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agentcheckup

Diagnose your agent setup before your agent does.

CI PyPI Python License: MIT

Every other MCP tool looks at one server. None of them look at what happens when you load five.

$ agentcheckup

agentcheckup 0.4.0  |  3 server(s)  |  4 tool(s)  |  ~442 tokens per request

  Grade C    Score  79/100   1 error  2 warning  1 info

  CONFLICTS (1)
    AGT201  Tool name 'read_file' is exposed by both 'files' and 'git'.
            [files/read_file <-> git/read_file]
            fix: Hard collision: the client keeps one and the other is
                 unreachable. Rename one, or use a gateway that prefixes.

  RISKS (2)
    AGT101  Server 'github' runs unpinned npx package
            '@modelcontextprotocol/server-github'.
    AGT107  Server 'github' stores credential(s) inline:
            GITHUB_PERSONAL_ACCESS_TOKEN.

  NUDGES (1 across 1 rule(s), no score impact)
    AGT105  Server did not return a tool list  (1)
            github

The problem nobody is testing for

Two servers cannot see each other. Your model can. It gets a flat list of 47 tools from five servers and picks by description similarity — with no way to know that files.read_file and git.read_file are different things.

Three failure modes follow, and no existing tool catches them:

1. Hard collision. Two servers expose the same tool name. The client keeps one, the other is silently unreachable. You spend an afternoon debugging "why won't it read the file" when the answer is "it's calling the other one".

2. Soft collision. github.search and docs.search with 70% overlapping descriptions. Selection becomes a coin flip that looks exactly like model flakiness. It isn't — it's your manifest.

3. Context tax. An agent pays for the full tool manifest on every request. 47 tools with 200-character descriptions is thousands of tokens before the user says anything. Nobody budgets for it because nobody measures it.

agentcheckup measures all three, in one command, from the configs you already have.

What it checks

Layer Question it answers Rules
Conflicts Will my agent pick the wrong tool? AGT201–AGT203
Risks Is my setup unsafe? AGT001–AGT107
Budget What does my manifest cost per request? reported on every run

36 rules in total. Full reference: docs/rules.md.

Install

pip install agentcheckup
# or run without installing
uvx agentcheckup

Python 3.10+. Zero runtime dependencies — no SDK, no tokenizer, no embeddings, no network calls. It reads JSON, starts processes, prints text.

Usage

One command, no arguments

agentcheckup

Finds your configs automatically — 26 known locations across Claude Desktop, Claude Code (including its per-project mcpServers), Cursor, VS Code, Cline, Roo Code, Kilo Code, Windsurf, Zed, Codex CLI and Continue, plus project-local .mcp.json / .cursor/mcp.json / .vscode/mcp.json — starts each server, collects its tools, and reports.

Servers that fail to start are reported as AGT105 and skipped, not fatal. A broken server should not stop you auditing the other four.

Common flags

agentcheckup --no-spawn          # configs only, no processes started
agentcheckup --config path.json  # add a config the discovery missed
agentcheckup --no-discover       # audit only what you passed with --config
agentcheckup --timeout 40        # slow server? give it longer
agentcheckup --format json       # machine-readable
agentcheckup --fail-on warning   # CI gate

One server at a time

agentcheckup scan tools.json                    # {"tools": [...]}, {"result": {...}} or a log
agentcheckup scan --cmd "python my_server.py"   # live stdio handshake
agentcheckup config ~/.claude.json              # config rules only
agentcheckup rules                              # list every rule

As a GitHub Action

The fastest way to keep a manifest from regressing, and the version you pin is the version you run — the action installs from its own checkout.

- uses: jiaqinq/agentcheckup@v0.8.0
  with:
    config: .mcp.json
    fail-on: warning

Full reference, including SARIF upload and score gates: docs/github-action.md.

