x402 Conformance
Prove your x402 payments can't double-credit, credit too early or credit on a broken answer, in one CI step.
An open set of conformance and safety checks for x402 facilitators and resource servers. It checks the properties a seller's money depends on. It never signs, pays or touches mainnet. It complements x402 and its facilitators and doesn't replace them.
Experimental. Passing a check is evidence about one property. It doesn't certify conformance to x402. — Ryan Gillespie, Optitransfer
Project page with the checks and the latest results: https://atsp-protocol.github.io/x402-conformance/
60-second quickstart
Before 1.4.0 is published: this page describes
main. The released 1.3.1 packages and the@v1Action already havelive,resource,offline,report,devnet,probe --resourceand the Action inputsfacilitators,facilitator-auth-host,resources,resource-url,start,network,port,offline,results-dirandfail-on-error. Everything else here ships in 1.4.0: bothdemocommands, R11 and thebinding-*inputs, F11, P6, P7,pr-comment,report --badge,--share,x402conf-svm resource, the test helpers, the MCP server, the Docker image and the GitLab template. Until then, run those from a clone (cd ts && npm ci && npm run build && node dist/src/cli.js demo, orPYTHONPATH=src python3 -m x402conf demo). CHANGELOG.md lists what is unreleased.
See it work first, with nothing to set up: no project, no wallet, no chain, a few seconds each.
npx -y x402-conformance-svm demo # R0-R10 against a bundled mock server behind a facilitator double
pipx run --spec x402-conformance x402conf demo # S1-S4, P1-P7 against a bundled mock, then the F1-F11 self-test
npx -y x402-conformance-svm demo --fault serve_on_any_settle # what a failure looks like, with a fix link per check
Then point it at your own code:
pipx run --spec x402-conformance x402conf live https://x402.org/facilitator # a facilitator's GET /supported
pipx run --spec x402-conformance x402conf resource https://your.api/paid-route # your 402 answer, one unpaid GET
npx -y x402-conformance-svm probe --resource http://127.0.0.1:4020/paid --start "node server.js" # fault injection
In CI, save this as .github/workflows/x402-conformance.yml:
name: x402 conformance
on: [push, pull_request]
jobs:
x402:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: atsp-protocol/x402-conformance@v1
with:
resource-url: http://127.0.0.1:4020/paid # your paid route
start: node server.js # must use X402_FACILITATOR_URL as its facilitator
From your test suite, agent or CI system: docs/USING.md covers vitest, jest, node:test, Hono, Express, MCP clients (Claude, Cursor), the Vercel AI SDK, LangChain, Docker and GitLab CI, with the same checks and report everywhere. Failures you choose to share build the public corpus of real x402 failures.
Who should use this
- Resource-server builders selling an API over x402. The probe puts a misbehaving facilitator in front of your paid
route and fails your build if you would serve content on a
/settletimeout, a broken answer,settlement_pending, an on-chain failure or a duplicate payment.resourcechecks that your 402 answer is well formed on any network. - Facilitator operators.
livechecks your publicGET /supported(shape, CAIP-2 IDs, Solana fee payers) with one GET, anddevnetruns the safety suite over real/verifyand/settleagainst a facilitator you run. - SDK and middleware maintainers. Run the probe against your framework's example server in CI. The repo's own CI
runs it against the stock
@x402/expressmiddleware on Solana devnet and Base Sepolia.
