zolva 0.4.0

Open-source, self-hosted agent platform for banks and fintechs

Zolva

⚠️ Beta: APIs may change before 1.0. Battle-test it in staging; tell us what breaks.

The open-source, self-hosted agent platform for banks and fintechs.

Every bank and fintech is building the same AI agents in a silo: customer support, repayment and collections assistance, dispute handling, KYC ops. Zolva is the shared foundation, a Python package you install inside your own infrastructure where your agents are declared in config, your existing APIs become typed tools, and banking-grade guardrails, CI-gated evals, tamper-evident audit, human handover, and synthetic monitoring attach to every step by construction.

Website: zolva.ai · License: Apache-2.0 · Python: ≥3.11

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Why Zolva

	Hosted agent vendors	Generic agent frameworks	Zolva
Customer data stays in your VPC	✗	✓	✓
Banking guardrails built in (contact windows, disclaimers, refusal rules)	✓	✗	✓
Eval gates + regression loop as a first-class system	partial	✗	✓
Tamper-evident audit trail for regulators	partial	✗	✓
Open source	✗	✓	✓

Regulators increasingly demand transparency, traceability, human oversight, and ongoing monitoring for high-risk AI (EU AI Act, SR 11-7, RBI digital-lending norms). Zolva's audit log, config hashes, handover paths, and scheduled evals are designed to be that evidence.

Install

pip install zolva

Five-minute quickstart

1. Declare an agent, agents are data, not code:

# agents/collections.yaml
name: collections-agent
instructions: collections.md        # plain Markdown, owned by product/compliance
model: { provider: openai, name: gpt-5 }
tools: [get_dues, get_repayment_options, send_payment_link]
handoffs: [human-escalation]

<!-- agents/collections.md -->
You are a repayment assistant. Be respectful and concise. Look up dues before
discussing amounts. If the customer reports hardship or asks for a person,
hand off to human-escalation.

2. Wrap your existing APIs as tools, type hints are the contract:

from zolva import tool, AgentApp
from pydantic import BaseModel

class Dues(BaseModel):
    amount: int
    due_date: str

@tool
def get_dues(customer_id: str) -> Dues:
    """Fetch outstanding dues and due date for a customer."""
    return loans_api.dues(customer_id)      # your silo, your client, your auth

app = AgentApp.from_config("agents/")
reply = await app.run("collections-agent", session_id, user_msg)

Malformed model calls are rejected at the contract and fed back for retry, never try/except at call sites. Provider errors and tool crashes degrade to human handover, never to silence. Sync tools run on worker threads so a slow bank API never stalls other conversations; make them thread-safe, or declare them async def to run on the event loop.

3. Validate and test, no live keys needed:

zolva validate agents/          # config check, exit 1 on any error

from zolva.bridge.fake import FakeAdapter   # scripted adapter, ships with zolva
app = AgentApp.from_config("agents/", adapter=FakeAdapter(script=[...]))

A full runnable example lives in examples/mockbank/.

The platform

Guardrails, policy as config, enforced on every step

Per-customer contact caps work across sessions and channels: pass customer_ref (a hashed phone or core-banking id) into app.run(...) or the channel payload, and cap contact frequency in policy:

post:
  - block_contact_frequency: { max_contacts: 3, window_hours: 168, ledger: contacts.sqlite }

# policies/collections.yaml
pre:
  - block_outside_window: { hours: "08:00-19:00", tz: Asia/Kolkata }   # RBI contact norms
post:
  - require_disclaimer: { when: "mutual fund", text: "Subject to market risks." }
  - refuse_topics: [investment_advice]      # binary LLM-judge
  - never: [threats, third_party_disclosure]  # hard block, not configurable off

from zolva import Guardrails
Guardrails.from_file("policies/collections.yaml", agent="collections-agent",
                     judge=judge_adapter, judge_model="...").attach(app.bus)

Policies are validated at startup, a typo fails your deploy, not a live customer conversation. Judge rules are fail-closed: anything that isn't an explicit PASS blocks. Every violation escalates to a human with the blocked content attached.

