Allela SDK
Tamper-evident attestation for AI decisions, timestamped with an RFC 3161 token from DigiCert's timestamp authority.
Quickstart
Create a project folder and a virtual environment, then install Allela.
macOS / Linux:
mkdir allela-quickstart && cd allela-quickstart
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install allela
Windows (PowerShell):
mkdir allela-quickstart; cd allela-quickstart
py -m venv .venv
.venv\Scripts\Activate.ps1
pip install allela
Windows note: if
Activate.ps1is blocked ("running scripts is disabled on this system"), run this once, then activate again:Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser RemoteSigned
Save this as quickstart.py:
import allela
allela.configure(
tenant_id="quickstart",
model_provider="anthropic",
model_id="claude-sonnet-4-6",
model_version="20250929",
)
prompt = "Applicant: income $60,000, requesting $10,000 loan."
answer = "APPROVED: Low risk profile."
# 1. Sign the record and get an RFC 3161 timestamp from DigiCert.
event_id = allela.attest(prompt, answer)
# 2. Look up what was stored.
event = allela.get_event(event_id)
print("event: ", event_id)
print("status: ", event["status"]) # "success" = signed and timestamped
# 3. Verify the record against the original input and output.
result = allela.reconcile(event_id, raw_input=prompt, raw_output=answer)
print("verified: ", result["path"]) # FULL_INTEGRITY_VERIFICATION
print("timestamp:", result["timestamp_imprint_matches"]) # True
Run it:
python quickstart.py
Expected output (your event ID will differ):
event: evt_...
status: success
verified: FULL_INTEGRITY_VERIFICATION
timestamp: True
The first run creates three files in the current folder:
allela_private.key: your Ed25519 signing key. Keep it secret and never commit it.allela_public.key: the matching public key used to verify records.allela_ledger.db: the local, append-only record ledger.
Add *.key and *.db to your .gitignore. Timestamping needs outbound
HTTP access to timestamp.digicert.com; without it, records are still
signed and stored, with status signed_no_tsa.
Using it in your app
Wrap your existing AI call with @allela.trace to attest every call:
import allela
allela.configure(
tenant_id="acme_corp",
model_provider="anthropic",
model_id="claude-sonnet-4-6",
model_version="20250929",
)
@allela.trace(system_prompt="You are a credit risk assistant.")
def make_credit_decision(applicant_profile: str) -> str:
return call_your_llm(applicant_profile) # your existing AI call, unchanged
result = make_credit_decision("Applicant: income $60,000, requesting $10,000 loan.")
# `result` is returned immediately — attestation happens on a background
# thread and does not add latency to your function call.
# Before your process exits, flush any in-flight attestations:
allela.shutdown()
Verifying a decision later
result = allela.reconcile(
event_id="evt_...",
raw_input="Applicant: income $60,000, requesting $10,000 loan.",
raw_output="APPROVED: Low risk profile.",
)
print(result["path"])
result["path"] is one of:
FULL_INTEGRITY_VERIFICATION: the stored record is intact and your data matches it.TAMPER_DETECTED: the stored record is intact, but your data doesn't match it (mismatched_fieldssays which).DATA_UNAVAILABLE_AT_SOURCE: the stored record is intact; no data was supplied to compare.LEDGER_RECORD_INVALID: the stored record failed its signature or root-hash check (failed_checkssays which), so it can't be trusted and nothing was compared.NOT_FOUND: no event with that ID.
result["timestamp_imprint_matches"] only confirms that the stored
timestamp token covers this record's hash. It does not yet verify the
timestamp authority's signature or certificate chain.
What gets stored
Only cryptographic hashes and metadata (model ID/version, timestamps,
a hash of the system prompt) — never your raw input/output text. See
the Decision Event Schema (v1/decision-event.json) for the exact shape.
Important: call allela.shutdown() before exiting
Because attestation runs on a background worker so it never blocks your
application, an attestation that's still in flight when your process
exits abruptly could be lost. Call allela.shutdown() (which flushes
the queue) during your application's graceful shutdown sequence.
shutdown() waits at most timeout seconds (default 30; pass None to
wait indefinitely) and returns True if every attestation was written,
or False if the timeout expired with some still pending — in which
case a warning is logged with the count.
License
Apache License 2.0 — see LICENSE.
Metadata
Release files for allela 0.1.2
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| allela-0.1.2.tar.gz | 16.1 kB | Without provenance | Details for allela-0.1.2.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| allela-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for allela-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 31.1 kB
Release files / allela-0.1.2.tar.gz
| Download URL | allela-0.1.2.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 16.1 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
1bdb21001b571bac10f97ca61a28e56aad86fa64ac9a6da56275ccbf2c42459b
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
c9fa3520bb5cd1306e0b4ded37b7a6e20237c1b41bd7698cd47c48dbc6c6bfed
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.15
|
Release files / allela-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | allela-0.1.2-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 15.0 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
77f29d4e72551d2c26c5dac04cb4a24bba76625d082c47f70e662bfcb58e1155
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
246bc9db7661ce4b12685478340ea31611e79d20d81dc8719529eab3dcae2453
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
No |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.15
|
Security for allela 0.1.2
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
No provenance found
None of the files in this release were uploaded with provenance metadata.
A note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.
To learn more about protecting yourself from malicious actors, visit our package security documentation.