What it catches
Facilitators, live, read-only (x402conf live, one GET /supported each):
- S0 the endpoint doesn't answer HTTP 200 with a JSON object (unreachable, an error page, or credentials needed)
- S1 the response is missing
kinds,extensionsorsigners(a V1-only facilitator is graded against V1, which defineskindsonly) - S2 a V2 network isn't written as a CAIP-2 ID
- S3 a Solana kind uses an old V1 name such as
solana-devnetinstead of the published ID - S4 a Solana
exactkind has no valid fee payer (error), or its fee payer isn't listed undersigners(warning: the spec doesn't say it must be, I infer it from whatsignersis for)
Any paid URL, read-only (x402conf resource, one unpaid GET each), any network, V1 or V2:
- P1 an unpaid request isn't answered with HTTP 402
- P2 there's no
PAYMENT-REQUIREDheader (V2) or V1 JSON body, or it doesn't decode - P3
x402Version,resourceor a non-emptyacceptsis missing - P4 an
acceptsentry lacks a required field or has the wrong type (amount in atomic units, CAIP-2 network, timeout) - P5 a scheme-specific field is missing:
extra.nameandextra.versionfor EVMexact(EIP-3009),extra.feePayerfor Solanaexact - P6 the
PAYMENT-REQUIREDheader is over 8 KB (warning) or 16 KB (error): common proxies and servers reject headers that large - P7 an offer whose scheme defaults to a non-authorization flow (
uptoon Solana) doesn't declareextra.paymentFlow(warning; V2 §6.1 says it must, the upto SVM scheme text says it may be omitted)
Your resource server, under fault injection (x402conf-svm probe, R0-R11, R14 and R20): the probe starts a facilitator double
on loopback, points your server at it through X402_FACILITATOR_URL and pays your route with test payloads on
Solana devnet or Base Sepolia (exact; EVM via EIP-3009). Your server must:
- R0 answer an unpaid request with a 402 offering one of those networks. If it offers neither, the result is unsupported, not failed: nothing was graded
- R1 serve a settled payment, and use the double (if it serves without calling the double, the probe stops: the remaining checks would mean nothing)
- R2 serve the same payment at most once
- R3-R9 not serve when
/settlenever answers, answers an HTML 502, a 503 with a success body, a non-JSON page, a truncated body,settlement_pendingorinvalid_transaction_state - R10 send a
PAYMENT-RESPONSEheader that decodes tosuccess: truewith the content - R11 bind each payment to the request it pays for (give the routes with the binding options): a payment for a
cheap route is refused on a dearer one (R11a), an altered
payTo, asset or network is refused before/settle(R11b), a payment for the cheaper method (R11c) or query (R11d) is refused on the dearer one, an encoded separator or dot segment in a parameter never reaches a paid handler unpaid (R11e), and sign-in-with-x access is recorded for the route that was priced and settled, not the client'sresource.url(R11f) - R14 survive a crash between a successful
/settleand the response (add--crash): the probe kills your server while/settleis answering and again as the response starts, restarts it and presents the same payment. It must not settle again or ask for payment again, and must either deliver once (from an idempotency record) or refuse and name the transaction or payment id so it can be reconciled. With--startthe probe restarts that command; for a server it didn't start, give--crash-killand--crash-restart - R20 with
--retry, never charge one request twice when the client times out before/settleanswers and retries: a retry with a fresh payment under the same payment-identifier id is not settled again (R20a), and a retry resending the same signed payment is refused as a duplicate by/settle; both get the earlier result (R20b). The same check grades a client's own retry (checkClientRetry): it must resend the payment or keep the payment id
Every result carries its profile (normative: the spec says MUST; security-profile: a hardening rule the spec
leaves open; resilience: behaviour under failure), its spec basis and a fix link (results format
x402-conformance-evidence/2).
Safety suite (x402conf offline and devnet, F1-F11): a malformed payment accepted (F1), an underpayment accepted
(F2), a payment settled twice (F3), a memo or nonce replayed (F4), success before confirmation, or settlement_pending without a transaction and network (F5), a timeout or
garbage answer credited (F6), a pending payment never finalised or credited twice (F7), a failure stuck pending (F8),
a broken /settle transport credited (F9), a payment accepted under requirements it wasn't made for (F10),
/verify committing payment state (F11). offline runs them against built-in doubles: it's a self-test of the suite
and doesn't test your code. devnet runs F1-F6 over real /verify and /settle on Solana devnet.
docs/SPEC.md quotes the spec text behind every check, and docs/FIXES.md explains, for every check, what failed, why it matters and how to fix it.
Install
| how | command | needs |
|---|---|---|
| GitHub Action | uses: atsp-protocol/x402-conformance@v1 (see below) |
python3 3.10+ on the runner (GitHub-hosted runners have it) |
| Python CLI, one-off | pipx run --spec x402-conformance x402conf --help or uvx --from x402-conformance x402conf --help |
pipx or uv |
| Python CLI, installed | pip install x402-conformance |
Python 3.10+, no dependencies |
| TypeScript probe | npx -y x402-conformance-svm --help |
Node 20+ |
Packages: x402-conformance on PyPI (command x402conf) and
x402-conformance-svm on npm (command x402conf-svm; the name is
historical, it grades Base Sepolia too). x402conf --version and x402conf-svm --version print the version. Pin
x402-conformance==1.4.0, x402-conformance-svm@1.4.0 or the Action at @v1.4.0 if you want a fixed version; @v1
follows the latest 1.x release.