Raw CLI in CI

- name: Diagnose agent setup
  run: |
    pip install agentcheckup
    agentcheckup --no-spawn --fail-on warning

For GitHub code scanning, emit SARIF:

- run: agentcheckup --format sarif --fail-on never > agentcheckup.sarif
- uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v4
  with:
    sarif_file: agentcheckup.sarif

One run can produce all three outputs:

agentcheckup --format text --json-out report.json --sarif-out report.sarif

Exit codes: 0 clean, 1 findings at or above --fail-on, 2 usage/load error.

How conflicts are detected

No embeddings, no model, no network — because a linter that needs a 200MB wheel is a linter that stops running on a plane.

Each tool pair across servers is scored on two signals:

  • name overlap — normalised token Jaccard (read_files ≡ read_file)
  • description overlap — token Jaccard over stopword-stripped, plural-stemmed words

Chinese is tokenised as character bigrams (读取文件 → 读取, 取文, 文件) rather than by a segmenter, because a segmenter is a dependency. It is cruder than a real word split, but without it every Chinese description produced an empty token set and two Chinese tools could never be compared at all.

A pair is flagged when the descriptions overlap ≥ 65% and the names share a head noun, or when the blended score clears 0.55. The shared-noun requirement is what keeps search_repositories and search_documents apart — without it the false-positive rate made the report untrustworthy, which is worse than no report.

It is a heuristic, and the docs say so. AGT203 is a warning, not a verdict.

One client's filesystem is not another's

Cursor and Codex each load only their own config. Two servers with the same name in different clients are not an unreachable duplicate — nothing ever loads both lists at once — so that case is reported as information, not as an error:

AGT204  Tool name 'read_file' exists in both 'Cursor' and 'Codex CLI'.
        Separate clients, separate configs: they are never loaded together.

Within one client the same name is still AGT201 (error). When the client is unknown the strict answer wins: better to warn twice than to downgrade a real collision because a label was missing.

One client's filesystem is not another's

Cursor and Codex each load only their own config. Two servers with the same name in different clients are not an unreachable duplicate — nothing ever loads both lists at once — so that case is reported as information, not as an error:

AGT204  Tool name 'read_file' exists in both 'Cursor' and 'Codex CLI'.
        Separate clients, separate configs: they are never loaded together.

Within one client the same name is still AGT201 (error). When the client is unknown the strict answer wins: better to warn twice than to downgrade a real collision because a label was missing.

Adopting it on an existing project

The first run on a real repository finds things that were there before you arrived. Failing CI on all of them means the tool never gets turned on. Record them once, then fail only on what is new:

$ agentcheckup audit --write-baseline .agentcheckup-baseline.json
agentcheckup: recorded 8 finding(s) in .agentcheckup-baseline.json

$ agentcheckup audit --baseline .agentcheckup-baseline.json
baseline: 8 known finding(s) withheld
  Grade A    Score 100/100   clean

The baseline is plain JSON listing what it suppresses, so a reviewer can see what was accepted. Fingerprints ignore severity — escalating a rule does not orphan every entry — and an unreadable baseline is a usage error rather than a silent no-op.

Commit the file. Regenerate it when you fix things, so the list only shrinks.

Pick your clients

agentcheckup audit --client cursor --client codex

Repeatable, case-insensitive substring against the discovered client labels. An unmatched name exits 2 rather than printing an empty report — "found nothing" and "you typed it wrong" should not look alike.

Look before it runs

audit starts every server in your config to read its tool list. That is what makes cross-server conflict detection possible, and it is also the part worth being careful about. --dry-run shows exactly what would be executed and stops:

$ agentcheckup audit --dry-run

Would start 2 server(s) from 1 config(s):

  files                python /opt/mcp/files.py
  github               npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-github --api-key <redacted>

Nothing was executed.

Credentials are masked, so the preview is safe to paste into an issue. --no-spawn goes further: it audits the configuration and never starts anything, at the cost of no tool or conflict findings.

--probe is the explicit "yes, start them" acknowledgement. It does not change what runs today; it exists so that requiring it later is a documented migration rather than a surprise.

