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allus-company-data (Python)

The Python SDK for the allus company-data API. Point it at a JSON config file and it hands back typed, plaintext, your-slug-keyed conclusions: for each connected person, a map of your request-field slug → plaintext value (plus whether the value is live and when it last changed).

The SDK hides everything else — the OAuth token, the field catalog, the id plumbing, the hybrid decryption, binary fetching, the changes-queue mechanics, JSON-vs-XML. The platform is zero-knowledge: the API only ever holds ciphertext, so all decryption happens inside the SDK with your service private key. The person's own field choices are never exposed — you only ever see the request slots you configured.

This SDK is one of six language ports that share an identical API surface. This manual is the Python view of it.

Contents: TL;DR — fetch new updates · Quickstart · Every call · The typed value model · The changes pump · Webhooks · Company documents · Contract-flow runs · Rate limits · Errors · How it's wired

Deeper reference pages live in docs/: config · model · pump · webhooks · errors.


TL;DR — fetch new updates

A system/Homebrew Python refuses a bare pip install (PEP 668) — install into a virtualenv:

python3 -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate   # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
pip install allus-company-data

Point a config.json at your service keys:

{
  "api_url": "https://api.allme.fyi",
  "client_id": "svc_xxx",
  "client_secret": "xxx",
  "service_private_key": "/path/to/service.pem",
  "key_passphrase": "xxx",
  "cache_dir": "./allus-cache"
}

Drain everything new, handled one update at a time:

from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("config.json")

def handle(change):
    # one update at a time: event, person, slug, value, live, at
    print(change.event, change.person_id, change.slug, change.value,
          "live" if change.live else "snapshot", change.at)

client.process_changes(handle)   # returns when the feed is empty

process_changes pulls every pending change, decrypts it, and hands them to your callback ONE BY ONE, acking each only after your code returns. Crash mid-batch? The next run replays exactly what wasn't acked — nothing is lost, and the API keeps no backlog of its own. Run it on a schedule (cron / systemd timer); there is no daemon/follow mode by design. Connections, binary values, and webhooks are documented below.


Quickstart

Requires Python ≥ 3.11. A system/Homebrew Python refuses a bare pip install (PEP 668) — install into a virtualenv:

python3 -m venv .venv && source .venv/bin/activate   # Windows: .venv\Scripts\activate
pip install allus-company-data
# or, working from a clone:    pip install -e '.[dev]'      # from the repo root
python -c "import allus_company_data; print(allus_company_data.__version__)"

1. Write a config file

A single JSON file holds everything. Any field can be overridden by an ALLUS_* env var, so secrets needn't live in the file. No SDK method ever takes a key, passphrase, or secret as an argument — they all come from here.

allus.json:

{
  "api_url": "https://api.allme.fyi",
  "client_id": "svc_1a2b3c…",
  "client_secret": "…",
  "service_private_key": "./service-CRM.pem",
  "key_passphrase": "…",

  "account_private_key": "./account.pem",
  "account_passphrase": "…",

  "webhooks": {
    "wh_abc123": "hmac_secret_for_that_webhook"
  },

  "cache_dir": "./allus-cache",
  "format": "json"
}
Field Required Meaning
api_url yes API base, e.g. https://api.allme.fyi.
client_id / client_secret yes The registered client_credentials credentials for one service.
service_private_key yes Path to the OpenSSL-encrypted PKCS#8 PEM you downloaded from the portal.
key_passphrase yes Decrypts that PEM in memory at startup.
account_private_key / account_passphrase only for encrypt_payload webhooks The company account key, used to unwrap an encrypted webhook envelope.
webhooks / webhook_secret webhook auth — HMAC (default) Per-webhook HMAC secrets keyed by webhook id (matched via the X-Allus-Webhook-Id header). A single-webhook service can use a flat "webhook_secret": "…" instead of the map.
webhook_bearer_token webhook auth — bearer Verify Authorization: Bearer <token> deliveries.
webhook_basic webhook auth — basic {"username","password"} — verify HTTP Basic deliveries.
webhook_header webhook auth — header {"name","value"} — verify a custom-header delivery.
webhook_auth_none webhook auth — none true — explicit opt-out; verifyWebhook always passes (use only behind your own gateway). Configure at most one webhook auth method (two+ → ConfigError).
cache_dir no (default ./allus-cache) Durable local buffer for the changes pump. Must be writable + durable.
format no (default json) Wire format json or xml. Invisible in the output.

