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agentcheckup
Diagnose your agent setup before your agent does.
Every other MCP tool looks at one server. None of them look at what happens when you load five.
$ agentcheckup
agentcheckup 0.4.0 | 3 server(s) | 4 tool(s) | ~442 tokens per request
Grade C Score 79/100 1 error 2 warning 1 info
CONFLICTS (1)
AGT201 Tool name 'read_file' is exposed by both 'files' and 'git'.
[files/read_file <-> git/read_file]
fix: Hard collision: the client keeps one and the other is
unreachable. Rename one, or use a gateway that prefixes.
RISKS (2)
AGT101 Server 'github' runs unpinned npx package
'@modelcontextprotocol/server-github'.
AGT107 Server 'github' stores credential(s) inline:
GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN.
NUDGES (1 across 1 rule(s), no score impact)
AGT105 Server did not return a tool list (1)
github
The problem nobody is testing for
Two servers cannot see each other. Your model can. It gets a flat list of 47
tools from five servers and picks by description similarity — with no way to know
that files.read_file and git.read_file are different things.
Three failure modes follow, and no existing tool catches them:
1. Hard collision. Two servers expose the same tool name. The client keeps one, the other is silently unreachable. You spend an afternoon debugging "why won't it read the file" when the answer is "it's calling the other one".
2. Soft collision. github.search and docs.search with 70% overlapping
descriptions. Selection becomes a coin flip that looks exactly like model
flakiness. It isn't — it's your manifest.
3. Context tax. An agent pays for the full tool manifest on every request. 47 tools with 200-character descriptions is thousands of tokens before the user says anything. Nobody budgets for it because nobody measures it.
agentcheckup measures all three, in one command, from the configs you already
have.
What it checks
| Layer | Question it answers | Rules |
|---|---|---|
| Conflicts | Will my agent pick the wrong tool? | AGT201–AGT203 |
| Risks | Is my setup unsafe? | AGT001–AGT107 |
| Budget | What does my manifest cost per request? | reported on every run |
36 rules in total. Full reference: docs/rules.md.
Install
pip install agentcheckup
# or run without installing
uvx agentcheckup
Python 3.10+. Zero runtime dependencies — no SDK, no tokenizer, no embeddings, no network calls. It reads JSON, starts processes, prints text.
Usage
One command, no arguments
agentcheckup
Finds your configs automatically — 26 known locations across Claude Desktop,
Claude Code (including its per-project mcpServers), Cursor, VS Code, Cline,
Roo Code, Kilo Code, Windsurf, Zed, Codex CLI and Continue, plus project-local
.mcp.json / .cursor/mcp.json / .vscode/mcp.json — starts each server,
collects its tools, and reports.
Servers that fail to start are reported as AGT105 and skipped, not fatal. A
broken server should not stop you auditing the other four.
Common flags
agentcheckup --no-spawn # configs only, no processes started
agentcheckup --config path.json # add a config the discovery missed
agentcheckup --no-discover # audit only what you passed with --config
agentcheckup --timeout 40 # slow server? give it longer
agentcheckup --format json # machine-readable
agentcheckup --fail-on warning # CI gate
One server at a time
agentcheckup scan tools.json # {"tools": [...]}, {"result": {...}} or a log
agentcheckup scan --cmd "python my_server.py" # live stdio handshake
agentcheckup config ~/.claude.json # config rules only
agentcheckup rules # list every rule
As a GitHub Action
The fastest way to keep a manifest from regressing, and the version you pin is the version you run — the action installs from its own checkout.
- uses: jiaqinq/agentcheckup@v0.4.3
with:
config: .mcp.json
fail-on: warning
Full reference, including SARIF upload and score gates: docs/github-action.md.
Raw CLI in CI
- name: Diagnose agent setup
run: |
pip install agentcheckup
agentcheckup --no-spawn --fail-on warning
For GitHub code scanning, emit SARIF:
- run: agentcheckup --format sarif --fail-on never > agentcheckup.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
with:
sarif_file: agentcheckup.sarif
One run can produce all three outputs:
agentcheckup --format text --json-out report.json --sarif-out report.sarif
Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 findings at or above --fail-on, 2 usage/load error.
How conflicts are detected
No embeddings, no model, no network — because a linter that needs a 200MB wheel is a linter that stops running on a plane.
Each tool pair across servers is scored on two signals:
- name overlap — normalised token Jaccard (
read_files≡read_file) - description overlap — token Jaccard over stopword-stripped, plural-stemmed words
Chinese is tokenised as character bigrams (读取文件 → 读取, 取文, 文件) rather
than by a segmenter, because a segmenter is a dependency. It is cruder than a real
word split, but without it every Chinese description produced an empty token set
and two Chinese tools could never be compared at all.
A pair is flagged when the descriptions overlap ≥ 65% and the names share a
head noun, or when the blended score clears 0.55. The shared-noun requirement is
what keeps search_repositories and search_documents apart — without it the
false-positive rate made the report untrustworthy, which is worse than no report.
It is a heuristic, and the docs say so. AGT203 is a warning, not a verdict.
How the score works
Most linters fail here: a rule that fires on 18 of 18 tools is a preference, not a defect, and charging one point each scores the official MCP servers 0/100. That number is useless, so the model is calibrated instead of invented:
| Severity | Cost | Why |
|---|---|---|
error |
10 | breaks a run, or endangers the host |
warning |
3 | likely to cause wrong behaviour |
info |
1, capped at 10 total | a human should decide |
Budget is 20 points per tool, so a 200-tool manifest is not punished for being large, and a 4-tool manifest with one hard collision is not let off easy.
Calibration against four real inputs:
| Input | Tools | Result |
|---|---|---|
| Clean fixture | 2 | A · 100 |
Official fetch + git + time servers |
18 | B · 87 |
| Hard collision + unpinned package + plaintext token | 4 | C · 79 |
| Deliberately broken fixture | 7 | F · 36 |
Repeated findings are collapsed: 12 tools missing parameter descriptions print as one line naming all twelve, and info findings are summarised one line per rule. A report nobody can read is a report nobody acts on.
Design principles
- Zero runtime dependencies. A diagnostic that breaks because a transitive dep broke is worse than no diagnostic.
- Stable rule IDs.
AGT201never changes meaning. Suppressions and CI thresholds keep working across releases. - Every finding has a fix. A rule that only says "this is bad" trains people to ignore the output.
- Degrade, don't die. A server that will not start is one finding, not an aborted run.
- No network calls of its own. No telemetry, no API, no upload; your config
never leaves the machine. It does start the servers you configured, and those
can do whatever they were written to do —
--no-spawnskips that entirely. - Heuristics are labelled as heuristics.
infomeans "a human should decide". The score is a conversation starter, not a certification.
What this is not
- Not a sandbox. It tells you the manifest looks risky; it cannot stop the server.
- Not a runtime guard. Nothing here runs during an agent session.
- Not an MCP protocol validator. It checks quality and safety, not conformance —
the official
modelcontextprotocol/conformancesuite does that.
Further reading
- 多个 MCP Server 一起使用时,如何检测工具冲突? — the design story, in Chinese: why the scope changed from a single-server linter to cross-server conflicts, and how the scoring was rebuilt after it graded the official servers 0/100.
Contributing
Adding a rule takes about ten minutes and one small file — see CONTRIBUTING.md. Rules and client adapters are the whole point of this project, so those PRs are the most welcome kind.
License
MIT
Metadata
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