CLI
x402conf demo [--fault no_fee_payer|no_402] # a bundled mock on loopback, then the self-test
x402conf live https://x402.org/facilitator # S0-S4, GET /supported only
x402conf resource https://api.example.com/paid # P1-P7, one unpaid GET
x402conf offline # F1-F11 self-test against the built-in doubles
x402conf report --dir DIR --sarif out.sarif --junit junit.xml --badge badge.json
x402conf pr-comment DIR/pr-comment.md # sticky PR comment (GITHUB_TOKEN, in a pull_request run)
x402conf devnet --faults --keys DIR # F1-F6 over real /verify and /settle on Solana devnet
x402conf-svm demo [--fault serve_on_any_settle] # R0-R10 against a bundled mock server
x402conf-svm probe --resource http://127.0.0.1:4020/paid --start "node server.js" --out resource-server.json
x402conf-svm probe --resource http://127.0.0.1:4020/paid --start "node server.js" --crash # R0-R10, then R14
live, resource and offline print JSON with one entry per check (check, pass, severity, detail). Save them
as live.json, resource-402.json and offline.json (and the probe's --out as resource-server.json) in one
directory, and report converts them to SARIF and JUnit, printing a one-line summary such as
{"checks": 14, "failed": 0, "failed_ids": []}. Add --fail-on-error to live, resource or report to exit 1 when
an error-severity check fails; without it they exit 0 so existing scripts keep working. Warnings never fail a run.
devnet runs against a self-hosted reference facilitator on loopback with throwaway keys from --keys, and refuses any
other facilitator (--facilitator URL) unless you pass --operator-permission with the operator's written permission.
--rpc picks the devnet RPC (default https://api.devnet.solana.com). It needs Node 20+ and a funded devnet fee payer;
evidence/devnet shows a full run. live --evidence DIR and devnet --evidence DIR also write the raw
bodies, run.json and SHA256SUMS to DIR.
Facilitators that need credentials (Coinbase CDP, for example): put the full Authorization header value in
X402C_FACILITATOR_AUTHORIZATION and the facilitator's host name in X402C_FACILITATOR_AUTH_HOST. The header goes to
that host only, never to the others in the same run, and is never printed or written to evidence. A credential without
a host is a usage error. CDP uses short-lived JWTs, so mint one just before the run.
Exit codes.
| command | 0 | 1 | 2 | 3 |
|---|---|---|---|---|
x402conf live, x402conf resource |
done (with --fail-on-error: no error-severity check failed) |
with --fail-on-error, an error-severity check failed, S0 included |
usage or configuration error | – |
x402conf offline |
the reference passes every check and every fault-injected double is caught | otherwise | usage error | – |
x402conf report |
reports written (with --fail-on-error: and nothing failed) |
with --fail-on-error, an error-severity check failed |
usage error, or no results JSON in the directory | – |
x402conf devnet |
the facilitator under test passes, and with --faults every fault-injected build is caught |
otherwise (the current reference exits 1 on F4, see Results) |
usage error | – |
x402conf-svm probe |
every requested check (R0-R10, R11, R14) passes | a check failed | usage error, or the run couldn't complete: a port in use, your --start server exited or never answered |
unsupported: your server offers no network the probe grades |
x402conf --help, --version, x402conf-svm --help, --version |
always | – | – | – |
With --out, the probe writes its results file on every outcome, errors included.
