Aegis-DevOps

Stop AI agents from running kubectl delete, terraform destroy or DROP TABLE because a ticket told them to.

Aegis-DevOps checks every command an agent wants to run before it runs, and blocks it if your policy says no. A policy rule only counts if nobody has edited it since it was signed, and if its author was allowed to write that kind of rule. So a planted line in a Jira ticket can't become policy.

Install in Claude Code

pip install aegis-devops && aegis init .aegis
claude plugin marketplace add moneytool/aegis-devops
claude plugin install aegis-devops@aegis-devops

Install in Gemini CLI

pip install aegis-devops && aegis init .aegis
gemini extensions install https://github.com/moneytool/aegis-devops

Codex, GitHub Copilot (CLI and VS Code), Cursor and OpenCode: aegis install codex|copilot|vscode|cursor|opencode (see Coding agents). It only acts in projects with a .aegis/ policy, and only blocks what that policy blocks. It also works as a CI step (aegis check terraform plan.json --exit-style ci) and as a Python library; see Quick start.

What it does

Aegis intercepts a proposed agent action — a kubectl/terraform/aws/... invocation or a plan file — and checks it against a Constraint Store before it runs, returning ALLOW, BLOCK, or ESCALATE with citations. Unlike a naive policy engine, every constraint in the store must independently pass an integrity check (has it been tampered with since ingestion?) and an authority check (was its source ever allowed to assert this kind of policy?), so a poisoned Jira ticket or a forged Slack message can't quietly become law. It covers 20 CLI/plan targets today — Kubernetes, Terraform/OpenTofu, the three major clouds, Helm/ArgoCD/Flux, Git/GitHub, SQL/migrations, and Pulumi — through one shared intent schema.

Quick start

Requires Python 3.11+ (tested on 3.11, 3.13 and 3.14 on Linux and macOS).

pip install aegis-devops
aegis init ./.aegis

aegis init writes the example policy files (constraints, authority map, environment map, plan constraints, signed sources) into a directory. Putting them in ./.aegis means the CLI finds them with no flags and no environment variable — see Configuration for the full search order. Then check a command:

aegis check kubectl --now 2026-03-16T10:00:00-05:00 --pretty -- \
    kubectl scale deployment/api-server --replicas=5 -n prod

BLOCK: kubernetes scale deployment/api-server
  citations: no-scale-prod-peak
  covered: True  latency_ms: 0.20
PLAN BLOCK: 1 intent(s)
STORE: loaded=29 quarantined=0 principals=3
  warning: using example signing key

The warning is real and deliberate: the shipped policy files are signed with a public demo key that ships beside them, so the CLI verifies them out of the box while telling you it used a key everyone has. aegis init prints the two commands that replace it with your own — see Signing. The example rules are a demo, not a starting policy; replace constraints.example.yaml with your own constraints.yaml (a real file wins over the .example one when both exist).

From a clone

python -m venv venv
venv/bin/python -m pip install -e ".[dev]"
venv/bin/python examples/demo.py

examples/demo.py runs 15 intents across every supported tool through the interceptor and prints each decision, starting with the store's health. A clone already has data/, so the CLI finds its policy files without aegis init.

Exit codes, store health, the Claude Code hook, argv parsing, compound commands, dry runs and library usage are all in docs/cli.md.

How a decision is made

At load time, ConstraintStore.load parses the constraint YAML, verifies each provenance_hash, and (with --sources) re-fetches and checks the original source — anything that fails either check is quarantined, not silently dropped.

At decision time, AegisInterceptor.intercept matches each intent against the surviving constraints on (provider, resource_pattern, action, scope, time_window), re-checks integrity and authority (authority can be revoked after ingestion), applies any rate limit against the decision ledger, downgrades a dry run to ALLOW, and takes the highest-precedence effect (BLOCK > ESCALATE > ALLOW) among what's left. A PlanConstraint then runs once more over the whole batch of intents from one plan/chart/invocation.

Supported tools

Every target below is checked with aegis check <target> [flags] -- <argv...>, except terraform/tofu/pulumi-preview, which take a JSON document path instead of --.