Env overrides use the ALLUS_ prefix of the field name, e.g. ALLUS_CLIENT_SECRET, ALLUS_KEY_PASSPHRASE, ALLUS_ACCOUNT_PASSPHRASE, ALLUS_WEBHOOK_SECRET. A missing/invalid config (or an unreadable PEM / wrong passphrase) raises ConfigError at construction — fail fast.

2. First call — list a connection's values

from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

# Iterate every connected person (lazy, auto-paged).
for conn in client.connections():
    print(conn.display_name, conn.person_id)
    for slug, val in conn.values.items():
        print(f"  {slug} = {val.value!r}  (live={val.live}, updated={val.updated_at})")
    break  # just the first one for the demo

Or fetch one connection by id:

conn = client.connection("019xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx")
email = conn.values["work_email"].value        # "alice@acme.com"  (a str)

client = Client.from_env() builds the same client entirely from ALLUS_* env vars (no file).


Every call

Client is the only object you construct. Build it from config, then:

Client.from_config(path, **kwargs) -> Client     # from a JSON file (env overrides secrets)
Client.from_env(**kwargs)          -> Client      # entirely from ALLUS_* env vars

kwargs are advanced/optional: http (an injected HttpClient), logger (a logging.Logger), sleep (a Callable[[float], None], for tests).

request_fields()

request_fields() -> list[RequestField]

Your request-field definitions — fetched once from GET /api/company-data/request-fields and cached for the life of the client (it types every value). Returns your request config, never the person's fields.

  • Params: none.
  • Returns: list[RequestField] — each RequestField(slug, label, type, one_time, mandatory, raw). mandatory is true when the field is mandatory-to-provide or mandatory-to-stay-connected.
  • Raises: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError.
for f in client.request_fields():
    flag = "mandatory" if f.mandatory else "optional"
    print(f"{f.slug:20} {f.type:10} {flag}{' (one-time)' if f.one_time else ''}")

connections(limit)

connections(limit: int = 100) -> Iterator[Connection]

A lazy generator that pages GET /api/company-data/connections, newest connection first, following the list's cursor — each page's next marker is sent back as after until a page answers none — and yields one typed Connection at a time (bounded memory for a large book). A page is fetched only once the previous one has been consumed; a page costs the platform the same at any depth, and the list carries no total. Each conn.values[slug] is already decrypted (or a lazy binary handle).

  • Params: limit — page size (default 100, max 500).
  • Returns: Iterator[Connection].
  • Raises: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError (after the iterator's bounded internal backoff — see Rate limits).
  • A value the service key cannot open never ends the listing. It is returned in its own place with value None and unreadable True (see Value), and every other value and connection is returned as usual. When every value of every connection reads unreadable, check the configured service_private_key.

Heavily rate-limited. Use for the initial full sync + occasional reconciliation only — never as a poll substitute for the changes feed. The generator paces itself within the limit (backs off on Retry-After).

# Initial full sync, streaming so a 100k-connection book never lands in memory.
for conn in client.connections(limit=200):
    upsert_local_record(conn)

connection(id)

connection(id: str) -> Connection

Fetch one connection by its connection id (GET /api/company-data/connections/{id}).