GitHub Action
The quickstart workflow runs as is. Inputs:
| input | default | what it does |
|---|---|---|
facilitators |
empty | Space-separated facilitator base URLs, checked with GET /supported only (S0-S4) |
facilitator-auth-host |
empty | The one host that gets X402C_FACILITATOR_AUTHORIZATION (set it in the step's env from a secret) |
resources |
empty | Space-separated paid URLs, one unpaid GET each (P1-P7) |
resource-url |
empty | Your paid route; the Action puts a facilitator double in front of it and runs R0-R10 |
binding-cheap-url, binding-expensive-url |
empty | Two paid routes at different prices (R11, R11a, R11b) |
binding-method-url |
empty | A paid URL priced differently for GET and POST (R11c) |
binding-query-urls |
empty | Two paid URLs that differ only in the query, comma-separated (R11d) |
binding-param-url |
empty | A paid parameterised route with {id} for the parameter (R11e) |
binding-siwx-urls |
empty | Two paid sign-in-with-x routes, cheap first, comma-separated, Base Sepolia (R11f) |
crash |
false |
true also runs R14: the probe kills your server after /settle succeeds and before the response, restarts it and presents the same payment (needs resource-url, and start or the two commands below) |
crash-kill, crash-restart |
empty | For a server start didn't launch: a command that kills it hard and returns once it's gone, and one that starts it again in the background (R14) |
retry |
false |
true also checks R20 retry double-pay on resource-url (--retry) |
start |
empty | Command that starts your server; it receives X402_FACILITATOR_URL |
network |
auto |
Which offered network the probe pays on: auto, solana:EtWTRABZaYq6iMfeYKouRu166VU2xqa1 or eip155:84532 |
port |
4402 |
Loopback port for the facilitator double |
offline |
true |
Also run the F1-F11 self-test of the suite (it tests the suite, not your code; set false to skip) |
results-dir |
x402-conformance |
Where live.json, resource-402.json, resource-server.json and offline.json are written |
fail-on-error |
true |
Fail the job when a check fails, a requested run left no results, or the probe found nothing to grade |
pr-comment |
false |
true posts one sticky pull request comment with the result and a fix link per failed check (needs permissions: { pull-requests: write }) |
github-token |
the job token | Token used for pr-comment; the default job token is enough |
| output | value |
|---|---|
result |
pass when every requested check passed, unsupported when the probe found nothing it could grade, otherwise fail |
results-dir |
the directory holding the results JSON |
badge |
<results-dir>/badge.json, a shields.io endpoint badge |
pr-comment |
<results-dir>/pr-comment.md, the sticky comment body |
sarif |
<results-dir>/x402-conformance.sarif, SARIF 2.1.0 of the failed checks |
junit |
<results-dir>/junit.xml, one test case per check |
It fails closed. If the probe can't run (its port is taken, your server exits or never answers, the build fails),
the job fails with the reason; a run that left no results is never reported as a pass. It leaves your toolchain
alone. It doesn't run setup-python or setup-node: the Python checks use the runner's python3, and the probe runs
on a pinned, checksum-verified Node in RUNNER_TEMP that is never put on your PATH, so your server and later steps
keep your Node.
Example job summary (abridged):
## x402 Conformance: pass
| target | check | result |
| http://127.0.0.1:4020/paid | R1 a settled payment is served, and the server used the facilitator double | pass |
| http://127.0.0.1:4020/paid | R3 /settle never answers: content not served (F6) | pass |
| https://x402.org/facilitator | S1 SupportedResponse shape: kinds[], extensions[], signers{} ... | pass |
Failures in code scanning. Every failed check can show up in your repo's Security tab, with a link to what failed
and how to fix it. Add permissions: { security-events: write, contents: read } to the job, id: x402 and
fail-on-error: false to the step above, then:
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
if: always()
with:
sarif_file: ${{ steps.x402.outputs.sarif }}
category: x402-conformance
- run: test "${{ steps.x402.outputs.result }}" = pass
The junit output works with any JUnit test-report viewer.
A comment on the pull request. Set pr-comment: "true" and give the job permissions: { pull-requests: write }.
The action posts one comment with the result and a fix link for each failed check, and updates that same comment on
every push instead of adding new ones. It's off by default; on a fork's pull request the token can't comment, so it
only warns.
Results
The full results, with raw bodies and hashes, are on the project page.
Live, 2026-10-20, GET /supported only, one request per facilitator
| facilitator | HTTP | S0 | S1 | S2 | S3 | S4 | note |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| x402.org/facilitator | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| facilitator.payai.network | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| x402.dexter.cash | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| facilitator.ultravioletadao.xyz | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | warning | devnet fee payer not listed under signers (inferred rule) |
| facilitator-A (name withheld) | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| facilitator.xpay.sh | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| x402.polygon.technology | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| facilitator.goplausible.xyz | 200 | pass | pass | fail | pass | pass | Algorand IDs use the full 44-character genesis hash; the x402 Algorand spec uses algorand:wGHE2Pwdvd7S12BL5FaOP20EGYesN73k |
| facilitator.pieverse.io | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| facilitator.x402.rs | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| facilitator.daydreams.systems | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | |
| facilitator.mogami.tech | 200 | pass | pass | pass | pass | pass | V1-only, graded against V1 |
| api.cdp.coinbase.com/platform/v2/x402 | 401 | fail | – | – | – | – | needs credentials; not run with any |
| facilitator.cascade.fyi | – | fail | – | – | – | – | TLS handshake failed |
| facilitator.corbits.dev | – | fail | – | – | – | – | TLS handshake failed |
Raw bodies, run.json and SHA256SUMS for this run are in evidence/2026-10-20-v1.3.0. A
failed check is evidence about one property on one day, not a verdict on a facilitator; operators can
report a false positive.
