WraithMesh
Distributed deception sensor mesh — Phase 1.
Nodes collapse honeypot noise locally and uplink signed equivalence-class observations. The TIE aggregator corroborates across nodes, scores contributor reputation, and exposes a read API — without raw commands, IPs, or customer identifiers.
Phase 1 additions
- Canary sensor — watch a JSONL beacon inbox (
canary-kitintegration path) - Reputation engine — per-node trust scoring; canary observations weigh 2×
- Persistent TIE store — SQLite-backed campaigns + reputation
- TIE read API —
/v1/stats,/v1/campaigns,/v1/nodes/{id}/reputation - Sensor metrics —
wraithmesh sensor status
Install
cd honeypot-mitre && pip install .
cd ../wraithmesh && pip install .
Cowrie sensor
export WRAITHMESH_KEY="change-me"
wraithmesh init-manifest --output mesh.json --sensor-class cowrie
wraithmesh sensor run --config mesh.json --once
Canary sensor
External systems append beacon events (package + version only — no token, no IP):
{"package_name": "internal-sdk", "version": "2.4.1", "timestamp": "2026-07-12T00:00:00Z"}
wraithmesh init-manifest --output mesh-canary.json --sensor-class canary --beacon-inbox ./beacons.jsonl
wraithmesh sensor run --config mesh-canary.json --once
TIE aggregator
wraithmesh aggregator serve --port 8787 --db .wraithmesh/tie.db
| Endpoint | Purpose |
|---|---|
POST /v1/observations |
Ingest signed observation batch |
GET /v1/equivalence/{key} |
Corroborated campaign record |
GET /v1/campaigns |
List recent campaigns |
GET /v1/stats |
Exchange stats |
GET /v1/nodes/{id}/reputation |
Contributor trust score |
DML → mesh (signed deception document)
pip install ../dml-spec # or: pip install ".[dml]"
export DML_KEY=... WRAITHMESH_KEY=...
wraithmesh manifest from-dml signed_mesh.yaml cowrie-east-1 --output mesh.json
wraithmesh sensor run --config mesh.json --once
Anti-poisoning trap keys
wraithmesh manifest gen-trap-keys --output trap-keys.json
wraithmesh aggregator serve --trap-keys trap-keys.json
Observations matching a trap key are rejected and the node reputation is penalized.
Multi-node trust
Register node signing keys for the aggregator:
{
"0f37f3380e0fb940": "node-a-secret",
"1f20a905d9e47613": "node-b-secret"
}
wraithmesh aggregator serve --trusted-keys trusted-keys.json
Tests
pip install -e ../honeypot-mitre -e ".[dev]"
pytest
MIT — © 2026 Niffyhunt · wraithwall-toolkit
Metadata
Release files for wraithmesh 0.2.0
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Total release size: 49.2 kB
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