  • Params: id — the connection id (Connection.id).
  • Returns: one Connection. Note: this endpoint returns {connection_id, user_id, values} and no display_name/connected_at, so those identity fields are None here (the list endpoint carries them).
  • Raises: AuthError, ApiError (404 if unknown), RateLimitError. A value the service key cannot open is returned marked unreadable, never raised.
conn = client.connection(conn_id)
phone = conn.values.get("mobile")
if phone:
    print(phone.value, "live" if phone.live else "snapshot")

delete_connection(connection_id)

delete_connection(connection_id: str) -> None

End one of this service's connections (DELETE /api/company-data/connections/{id}). It leaves exactly the state the customer's own disconnect leaves: the link, the answers and copies held through it and the pair's messages on this service are deleted; the company connection, documents, signatures and flow runs stay. The customer is told by the platform, and connection_deleted reaches your change feed and webhooks. A customer whose account was deleted can still be disconnected. Reconnecting stays possible.

  • Returns: nothing.
  • Throws: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError; refusals are 404 company_data.connection_not_found (an id that is not a connection of this service) and 409 company_connections.active_contract (the customer holds an active agreement or subscription on this service).
client.delete_connection(conn_id)

logs(limit)

logs(limit: int = 50) -> Iterator[LogEntry]

The service's activity log, newest first (GET /api/company-data/logs) — ops events only (email / purge / webhook), never person field data. A lazy generator following the list's cursor (next sent back as after) until a page answers none.

  • Params: limit — page size (default 50, max 200).
  • Returns: Iterator[LogEntry] — each LogEntry(type, message, metadata, at, raw).
  • Raises: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError.
for entry in client.logs(limit=20):
    print(entry.at, entry.type, entry.message)

process_changes(handler, **options)

process_changes(handler: Callable[[Change], None], **options) -> None

The crash-safe changes pump: drains the feed through handler one Change at a time, durably buffering each batch before delivery, with per-item ack and retry → dead-letter → continue. Runs until the feed is empty, then returns — there is no follow/daemon mode (you schedule re-runs yourself). Delivery is at-least-once, so your handler must be idempotent (dedup on Change.id). See The changes pump for the full model.

  • Params: handler — your callback; called with one Change. A return is an ack; an exception triggers retry.
  • Options (keyword-only): batch_size (clamped to ≤ 500, default 100), max_retries (default 3), on_error ("deadletter" — default — or "halt"), backoff (Callable[[int], float], attempt → seconds).
  • Returns: None (when the feed is empty + the buffer is drained).
  • Raises: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError (during a drain); ValueError (bad on_error); whatever the handler raises if on_error="halt" and retries are exhausted.
def handle(change):
    if already_processed(change.id):      # idempotency — dedup on the stable id
        return
    if change.event == "field_updated":
        store(change.person_id, change.slug, change.value)
    elif change.event in ("connection_deleted", "field_deleted"):
        remove(change.person_id, change.slug)
    mark_processed(change.id)

client.process_changes(handle)            # returns when the feed is empty

logger is not a process_changes option in this SDK — pass it once to the Client constructor (Client.from_config("allus.json", logger=my_logger)).

Advanced changes primitives

drain_batch(max: int = 100)                      -> list[Change]   # raw, UNBUFFERED — you own durability
dead_letters()                                   -> list[dict]      # the local dead-letter store
retry_dead_letters(handler, **options)           -> int             # re-drive dead-lettered events; returns count re-driven
  • drain_batch(max) — fetches one batch (clamped ≤ 500) and returns the decrypted Changes directly. It does not persist anything, so a crash loses what the API already deleted. Prefer process_changes for safe consumption.
  • dead_letters() — each dict is the stored (ciphertext) event plus a flattened error and attempts.
  • retry_dead_letters(handler, **options) — same max_retries / on_error / backoff options as process_changes; on success a record is removed, on repeated failure it stays dead-lettered (or re-raises under "halt"). Dead letters are never re-fetched from the API — the local store is their only home.
for dl in client.dead_letters():
    print("stuck:", dl["id"], dl["error"], "after", dl["attempts"], "attempts")

n = client.retry_dead_letters(handle)     # after you've fixed the bug
print(f"re-drove {n} dead letters")

Key rotation — key_rotated and the public-key cache

Every client caches the RSA public keys it fetches: a person's key is immutable — until they rotate it. A person learns of a rotation from a silent push; your service gets no pushes, so the key_rotated change is your only signal. Without it a long-running worker keeps encrypting to the rotated-away key for its whole lifetime, and the person can never read those values.

