WPair - CVE-2025-36911 Fast Pair Vulnerability Scanner
WPair is a defensive security research tool that demonstrates CVE-2025-36911 vulnerability in Google's Fast Pair protocol.
⚠️ SECURITY RESEARCH TOOL - AUTHORIZED USE ONLY ⚠️
This tool is provided for:
- Security research and education
- Testing devices you OWN
- Authorized penetration testing with written permission
Unauthorized access to computer systems is ILLEGAL.
Violators will be prosecuted under applicable laws including:
- Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (USA)
- Computer Misuse Act (UK)
- Similar legislation in your jurisdiction
By using this tool, you agree to use it responsibly and legally.
What is CVE-2025-36911?
CVE-2025-36911 (also known as "WhisperPair") is a vulnerability in Google's Fast Pair protocol that affects millions of Bluetooth audio devices worldwide.
Impact:
- Unauthorized Bluetooth pairing without user consent
- Microphone access via Hands-Free Profile (HFP)
- Persistent device tracking via Account Key injection
CVSS Score: 8.1 (High)
Affected Devices: JBL, Sony, Google Pixel Buds, Anker, Nothing, OnePlus, Beats, Bose, Jabra, Xiaomi, and many others.
Installation
From PyPI (when published)
pip install wpair
From Source
git clone https://github.com/markmysler/wpair-cli.git
cd wpair-cli
pip install -e ".[dev]"
Usage
1. Scan for Fast Pair Devices
Discover nearby Bluetooth devices advertising Fast Pair service:
wpair scan --timeout 30
Options:
--timeout N- Scan duration in seconds (default: 30)--all- Scan all BLE devices, not just Fast Pair
Example output:
┏━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━┳━━━━━━━━━┓
┃ Name ┃ Address ┃ Model ID ┃ Signal ┃ Status ┃
┡━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━╇━━━━━━━━━┩
│ Pixel Buds Pro 2 │ AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF│ 30018E │ ████ │ Unknown │
│ Sony WF-1000XM4 │ 11:22:33:44:55:66│ CD8256 │ ███ │ Unknown │
└────────────────────┴──────────────────┴──────────┴────────┴─────────┘
2. Test a Device for Vulnerability (Non-Invasive)
Test if a device is vulnerable without exploiting or pairing:
wpair test AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF
This performs a read-only test by sending a Key-Based Pairing request and interpreting the GATT error code. No pairing or modification occurs.
Output:
VULNERABLE- Device accepts unauthenticated pairing requestsPATCHED- Device correctly rejects unauthorized requestsERROR- Test inconclusive (device may already be paired)
3. Exploit (Authorized Testing ONLY)
⚠️ WARNING: This performs actual exploitation. Use only on devices you own.
wpair exploit AA:BB:CC:DD:EE:FF --confirm
The --confirm flag is required and serves as acknowledgment that you own the device or have explicit written permission.
What this does:
- Bypasses Key-Based Pairing authentication
- Establishes Bluetooth Classic bonding
- Writes persistent Account Key to device
- May enable microphone access via HFP profile
4. About CVE-2025-36911
Display detailed information about the vulnerability:
wpair about
Features
| Feature | Description |
|---|---|
| BLE Scanner | Discovers Fast Pair devices broadcasting the 0xFE2C service UUID |
| Vulnerability Tester | Non-invasive check if device is patched against CVE-2025-36911 |
| Exploit Demonstration | Full proof-of-concept for authorized security testing |
| Device Database | 20+ known vulnerable device models with quirks handling |
| Multi-Strategy Exploitation | 4 different KBP request strategies with automatic fallback |
| Progress Tracking | Real-time progress display with Rich terminal UI |
How It Works
Attack Overview
The vulnerability exploits weaknesses in Google's Fast Pair Key-Based Pairing (KBP) protocol:
- Discovery: Scan for devices advertising Fast Pair service (UUID 0xFE2C)
- KBP Request: Send unauthenticated Key-Based Pairing request
- Address Extraction: Parse BR/EDR address from response
- Classic Bonding: Pair via Bluetooth Classic
- Account Key Injection: Write persistent tracking identifier
Technical Details
- Protocol: Google Fast Pair (GATT-based BLE service)
- Vulnerability: Insufficient authentication in Key-Based Pairing
- Crypto: ECDH (secp256r1) + AES-ECB
- Persistence: Account Key stored in device NVRAM
Known Vulnerable Devices
WPair includes a database of 20+ confirmed vulnerable devices:
- Google Pixel Buds (multiple models)
- Sony WF-1000XM4, WH-1000XM5
- JBL Tune Buds, Live Pro 2
- Nothing Ear, Ear (a), Ear (2)
- OnePlus Buds Pro 2
- Beats Studio Buds+
- Anker Soundcore Liberty 4 NC
See wpair/database/known_devices.py for full list.
