator is. Policy rules are authored in WPL, a small expression language (fact declarations plus one boolean expression: comparisons, in, &&, ||, !), and impl/policy_lang.py compiles them to the term a verifier re-runs. The compiler reports the exact ATP the check will cost and refuses at authoring time anything it cannot compile inside the budget. It is deliberately not trusted code: the verifier re-runs the term, the compilation is reproducible from the pinned source blob, and every compile is checked against the Σ-GLYPH oracle before it is emitted.

python3 impl/policy_lang.py compile examples/policies/1-threshold.wpl
python3 impl/policy_lang.py verify  examples/policies/1-threshold.wpl

impl/warrant.py — reference implementation (M1): the five verbs on a plain-file store, one file, stdlib + Ed25519 (pip install cryptography). It must pass its own law:

python3 impl/warrant.py conformance examples   # all SPEC §8 vectors, byte-exact
python3 impl/warrant.py selftest               # live round-trip + tamper detection

impl-go/ — independent Go implementation for cross-checking the spec:

(cd impl-go && go build -o warrant-go .)       # stdlib-only; binary is not committed
./impl-go/warrant-go conformance examples      # same SPEC §8 vectors
./impl-go/warrant-go selftest examples         # schema and verification edges

impl-rs/ — a third, independent Rust implementation (from scratch, no external crates): JCS canonicalization, schema, WarrantID, the weak-key blocklist, and a from-scratch Ed25519 verifier (SHA-512 + the 2^255-19 field + Edwards curve). It verifies all three §8 signatures and agrees with Python/Go byte-exact:

(cd impl-rs && cargo build --release)                 # no crates; binary not committed
./impl-rs/target/release/warrant-rs conformance examples   # §8 WarrantIDs + signatures + §8.3 negatives
./impl-rs/target/release/warrant-rs edtest            # Ed25519 selftest (RFC 8032 TV1)
python3 tests/differential.py                         # three-way canon: PY/GO/RS agree byte-exact
python3 tests/ed25519_differential.py                 # Ed25519: Rust vs Python cryptography agree

Writing a fourth implementation

conformance/ is a self-contained pack for checking an implementation that is not one of these three — no clone, no install, and the runner never executes ours:

python3 conformance/run.py --candidate "./your-verifier probe"   # 133 vectors
python3 conformance/run.py --candidate "./your-verifier probe" --self-check

Your side of it is one page (conformance/CONTRACT.md): read one JSON request from stdin, print one JSON response, exit 0 whenever you produced an answer. 58 of the 133 vectors are MUST-REJECT, so an implementation that accepts everything fails loudly rather than scoring well; --self-check breaks your program on purpose and fails if the runner does not notice. Grades are reported, not pass/fail — impl-rs claims and reaches SPEC §6 base grade, which is a complete result, not a shortfall. The pack ships as a release tarball pinned by hash in SPEC §8.6, and TRADEMARK.md conditions the name on it.

First real user: sigma-glyph files its review adjudications as warrants (.warrants/ in that repo) — the maintainer's accept/reject decisions are signed, hash-addressed, and cite CI gates as cmd@v1 checks.

Signatures are domain-separated (v0.4, BREAKING)

The message a key signs is not the WarrantID. It is

"warrant-sig-v1:" || WarrantID_raw          15 + 32 = 47 bytes

still pure RFC 8032 Ed25519 over a byte string (SPEC §5, vectors in §8.5). Before 0.6.0 the message was the bare 32-byte WarrantID, which is indistinguishable from any other SHA-256 digest — so a key that also signed digests in another protocol produced signatures valid in both. There is no dual-accept window: a verifier that took the old message too would have no separation at all.

A record signed before 0.6.0 therefore does not verify, and says why:

python3 impl/warrant.py verify
# WARN <id>  signature does not verify (excluded): LEGACY pre-v1 signature
#            construction ... Re-sign with: warrant resign --key <keyfile>

python3 impl/warrant.py resign --key mykey.key --dry-run   # what would change
python3 impl/warrant.py resign --key mykey.key             # migrate in place

resign rewrites only sigs[].sig, and only where the existing signature is a valid old signature by the key you gave it — so it re-signs what that key already signed and invents nothing. No WarrantID moves: identity is SHA-256 of the canonical body and the envelope is not hashed. A record whose key you do not hold is named and the command exits non-zero, because a partial migration that reports success is worse than one that stops.

License: MIT.

v0.3: settlement-grade verification (DRAFT)

Beyond integrity (verify), v0.3 adds settlement semantics (SPEC §5.1/§7/§9):

python3 impl/warrant.py verify --settlement --trust-config trust.json
python3 impl/warrant.py settle <settling-wid> candidate-body.json
./impl-go/warrant-go verify --settlement --trust-config trust.json <store>
# NB: Python takes a global --store flag; Go verify/settle take the store as a
# positional argument — Go is deliberately verify-only (no filing surface).

Settlement-active roots come from your local trust configuration (plus policy-authorized adoptions); genesis.json is advisory and must be pinned to be used. Re-litigation of a settled subject requires new evidence or a new outcome fingerprint — prose never re-opens anything. Key rotation/revocation are warrants; key state derives from the DAG. Both implementations must agree on every settlement outcome: python3 tests/settlement.py.