On the pump this is automatic — the cached key is dropped as the change passes through, before your handler sees it. Over a webhook it is not: the signature verifier is static and has no client instance, so it cannot reach the cache. Call the invalidator yourself — noting that the two clients key their caches differently: the service client by share_code, the customer client by the person's user id. Passing a share code to the customer client removes nothing and leaves you encrypting to the old key. Both identifiers ride every change, alongside public_key_sha256 — the fingerprint of the person's new key.

if change.event == "key_rotated":
    client.invalidate_public_key(change.share_code)      # service Client — keyed by SHARE CODE
    customer.invalidate_public_key(change.person_id)     # CustomerClient — keyed by PERSON USER ID
    # change.public_key_sha256 = fingerprint of the NEW key, if you want to verify the refetch

This is eventual, not fail-closed — nothing rejects a document encrypted to a stale key, so a window remains between the rotation and your next drain. Drain often if that window matters.

service_key_rotated — the same thing, the other way round

The customer client also caches the service's public key, the one you encrypt your consent answers and documents to, keyed "companyCode/serviceCode". When that company replaces its service keypair, the service_key_rotated change on your account feed is your only signal — you receive no pushes. Same shape, same guarantees, same automatic handling on the pump:

if change.event == "service_key_rotated":
    # Automatic on the pump. Over a webhook, from the raw event body:
    customer.invalidate_service_key(body["company_share_code"], body["service_share_code"])
    # body["service_public_key_sha256"] = fingerprint of the service's NEW key

Also eventual, not fail-closed. Note the identifiers are share codes, not the ids used by invalidate_public_key — the two caches are keyed differently and the wrong call removes nothing.

Webhook helpers (on the client)

The webhook receiver helpers are also exposed as Client methods (they delegate to the module functions, fully config-driven — no key/secret arguments):

client.verify_webhook(raw_body: bytes, headers: dict) -> bool
client.parse_webhook(raw_body: bytes, headers: dict)  -> Change
client.handle_webhook(raw_body: bytes, headers: dict) -> Change   # verify + parse
  • verify_webhook — recomputes HMAC-SHA256(raw_body, secret) and constant-time-compares it to X-Allus-Signature. Returns True/False; never raises for a bad signature.
  • parse_webhook — body → a typed Change. Does not verify. Handles JSON, XML, and the encrypt_payload account-key envelope. Raises WebhookError on a malformed/unparseable body.
  • handle_webhook — verify then parse; raises WebhookError on a bad/unknown signature, otherwise returns the Change. The typical one-liner inside a route.

The same three are importable as standalone functions (from allus_company_data import verify_webhook, parse_webhook, handle_webhook), which take the config and the decrypt/type closures explicitly — but inside an app you'll almost always use the client methods. See Webhooks.


The typed value model

You work with these objects and nothing else (from allus_company_data import …):

RequestField { slug, label, type, one_time, mandatory, verified, verified_max_age_days }
Connection   { id, person_id, display_name, connected_at, values: {<slug>: Value} }
Value        { value, live, updated_at, verified, verified_at, verified_expires_at,
               verified_method, verified_provider, verification_id, unreadable }
Change       { id, event, person_id, slug?, value?, live?, document_id?, status?, at,
               sealed_at?, plain_sha256?, signer_first_name?, signer_last_name?, signer_name_verified? }
Document     { id, kind, name, description, status, payload_kind, is_private, value, metadata,
               created_at, updated_at, plain_sha256, sealed_at, signatures }
LogEntry     { type, message, metadata, at }

Keyed by your slug

conn.values["work_email"].value → "alice@acme.com". The key is the stable, explicit slug you set per request field in the portal — rename the label freely, the slug is the contract. The person's source field is never exposed: no source slug, no field_id, not even via .raw.

