weft-macos-sandbox 0.6.0

macOS sandbox runner plugin for Weft

weft-macos-sandbox

macOS sandbox runner plugin for Weft.

This extension adds the macos-sandbox runner via the weft.runners entry-point group. It currently supports one-shot command TaskSpecs only and uses sandbox-exec with a caller-provided profile.

Environment variables

The sandboxed child process does not inherit the full host environment. By default only a fixed baseline of session-plumbing variables is forwarded:

• HOME
• LANG
• LC_ALL
• LC_CTYPE
• LOGNAME
• PATH
• SHELL
• TERM
• TMPDIR
• USER

To forward additional host-derived values, opt in explicitly via spec.runner.options.env_passthrough:

{
  "runner": {
    "name": "macos-sandbox",
    "options": {
      "profile": "/path/to/sandbox.sb",
      "env_passthrough": ["MY_HOST_TOKEN"]
    }
  }
}

For fixed values (not derived from the host), set spec.env instead. spec.env always wins over both the baseline and env_passthrough, so TaskSpec-declared values cannot be shadowed by host state.

Migration note: weft-macos-sandbox releases before 0.6.0 inherited the full host environment; set env_passthrough explicitly if you depended on that.

Security model

This plugin's preflight validation only checks that spec.runner.options.profile exists on disk (not that it is a regular, non-empty file) and that the configured sandbox_binary (default sandbox-exec) is on PATH; at construction time the option only needs to be a non-empty string. It does not parse or validate the profile's contents. Isolation is exactly what the supplied Seatbelt profile grants — nothing more, nothing less. A profile that reads (allow default) grants no isolation at all; the plugin runs it without complaint. Writing a correctly restrictive profile is the caller's responsibility.

sandbox-exec is an Apple-deprecated, undocumented mechanism: Apple has marked the command deprecated for years and publishes no supported API or stability guarantee for the Seatbelt profile language it consumes. Treat this runner as a best-effort, host-specific containment tool, not a supported or guaranteed sandbox boundary — consistent with Weft's broader trust model (docs/specifications/00-Overview_and_Architecture.md, "Observability and Security"): user-level trust, not hostile multi-tenancy, with the OS/filesystem as the actual security boundary.

Release tag:

• weft_macos_sandbox/vX.Y.Z