Coverage

A server that never answered is not a clean server. The report says which is which:

coverage: 2/3 server(s) inspected (67%), 1 unverified

servers_inspected, servers_unverified and coverage are in the JSON output too. Findings from an unverified server are reported as AGT105, never as "nothing wrong found".

Does it scale?

detect_conflicts groups by exact name and by normalised name, so hard collisions cost O(n) rather than O(n²). Only the soft-overlap phase enumerates pairs, from a token index, rarest tokens first, under a budget.

Measured with scripts/perf.py on a synthetic manifest:

tools pairs old peak now peak now time planted collision found
50 1,225 0 MiB 0 MiB 0.015 s yes
200 19,900 1 MiB 0 MiB 0.186 s yes
1,000 499,500 30 MiB 5 MiB 2.6 s yes
5,000 12,497,500 763 MiB 8 MiB 2.7 s yes

"old peak" is list(combinations(refs, 2)) alone — what the first version allocated before filtering anything.

How well does conflict detection work?

Measured, not asserted. tests/fixtures/collision_benchmark.json holds 44 hand-labelled tool pairs — 20 that should be flagged, 24 that should not — and scripts/benchmark.py scores the detector against them:

value
pairs 44 (20 positive, 24 negative)
precision 0.952
recall 1.000
F1 0.976

The one disagreement is a pair like lookup_contact / lookup_user with near-identical descriptions: the detector flags it, the label says it should not. That is arguably the detector being right and the label being strict.

Two honest caveats. The labels are the author's, not users' — the criterion was "would a model picking the wrong one get a materially different result". And this benchmark did not exist before 0.4.4; the earlier claim of "zero false positives" came from running on 18 tools that contained no conflicts at all, which measured nothing. tests/test_benchmark.py fails the build if precision or recall drops below 0.90.

How the score works

Most linters fail here: a rule that fires on 18 of 18 tools is a preference, not a defect, and charging one point each scores the official MCP servers 0/100. That number is useless, so the model is calibrated instead of invented:

Severity Cost Why
error 10 breaks a run, or endangers the host
warning 3 likely to cause wrong behaviour
info 1, capped at 10 total a human should decide

Budget is 20 points per tool, so a 200-tool manifest is not punished for being large, and a 4-tool manifest with one hard collision is not let off easy.

Calibration against four real inputs:

Input Tools Result
Clean fixture 2 A · 100
Official fetch + git + time servers 18 B · 87
Hard collision + unpinned package + plaintext token 4 C · 79
Deliberately broken fixture 7 F · 36

Repeated findings are collapsed: 12 tools missing parameter descriptions print as one line naming all twelve, and info findings are summarised one line per rule. A report nobody can read is a report nobody acts on.

Design principles

  • Zero runtime dependencies. A diagnostic that breaks because a transitive dep broke is worse than no diagnostic.
  • Stable rule IDs. AGT201 never changes meaning. Suppressions and CI thresholds keep working across releases.
  • Every finding has a fix. A rule that only says "this is bad" trains people to ignore the output.
  • Degrade, don't die. A server that will not start is one finding, not an aborted run.
  • No network calls of its own. No telemetry, no API, no upload; your config never leaves the machine. It does start the servers you configured, and those can do whatever they were written to do — --no-spawn skips that entirely.
  • Heuristics are labelled as heuristics. info means "a human should decide". The score is a conversation starter, not a certification.

What this is not

  • Not a sandbox. It tells you the manifest looks risky; it cannot stop the server.
  • Not a runtime guard. Nothing here runs during an agent session.
  • Not an MCP protocol validator. It checks quality and safety, not conformance — the official modelcontextprotocol/conformance suite does that.

Further reading

Contributing

Adding a rule takes about ten minutes and one small file — see CONTRIBUTING.md. Rules and client adapters are the whole point of this project, so those PRs are the most welcome kind.

License

MIT

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