Value(value, live, updated_at)

Attribute Meaning
value The typed plaintext (see the table below).
live True if the person chose "keep connected" (auto-updates); False for a one-time snapshot.
updated_at datetime of when this answer last changed (per-answer, rides on the Value).
verified True only when the verification hash recomputes over the decrypted plaintext and the verification has not lapsed. Absent metadata reads False, which means "not attested", not "wrong".
verified_at datetime the answering field was verified, or None. A stamp, not a promise about today.
verified_expires_at datetime that verification lapses, or None when it does not. A document-backed verification dies with the document; once this is past, verified reads False.
verified_method HOW allme bound the value: email_code | sms_code | sumsub_id | sumsub_address.
verified_provider WHO established the proof: allme | sumsub.
verification_id The proof id to quote back to allme in a dispute — it resolves the full record, including facts you never receive.
unreadable True when the answer is present but the configured service key cannot open it — sealed to a key the service has since replaced, or a wrong configured key. value is then None and verified False; every other attribute is read as for a readable value.

Not readable is not empty. An unanswered value is value None with unreadable False; a value that could not be opened is value None with unreadable True. A binary value is a lazy handle and is never marked: a binary whose file cannot be opened fails when its bytes are read. When every value of every connection reads unreadable, check the configured service_private_key.

verified_method, verified_provider and verification_id are the proof metadata and arrive together or not at all: a value bound before the proof log existed carries the four verification keys and none of these, so all three read None. They are readable whatever verified says — that boolean stays the only trust decision.

Value types — from the type's RESOLVED definition

A contact-field TYPE is a ROW in the served field-type registry, not a name this SDK knows by heart. The client fetches that registry (GET /api/contact-field-types) beside your request-field catalog and holds it for its life; a value's shape follows the type's resolved storage LANE and PRIMITIVE, so a type added as a row types itself with no SDK release.

The type's resolved… Python value
storage lane photo / document a lazy BinaryHandle — pages, declared entries and file bytes; see below
primitive composite dict — the decrypted plaintext is a JSON object, parsed for you
primitive date datetime.date (falls back to the raw string if it can't be parsed)
primitive multilist list of the chosen option strings
the reserved type key plugin (typed first, before the registry) a PluginValue — see below
anything else, and a type the registry does not carry str

For the seeded types that means, unchanged: email/phone/url/text → str (phone is a single E.164-style string, + and digits); country/nationality → str, an ISO 3166-1 alpha-2 code (e.g. "US", "NL"), not a display name; personal_number/place_of_birth → str, and a verified place of birth is <city>, <alpha-2> (e.g. "Amsterdam, NL") — a country CODE, not a name; address/bank/creditcard → dict; date/date_of_birth → datetime.date; photo, document, legal_document and the ID-document subtypes passport, photo_id, drivers_license → a lazy BinaryHandle.

An address's country/state sub-fields are an ISO alpha-2 code / USPS 2-letter state code respectively. client.field_types().is_field_value_valid(type, value) validates a plaintext against its type; is_valid_country_code(code) / dial_code_for(code) check a code or look up its E.164 dial code.

Reach the registry itself for resolve(), accepts(requested, actual), descendants(), is_binary(), label_for(), ordered() and validate(type, value) (None when valid, else the name of the first failing rule). A request row of a PARENT type MAY be answered by a field of any DESCENDANT — a legal_document slot can be answered with a passport — but that matching is the API's and stays there. The answer reaches you keyed by YOUR slug and typed by the SLOT's own type: the person's source field is never exposed, so there is no source slug, no field_id and no source type to resolve, not even via .raw. For a binary slot the API resolves slot → source → file itself, so the bytes you fetch are the answering field's whatever type that field carries.

