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Allela SDK

Tamper-evident attestation for AI decisions, timestamped with an RFC 3161 token from DigiCert's timestamp authority.

Quickstart

Create a project folder and a virtual environment, then install Allela.

macOS / Linux:

mkdir allela-quickstart && cd allela-quickstart
python3 -m venv .venv
source .venv/bin/activate
pip install allela

Windows (PowerShell):

mkdir allela-quickstart; cd allela-quickstart
py -m venv .venv
.venv\Scripts\Activate.ps1
pip install allela

Windows note: if Activate.ps1 is blocked ("running scripts is disabled on this system"), run this once, then activate again:

Set-ExecutionPolicy -Scope CurrentUser RemoteSigned

Save this as quickstart.py:

import allela

allela.configure(
    tenant_id="quickstart",
    model_provider="anthropic",
    model_id="claude-sonnet-4-6",
    model_version="20250929",
)

prompt = "Applicant: income $60,000, requesting $10,000 loan."
answer = "APPROVED: Low risk profile."

# 1. Sign the record and get an RFC 3161 timestamp from DigiCert.
event_id = allela.attest(prompt, answer)

# 2. Look up what was stored.
event = allela.get_event(event_id)
print("event:    ", event_id)
print("status:   ", event["status"])  # "success" = signed and timestamped

# 3. Verify the record against the original input and output.
result = allela.reconcile(event_id, raw_input=prompt, raw_output=answer)
print("verified: ", result["path"])   # FULL_INTEGRITY_VERIFICATION
print("timestamp:", result["timestamp_imprint_matches"])  # True

Run it:

python quickstart.py

Expected output (your event ID will differ):

event:     evt_...
status:    success
verified:  FULL_INTEGRITY_VERIFICATION
timestamp: True

The first run creates three files in the current folder:

  • allela_private.key: your Ed25519 signing key. Keep it secret and never commit it.
  • allela_public.key: the matching public key used to verify records.
  • allela_ledger.db: the local, tamper-evident record ledger. Each decision record is signed and hashed. UPDATE and DELETE on its decision_events table are blocked by database triggers, which anyone with access to the file can remove; its intent_gaps table has no such triggers.

Back up allela_private.key: records can only be verified with the key that signed them. If the key file is missing while allela_ledger.db exists, configure() raises SigningKeyMissingError instead of creating a new key. If the key doesn't verify the ledger's newest record (a different key, or an altered record), configure() raises LedgerKeyCheckError and changes nothing. get_event, list_events and reconcile raise LedgerNotFoundError if the ledger file doesn't exist, rather than creating an empty one.

Add *.key and *.db to your .gitignore. Timestamping needs outbound HTTP access to timestamp.digicert.com; without it, records are still signed and stored, with status signed_no_tsa.

Using it in your app

Wrap your existing AI call with @allela.trace to attest each call to the function you wrap (see "What is not captured" for when a record can't be written):

import allela

allela.configure(
    tenant_id="acme_corp",
    model_provider="anthropic",
    model_id="claude-sonnet-4-6",
    model_version="20250929",
)

@allela.trace(system_prompt="You are a credit risk assistant.")
def make_credit_decision(applicant_profile: str) -> str:
    return call_your_llm(applicant_profile)  # your existing AI call, unchanged

result = make_credit_decision("Applicant: income $60,000, requesting $10,000 loan.")
# `result` is returned immediately — attestation happens on a background
# thread and does not add latency to your function call.

# Before your process exits, flush any in-flight attestations:
allela.shutdown()

Verifying a decision later

Allela stores only hashes, never your raw inputs and outputs. Keeping the original inputs and outputs is up to you. To verify a decision later, you hand them back to reconcile(), which checks them against the signed record.

Save this as verify_example.py:

import allela

allela.configure(
    tenant_id="acme_corp",
    model_provider="anthropic",
    model_id="claude-sonnet-4-6",
    model_version="20250929",
)

@allela.trace(system_prompt="You are a credit risk assistant.")
def make_credit_decision(applicant_profile: str) -> str:
    return "APPROVED: Low risk profile."  # stand-in for your model call

applicant = "Applicant: income $60,000, requesting $10,000 loan."
decision = make_credit_decision(applicant)
# Store `applicant` and `decision` in your own records; Allela keeps only hashes.

# @trace writes its record in the background. shutdown() waits for that write;
# it does not stop Allela, and @trace keeps working afterwards.
allela.shutdown()

# @trace doesn't return the event ID, so look it up: newest first, per tenant.
event_id = allela.list_events("acme_corp", limit=1)[0]["event_id"]

result = allela.reconcile(
    event_id,
    raw_input=allela.trace_input(applicant),   # same arguments as the original call
    raw_output=allela.trace_output(decision),
)
print(result["path"])  # FULL_INTEGRITY_VERIFICATION

Finding the event ID. list_events(tenant_id, limit=20, offset=0) returns event_id, timestamp_utc and status, newest first. Taking the newest event only works if no other traced call ran in between; otherwise match on timestamp_utc. If you need the ID at the moment of the decision, call allela.attest(input_text, output_text) directly instead of using @trace: it returns the event ID.

Rebuilding the input exactly. @trace records the call's arguments in a fixed format, and trace_input() rebuilds it. It only matches if you pass the same values in the same way:

  • Pass plain values (strings, numbers, lists, dicts), or give your objects a stable __str__. An object with Python's default str() includes its memory address, so it never matches.
  • Pass arguments the same way as the original call: if it was make_credit_decision(applicant_profile=x), use trace_input(applicant_profile=x), not trace_input(x). If any keyword value can't be turned into JSON (a Decimal, for example), keyword order matters too.
  • A dict passed positionally is recorded with str(), so its key order matters.

A mismatch from any of these returns TAMPER_DETECTED, the same result as real tampering, so get the arguments right before treating it as an alert.

result["path"] is one of:

  • FULL_INTEGRITY_VERIFICATION: the stored record is intact and your data matches it.
  • TAMPER_DETECTED: the stored record is intact, but your data doesn't match it (mismatched_fields says which).
  • DATA_UNAVAILABLE_AT_SOURCE: the stored record is intact; no data was supplied to compare.
  • LEDGER_RECORD_INVALID: the stored record failed its signature or root-hash check (failed_checks says which), so it can't be trusted and nothing was compared.
  • NOT_FOUND: no event with that ID.

result["timestamp_imprint_matches"] only confirms that the stored timestamp token covers this record's hash. It does not yet verify the timestamp authority's signature or certificate chain.

What gets stored

Only cryptographic hashes and metadata (model ID/version, timestamps, a hash of the system prompt) — never your raw input/output text. See the Decision Event Schema (v1/decision-event.json) for the exact shape.

What is not captured

If an attestation fails, the function still returns its result, the failure is logged to the application log, and no ledger record exists.

Important: call allela.shutdown() before exiting

Because attestation runs on a background worker so it never blocks your application, an attestation that's still in flight when your process exits abruptly could be lost. Call allela.shutdown() (which flushes the queue) during your application's graceful shutdown sequence.

shutdown() only waits for pending records; it doesn't stop Allela, so it is also safe to call mid-run, as in the verification example above.

shutdown() waits at most timeout seconds (default 30; pass None to wait indefinitely) and returns True if every attestation was written, or False if the timeout expired with some still pending — in which case a warning is logged with the count.

License

Apache License 2.0 — see LICENSE.

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