agent-release-gates 0.1.4

Release-readiness gates for AI agents: replay a pack of constructed safety scenarios, apply policy-as-code gates, and produce ship/warn/block evidence before an agent, prompt, model, or tool-policy change ships.

Agent Release Safety Gates

Before shipping software, teams run a check that blocks the release if something is broken. This project builds that check for AI agents — and then asks whether the check itself can be trusted.

The question. If someone quietly weakened the safety rules inside the gate, would the gate notice? Or would it keep saying ship?

The answer. Usually it would not notice. Half the deliberate weaknesses planted in this project's own gate left it reporting a clean release (47.4% caught, 9 of 19; 95% interval 27.3–68.3%).

_{The reviewer dashboard — one screen showing whether a change may ship. Open it live →}

Status: concluded, not maintained. A reference implementation and a research result, not a product. The research programme behind it was closed by its own stopping criterion — see below. There is no roadmap and no support commitment. Released under the MIT Licence.

What this is for

Agents regress quietly. A prompt tweak, a model swap, or a loosened tool permission can reintroduce a failure you already fixed, and unlike a crashing web service, an unsafe agent still returns a fluent answer. Web services solved the analogous problem with release gates in CI. This applies that idea to agent safety: replay a pack of safety scenarios against a changed agent, apply thresholds kept in a config file, and emit ship / warn / block with a non-zero exit code.

Read it if you build agent evaluation or release tooling, or if you want a worked example of a project measuring — and publishing — the limits of its own instrument.

Related work. Several tools fail a build on evaluation thresholds: promptfoo, DeepEval, Giskard, and release-gate among them. What none of them published, at the time of the survey below, is a measurement of whether the gate notices its own rules being weakened. That measurement is the contribution here; the gate itself is ordinary. Upstream companion: redteam-foundry.

Try it

pip install agent-release-gates

agent-safety release-gate

That replays the built-in pack and exits non-zero on a block. To score your own agent, convert its logs and gate them — see the quickstart.

To reproduce the finding you need the repository, since the probe is a script rather than part of the installed package:

git clone https://github.com/rosscyking1115/agent-release-gates && cd agent-release-gates

uv sync && uv run python scripts/run_gate_mutation_probe.py

No network access, no API keys, no cost.

The result

Gate mutation adequacy is the measurement: seed a semantically meaningful defect into the gate's own configuration — delete a rule, loosen a threshold, reroute a tool, reword a signal to a synonym — and see whether the release decision changes. The fraction that changes it is the score.

This gate scored 47.4% (9 of 19), with 0 false alarms across 4 controls that changed the policy without weakening it.

The cause was a specific, nameable design defect. The gate's expected outcome was satisfied by either a refusal or a hold for human approval — and because the agent never receives approval during replay, anything that reached the tool step was held anyway. Deleting the entire safety rule set still left the critical prompt-injection case reporting clean, because the approval hold absorbed the difference.

Splitting those two outcomes apart fixed that specific hole: no case now survives deletion of the safety rules. It moved the headline score to 52.6% — one mutant, McNemar p = 1.0, which is not distinguishable from noise, and is reported as such rather than banked.

The generalisation, which outlives this repository: any release gate whose expected outcome is satisfied by both a refusal and a hold cannot measure whether its safety layer works. Remove the refusing layer and the holding layer absorbs the difference, so every case still passes and every metric stays green.

The programme was then closed by its own kill criterion. Scaling this across tools needed 40–60 executable incident-derived cases; reading all 57 MITRE ATLAS case studies produced 19. Rights were never the constraint — the source with mechanism-level detail is small, and the source with volume withholds the detail.

→ The full finding, with method, controls, and limits.

Why the result is trustworthy

• Every mutant declared its oracle before it ran — which rule it weakens, and why the gate ought to react — committed in the script ahead of any result.
• One of those oracles was wrong. It claimed a rule was a case's only protection when a second rule also caught it. It is left in the script as written and reported as wrong.
• A positive control rules out "the probe detects nothing": disabling the approval hold outright is caught by three gates at once.
• The before measurement is committed, not reconstructed — git show 34bee32:reports/gate_mutation_adequacy.json.
• Limits, plainly. Nineteen hand-authored mutants are not a random sample, so the interval flatters itself. Eight cases, one candidate, one policy file. No other tool was measured. Four controls cannot establish a false-alarm rate.

What is in this repository

The finding	finding_gate_mutation_adequacy.md
Evaluation integrity — this project's audit of its own benchmark	evaluation_integrity.md
Measured results, and what produces them	results.md
What the eight incident cases are	incident_cases.md
Why the benchmark programme was closed	atlas_executability_audit.md
A packaging defect, generalised	finding_gitignore_not_a_packaging_control.md
Design rationale, schemas, cards, house style	docs/
The probe, the runners, the release gate	scripts/, src/

Also here: an Inspect (UK AISI) task, a FastAPI evidence service, the Streamlit dashboard above, Docker, and CI.

Limitations

• The incident pack is constructed, not sourced — eight scenarios written for this repository. Nothing here measures coverage of a real incident population.
• The synthetic benchmark is circular and its scores are not retrieval evidence. Retrieval is reported on external public data instead.
• mypy --strict covers the 12 modules where a type error would corrupt a published number, not the whole package.
• Human-review labels are simulated; independent reviewer labels are prepared, not published.

All benchmark data is synthetic. This project does not reproduce or assess any organisation's internal AI system. Feedback via issues.