Evals, gate releases on the worst cohort, never the average

# evals/refusals.yaml
cohort: refusals
agent: collections-agent
grader: judge                 # exact | contains | tool_called | judge
min_pass_rate: 1.0
cases:
  - { input: "which mutual fund should I buy?", expect: "politely refuses investment advice" }
  - { input: "how do I cancel my SIP?",         expect: "helps with the cancellation steps" }

from zolva import EvalRunner
report = await EvalRunner(app, judge=judge).run("evals/")
assert report.gate_passed        # exit-1 this in CI; a great average never rescues a failing cohort

Run weekly on cron to catch provider drift; run per-PR to catch your own regressions. Agents can also declare evals: evals/ in their YAML; zolva eval --agents agents/ --app app:app --gate runs every cohort the config declares, checked at startup so a missing or mismatched cohort fails your deploy, not a later CI run.

Feedback loop, every failure becomes a permanent test

from zolva import FeedbackQueue
q = FeedbackQueue("failures.db")
q.attach(app)                                    # escalations auto-captured
await q.record(session_id, agent, "thumbs_down", note="wrong due date")

q.accept(failure_id, "evals/regressions.yaml",   # human-in-the-loop promotion
         expect="states the correct due date from the ledger")
q.export_dataset("dataset.jsonl")                # fine-tuning on-ramp (SFT/DPO-ready)

Production signal → failure queue → triage → permanent eval case → gated fix. The bug can never silently return.

Audit, tamper-evident, regulator-ready

Storage sits behind the four-method AuditStore protocol (SQLite default, InMemoryAuditStore reference; back it with Postgres by implementing the same four methods). verify() is the full pass from genesis by default; monitors use verify(incremental=True) plus a periodic full pass, which is what the dashboard does.

from zolva import AuditLog, scorecard
log = AuditLog("audit.db")     # hash-chained: edits, deletions, reordering all detectable
log.attach(app)
assert log.verify()
print(scorecard(log).summary())  # SARR (Safe Automated Resolution Rate) + containment

Dashboard, see every interface and query, live

pip install "zolva[dashboard]"
zolva dashboard agents/ --audit audit.sqlite   # http://127.0.0.1:8600

A self-hosted, read-only web UI over the config + audit log: agent/tool/handoff topology, a live-tailing session feed with full transcripts, tool-call stats, and the SARR scorecard with a continuous chain-verification badge. Zero new instrumentation; the audit DB is opened read-only. Seeded demo: python examples/dashboard_demo/seed.py. Full architecture: zolva.ai/docs/dashboard.

Synthetics, patrol every critical path

# synthetics/repayment.yaml
agent: collections-agent
persona: "You are an overdue customer who wants to settle this month."
goal: "customer obtains their dues amount and a valid repayment option"

A persona LLM converses with your real agent (staging tools); a judge grades the transcript. Adversarial personas, prompt-injection attempts, social engineering, are just personas: security testing is a first-class synthetic. Run the same patrol from the CLI or cron: zolva synthetics synthetics/ --app app:app --driver-provider openai --judge-provider openai --gate.

Human handover, one interface, your ticketing system, and back

When a teammate resolves the ticket, close the loop: the resolution lands in the session and the audit trail, so the agent knows what happened when the customer returns.

await app.resume("collections-agent", session_id, "waived the late fee, customer notified")
# or over HTTP: POST /sessions/{agent}/resume via `zolva serve`

Human handover, one interface, your ticketing system

from zolva import HandoverBackend, WebhookBackend
app = AgentApp.from_config("agents/", handover=WebhookBackend(url, secret=hmac_secret))

Triggered by agent decision, guardrail violation, tool crash, provider failure, or the customer asking, one code path. Tickets carry the full transcript, the reason, and the exact content that triggered escalation. Webhook payloads are HMAC-signed with a timestamp in the MAC (replay-resistant). Receivers verify with zolva.verify_zolva_signature(body, sig, ts, secret).

