warrantor-admission
AumOS Kubernetes validating admission webhook. Refuses to admit a Pod into the cluster unless it carries a valid AumOS Attestation Envelope (AAE) annotation. The AAE is the signed attestation produced when the workload image (and its runtime config) was measured; without it a pod cannot be trusted to be the thing it claims to be.
The webhook is policy-light by design: it enforces annotation presence and structural validity. The cryptographic verification of the AAE quote is delegated to the attestation verifier in the AumOS agent running on the node — the webhook is the gate, not the verifier.
Annotations
| Annotation | Meaning |
|---|---|
muveraai.com/aae |
Required. The base64 attestation envelope blob. |
muveraai.com/aae-digest |
Optional. When present, must match sha256:<hex>. |
Behaviour
- Pods in
kube-system,kube-public,kube-node-leaseare exempt by default (override withallow_namespaces). - Optional positive selector: only enforce in namespaces in
namespace_selector. - Non-
Podresources in anAdmissionRevieware passed through (the webhook only enforcesPod).
Usage
from warrantor_admission import AdmissionWebhook
webhook = AdmissionWebhook()
result = webhook.validate_pod(pod_manifest)
if not result.allowed:
raise RuntimeError(result.reason)
# Or process a full AdmissionReview object:
response = webhook.handle_admission_review(admission_review)
assert response["response"]["allowed"] is True
# Run as a standalone HTTP server:
webhook.serve(port=8443)
Deployment manifests
# 1. Service
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
name: warrantor-admission
namespace: warrantor-system
spec:
selector:
app: warrantor-admission
ports:
- port: 443
targetPort: 8443
---
# 2. Deployment
apiVersion: apps/v1
kind: Deployment
metadata:
name: warrantor-admission
namespace: warrantor-system
spec:
replicas: 2
selector:
matchLabels:
app: warrantor-admission
template:
metadata:
labels:
app: warrantor-admission
spec:
containers:
- name: webhook
image: aumos/admission:1.0.0
ports:
- containerPort: 8443
volumeMounts:
- name: tls
mountPath: /tls
readOnly: true
env:
- name: AUMOS_ADMISSION_PORT
value: "8443"
volumes:
- name: tls
secret:
secretName: warrantor-admission-tls
---
# 3. ValidatingWebhookConfiguration
apiVersion: admissionregistration.k8s.io/v1
kind: ValidatingWebhookConfiguration
metadata:
name: warrantor-admission
webhooks:
- name: admission.muveraai.com
sideEffects: None
admissionReviewVersions: ["v1"]
rules:
- apiGroups: [""]
apiVersions: ["v1"]
resources: ["pods"]
operations: ["CREATE", "UPDATE"]
clientConfig:
service:
name: warrantor-admission
namespace: warrantor-system
path: /validate
caBundle: <base64 of the CA cert that signed the webhook's serving cert>
namespaceSelector:
matchExpressions:
- key: kubernetes.io/metadata.name
operator: NotIn
values: ["kube-system", "kube-public", "kube-node-lease"]
The caBundle value can be produced with ca_bundle_for_webhook(pem).
Development
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest
ruff check .
Metadata
Release files for warrantor-admission 1.0.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| warrantor_admission-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Release files / warrantor_admission-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | warrantor_admission-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 7.0 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
9d81e38f9416bad0511c2f481707a0f847b4b581484d1d26911a92ac1973fef0
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
273207977a4e0cb81dd4130555b62ec24477764823e83fbdf9dbbfdc13830a6a
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.9
|
Security for warrantor-admission 1.0.0
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