The first run, with 1.2.0, is in evidence/2026-10-20. Want your facilitator listed? Open a request.
Devnet, 2026-10-20, F1-F6 over real /verify and /settle
I ran F1 to F6 on Solana devnet against my self-hosted reference facilitator (@x402/core and @x402/svm 2.28.0),
then against fault-injected builds of it.
| facilitator | F1 | F2 | F3 | F4 | F5 | F6 |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
self-hosted reference, @x402/svm 2.28.0 |
pass | pass | pass | fail | pass | pass |
F4 fails because the reference facilitator deduplicates by transaction but not by memo, so two different
transactions with the same memo both settled. The payer paid twice, so the seller lost nothing, but a resource server
that ties one purchase to one memo has to enforce that itself. Every fault-injected build was caught by the check
it targets. Transaction links, the full run.json and its hash are in evidence/devnet. Results for
other facilitators go in the facilitator matrix, and I run them against a third party only with the
operator's permission.
Roadmap
Next is depth, not breadth. v1.4 tests that a payment for one route, price, recipient or method never unlocks another,
on a real resource server rather than only on the facilitator double, and makes the suite's own oracle fail closed on
malformed amounts. v1.5 adds parallel and multi-replica replay, a crash between settling and serving, and payment
versus delivery (failed handlers, HEAD, caches, late settlement). Every check is labelled normative, security profile
or resilience, and every check ships with a passing control and a faulty build it catches. Alongside the checks, an
adoption track makes the suite quick to run and keep: a one-line demo against a local mock target in under 60 seconds
with no wallet, a 3-line Action with a pull-request summary, fix hints on every failure, framework quickstarts, a
public regression corpus anyone can add a case to, and a compatibility matrix rebuilt in CI. The plan and the release
gate for dropping the experimental label are in docs/ROADMAP.md.
How this repo is verified
Scope and acceptance criteria live in proofline.json, a Proofline
contract. It's signed with my owner key: the signature is in proofline.json.sig and the public key is pinned in
guard/owner.pub. On every push to main and on every pull request, CI checks that signature and then runs tools/vv.py, which checks
every acceptance criterion and uploads a receipt (docs/VV.md). Any change to the contract has to be
re-signed before CI passes again. You can check the signature yourself from a clone:
node tools/verify-sig.mjs # no dependencies; exits 0 when the signature matches
npx -y @optitransfer/proofline@next contract verify-sig # the Proofline CLI (Node 22+), same check
The Lean 4 models in lean/ cover the credit rule, nonces, timeouts, settlement_pending reconciliation and
concurrent settles. They use only standard axioms and contain no sorry. They model the rule the suite checks, not any
facilitator's code.
Add the badge
If your project runs the suite in CI, you can say so. It means "tested with", not "certified":
[](https://github.com/atsp-protocol/x402-conformance)
For a badge that shows the latest result (pass 32/32 or 2 failing), publish the action's badge output somewhere
public, for example with GitHub Pages or a gist, and point shields.io at it:
[](https://github.com/atsp-protocol/x402-conformance)
x402conf report --dir x402-conformance --badge x402-badge.json writes the same file outside the action.
Who uses it
No public users yet. I only list a user once they've said so publicly. If you run it, open an issue or say so in Discussions and I'll add you here and to docs/ADOPTION.md.
Free run for your project. Open an issue with your repo or facilitator URL and I'll run the suite against it, post the results, and send a tests-only pull request with the Action and badge. It's free, with no conditions.
Safety
The suite holds no keys of yours and never signs or pays. live and resource are GET-only, and that's tested. The
probe's facilitator double listens on loopback only and never touches a chain. A facilitator credential, if you give
one, comes from the environment, goes only to the host you name and is never printed. The devnet runner refuses
mainnet and any third-party facilitator without written permission.
Security
Please report vulnerabilities through GitHub private vulnerability reporting (Security → Report a vulnerability), not in a public issue. When the suite finds a failing safety check in someone else's facilitator, I tell the operator privately first. The full policy is in SECURITY.md.
Contributing
Questions and ideas are welcome in Discussions. Issues and pull requests are welcome, and new checks especially: propose one with the check-proposal issue template, quoting the x402 spec text it rests on. If a check flags something you believe is correct, open a false positive report. Every check needs a test that fails against a faulty double and passes against the reference. CONTRIBUTING.md lists the local checks to run before you push, and everyone taking part follows the Code of Conduct. Changes are listed in CHANGELOG.md.
Licence
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE and NOTICE (Ryan Gillespie / Optitransfer).
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