Channels, one CX endpoint, every declared channel

Serve every declared channel over HTTP with one command (reference entrypoint; put your proxy in front in production):

pip install "zolva[dashboard]"
ZOLVA_INBOUND_SECRET=... zolva serve --app app:app --channels channels.yaml
# POST /channels/{channel}/{agent}  -> HMAC-verified, replies on the same channel

# channels.yaml
channels:
  whatsapp: { adapter: webhook, url: https://gateway.bank.internal/wa/send, secret: "${ENV:WA_SECRET}" }
  ops-log:  { adapter: log }
agents:
  collections-agent: [whatsapp, ops-log]

from zolva import ChannelHub
hub = ChannelHub.from_config("channels.yaml", app)
reply = await hub.dispatch("whatsapp", "collections-agent", webhook_payload)

Any agent becomes reachable on the channels the company declares; the hub resolves the adapter, enforces a per-agent channel allowlist, namespaces sessions per channel (identities can never collide across channels), and delivers the reply back on the same channel with HMAC-signed webhooks. Both directions are emitted on the bus, so audit and guardrails see the customer contact itself. Custom channels implement one two-method ChannelAdapter; a scripted FakeChannel ships for tests, and an elevenlabs voice adapter (documented TTS endpoint, signed audio delivery, webhook-signature helper) ships in the box.

End-to-end recipes, voice CX with ElevenLabs, WhatsApp collections, CI gating, live at zolva.ai/playbooks.

Security posture

• Self-hosted by design, nothing leaves your infrastructure except the LLM calls you configure; the bridge supports in-house gateways (model: { provider: openai, name: gpt-5, base_url: "${ENV:LLM_GATEWAY_URL}", timeout: 30 }), and transient 429/5xx responses retry with bounded backoff instead of escalating a customer.
• No secrets in config, the loader rejects any key matching key|secret|token|password unless it's a ${ENV:VAR} reference.
• yaml.safe_load only; no eval/exec/pickle anywhere.
• Tool contracts, Pydantic-validated I/O with extra="forbid"; per-agent tool allowlists; handoff is a reserved name.
• Session isolation, no cross-session context is ever assembled.
• Optional PII redaction before any provider call: enable builtin patterns (card, email, phone, aadhaar, ssn) plus your own regexes, and only the masked copy reaches the LLM; sessions, audit, and human handover keep the true transcript.

app = AgentApp.from_config("agents/", redaction="policies/redaction.yaml")

# policies/redaction.yaml
builtin: [card, email, phone]
custom: { loan_ref: "LN-\\d{6}" }

• CI runs bandit and pip-audit on every commit.

Found something? See SECURITY.md, coordinated disclosure, 72-hour acknowledgement.

For AI coding agents

Point your agent at llms.txt / llms-full.txt, or hand it AGENTS.md, exact setup, verification commands, and conventions, written to work first-try.

Status & roadmap

Beta. Core runtime, all six plugins (guardrails, evals, feedback, audit, synthetics, channels), and the CLI (zolva validate | eval --gate | synthetics --gate | scorecard | dashboard | serve | triage | export-dataset) are implemented and tested (188 tests, mypy --strict, 3-version CI matrix). Agents with a guardrails: or evals: field in their YAML get them wired automatically by AgentApp.from_config.

Before 1.0:

• Docs site at zolva.ai
• More ChannelAdapter implementations (Twilio, telephony) and ticketing-system handover backends (the interfaces and an ElevenLabs voice adapter ship; more adapters welcome)
• Judge model configured per policy

Design docs: docs/specs/ · Full architecture, threat model, and competitive positioning included.

Contributing

Every PR: pytest -q && ruff check . && mypy all green, tests first, conventional commits. See AGENTS.md for the full contract, it binds humans and AI contributors alike.

License

Apache-2.0