Architecture
wpair/
├── core/ # Core functionality
│ ├── device.py # Device data models
│ ├── scanner.py # BLE scanner
│ ├── vulnerability_tester.py # Non-invasive testing
│ └── exploit.py # Exploitation engine
├── bluetooth/ # Bluetooth adapters
│ └── classic_adapter.py # BR/EDR pairing
├── crypto/ # Cryptography
│ ├── ecdh.py # ECDH key exchange
│ └── aes.py # AES encryption
├── database/ # Known devices database
├── ui/ # User interface
│ └── terminal.py # Rich-based TUI
└── cli.py # Click-based CLI
Legal and Ethical Usage
⚠️ CRITICAL: Read Before Use
This tool is for AUTHORIZED security testing ONLY.
✅ Allowed:
- Testing your own devices
- Authorized penetration testing with written permission
- Academic security research in controlled environments
- Defensive security to identify vulnerable devices
❌ FORBIDDEN:
- Testing devices you do not own
- Unauthorized access to any device
- Malicious use or privacy violations
Legal Consequences
Unauthorized access to Bluetooth devices is ILLEGAL under:
- USA: Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA), 18 U.S.C. § 1030
- UK: Computer Misuse Act 1990
- EU: Directive 2013/40/EU
- Similar legislation worldwide
By using this tool, you agree to use it only on devices you own or have explicit written permission to test.
Development
Setup Development Environment
python -m venv venv
source venv/bin/activate # or venv\Scripts\activate on Windows
pip install -e ".[dev]"
Run Tests
pytest
Code Formatting
black wpair/
ruff check wpair/
Type Checking
mypy wpair/
Credits
Original Research Team - KU Leuven, Belgium
| Researcher | Affiliation |
|---|---|
| Sayon Duttagupta | COSIC Group |
| Nikola Antonijević | COSIC Group |
| Bart Preneel | COSIC Group |
| Seppe Wyns | DistriNet Group |
| Dave Singelée | DistriNet Group |
Funding: Flemish Government Cybersecurity Research Program (VOEWICS02)
Resources:
License
This project is licensed under the Apache License 2.0 - see the LICENSE file for details.
Disclaimer
This application is an independent implementation created for security research purposes. The original KU Leuven researchers discovered and disclosed the vulnerability but have not released any code and are not affiliated with this project. Their inclusion in credits is solely to acknowledge their research contribution.
Built for the security research community.
Metadata
Release files for wpair 1.0.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| wpair-1.0.0.tar.gz | 43.6 kB | With provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| wpair-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 70.5 kB
Release files / wpair-1.0.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | wpair-1.0.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 43.6 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
08046320eb22bd0ab7a3367a7b58acea050683a50e646cf4e6e15d472894943c
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
3c33b389e8106a953e063258f1e0e40f3a45ed638a6e5398501820e46de7222d
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.1.0 CPython/3.13.7
|
Provenance
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Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jan 19, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / wpair-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | wpair-1.0.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 26.9 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
cbd31a26e0f0c6c44b880134ed7c648689f1000385b2d1d2c66e297a763e3dd6
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
bd1d098a441c30da323212b1f464e8aea38f0bb05d3482d0fe40611ba6b0c7e7
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/6.1.0 CPython/3.13.7
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jan 19, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for wpair 1.0.0
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
All 2 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for wpair-1.0.0.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Jan 19, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.