Results

scripts/benchmark.py runs Aegis and several baselines over the labeled 500-constraint corpus in data/corpus/ (323 distinct rule structures), on 120 held-out intents, scored against an oracle that never imports Aegis's own code. The full table (precision/recall/F1, latency, coverage) and methodology are in docs/benchmark.md; the columns that matter most are summarized below.

poison-susceptibility (ps + pe) is the fraction of poisoned rules — constraints an unauthorized/tampered/forged author slipped in — that moved a verdict at all, split by kind; ps_unauth + pe_unauth isolates the realistic pre-ingest attacker (an unauthorized principal). It's the headline column because signing a policy bundle proves it wasn't altered in transit, not that its author was ever allowed to write the rule — opa-signed scores 1.000 on it for exactly that reason, while Aegis's independent authority check scores 0.000.

The codex* and claude-cli* rows are agent harnesses wrapped around a model, not raw completions — seven models across two vendors (Claude Haiku 4.5, Sonnet 5, Opus 5 and Fable 5.1; GPT gpt-6-astra, gpt-6-sol and gpt-6-luna), each verified before its run to be the model that actually answered. For context-window and cost reasons they, and the local model, are shown only the corpus's 100-constraint holdout subset, so they are scored against the oracle over those same 100 rules (19 poison candidates rather than 30); aegis-holdout runs Aegis on the same 100 for a like-for-like row. Compare rows within one "rules" value. On that basis model size and vendor do not change the picture: six of the seven models act on every poisoned rule they are shown, gpt-6-luna on 15 of 19, and Aegis on none. A model can reason about who wrote a rule, but it cannot recompute a hash or fetch a source. Up to v0.1.5 these rows were scored against all 500 rules, which counted rules the models never saw as resisted poison and understated their susceptibility (0.23–0.33); see CHANGELOG.md.

Why not OPA/Gatekeeper?

OPA/Gatekeeper evaluates structured API objects against hand-authored rules. Aegis derives unstructured human constraints (from Slack, Jira, Git) and applies authority-driven validation to the agent's intent before it reaches the infrastructure.

How it compares

Other tools stop destructive commands in coding agents, and cover more agents and more kinds of command than Aegis does today. The difference is where the rules come from: Aegis treats every rule as a claim that has to be checked (was it changed since it was signed, does its cited source back it, was its author allowed to write that kind of rule), because in an agent's context a rule can arrive from a ticket or a chat message as easily as from you.

"—" means the project's README does not describe it. Checked against each project's README on 2026-09-27; corrections welcome.

Project status / roadmap

The engine (constraint store, interceptor, environment mapping, dry-run handling, rate limits, plan-level constraints, and parsers for every tool in "Supported tools") is complete, and v0.2.0 is on PyPI as an alpha. Real LLM baselines have been run: Claude Sonnet 5 through the API (cached in results/llm-external.md), Haiku through the Claude Code CLI, gpt-6-astra through the Codex CLI, and a local mistral:latest.

What is not done is the part the threat model leans on hardest. See docs/dev/PLAN.md §8, but in short: a rule may now cite a signed commit in a policy repository, whose verified signer becomes its principal (Git sources, SSH or GPG signatures), but file sources, the key-to-principal list and the other policy files still rest on a shared signing secret rather than per-principal public keys, and there are no Slack/Jira connectors. Until those land, Aegis demonstrates that the decision procedure is sound; it proves the identities feeding it only for Git-sourced rules. Resource matching is also case-sensitive on names. It is not production-ready: read docs/dev/PLAN.md §8 for the full list of open gaps before putting it in front of anything you care about.

Documentation

Development

venv/bin/python -m pytest -q      # 1257 passed (last full green run; CI runs this on 3.11/3.13/3.14)
venv/bin/python -m ruff check src tests scripts examples
vhs docs/demo.tape                # regenerate docs/demo.gif

Adding a new parser or tool: see docs/CONTRIBUTING.md. Reporting a bypass: see SECURITY.md — parser evasion is the largest attack surface and the most useful thing to report. Release history is in CHANGELOG.md.

License

Apache-2.0 — see LICENSE.