A CHOICE type's options. select and multiselect carry no options of their own — a flow element supplies them — so validate / is_field_value_valid / field_value_error take an optional third argument, the caller's own option list. The ROW's resolved options govern whenever it has any, else the supplied list, and never a merge of the two; client.field_types().options_for(type, options) answers exactly the domain the validator will enforce, or None when neither source has one. A choice with no domain at all is refused (rule name options_unavailable) rather than measured against an empty list. submit_flow_answers passes the flow element's options for you.

addr = conn.values["home_address"].value     # dict, e.g. {"street": "...", "city": "...", ...}
dob  = conn.values["birthday"].value          # datetime.date(1990, 5, 17)

Plugin rows — RequestField.plugin and PluginValue

A company can ask a request row through a plugin it added in the portal. Such a row's type is the reserved key plugin, and its definition carries plugin — RequestFieldPlugin(plugin_name, field_type, snapshot), snapshot being the field type's frozen description (label, blocks, inputs, outputs); every other row reads plugin=None. A plugin row is always one-time and is asked of people only.

Its value is a PluginValue — the self-describing answer, readable without the plugin:

PluginValue(
    plugin,    # the plugin's name, e.g. "Flex"
    type,      # the field type, e.g. "cao"
    blocks,    # [{key, kind, label, id, value}] in declared order; a search_select pick carries id + its option label as value
    outputs,   # [{key, type, label, value}] typed as the plugin declared them
    raw,
)

cao = conn.values["cao"].value
next(o["value"] for o in cao.outputs if o["key"] == "min_wage")   # 9.5

A plugin answer is what the person's client submitted — sealed to your service key but not signed. When you must rely on an output, check it with the plugin itself.

Binary fields — the lazy BinaryHandle

A photo/document value is a BinaryHandle. Nothing is fetched or decrypted until you call .bytes() or .save():

handle = conn.values["passport_scan"].value   # BinaryHandle (no network yet)

pages = handle.pages()                         # GET the slot file → every page, in order
meta  = handle.metadata()                      # the entries the type declares
data  = handle.bytes()                         # the primary file bytes (single-file answers)
n     = handle.save("/tmp/contract.pdf")       # same, written to disk; returns bytes written
print(handle.value_url)                         # the opaque slot-keyed URL it fetches from
print(handle.content_type)                      # what the answer arrived as, once fetched
print(handle.content_sha256)                    # the platform's digest of the served artifact

for page in pages:
    print(page.label, page.name, page.mime, len(page.bytes))
print(meta.get("document_number"), meta.get("expiry_date"), meta.get("name"))

The slot-keyed file endpoint has three 200 shapes, and which one you get is not yours to choose. It depends on whether the person's source field is private AND on the type of the field they answered with; both can change, and nothing announces either in advance:

  • private source → application/json, {"encrypted": true, "value": <wrapper>}. The handle decrypts the wrapper with your service key into the JSON ENVELOPE.
  • non-private source whose type stores more than one file or declares metadata entries (the ID-document subtypes and legal_document) → application/json, {"encrypted": false, "value": "<envelope>"} — the same envelope in the clear. Nothing is decrypted.
  • every other non-private source → the file's own Content-Type (image/jpeg, application/pdf, …) and the body IS the file.

The envelope is {"full": "data:…", "thumb": …} for a photo, {"file": "data:…", …} for a single-file document, and {"pages": [{"label": …, "file": "data:…", …}], …} for a multi-page one, with every entry the type declares beside it.

The handle hides the difference. .pages() gives you the pages of a multi-page answer (and [] for a single-file one); .metadata() gives you the declared entries (document_number, expiry_date, issuing_country, name, …) and {} when the type declares none; .bytes()/.save() give you the primary file. On a multi-page envelope .bytes()/.save() raise DecryptError("multi-page envelope: use pages") rather than handing back the front page as though it were the whole document. .metadata() carries no ordering guarantee — read the envelope string yourself if you need the declared order.

The raw-bytes shape is told apart on the response Content-Type, never by looking at the body — a PDF that happened to start with a brace must not be mistaken for a wrapper — and the two JSON shapes on the body's encrypted member. All four accessors share ONE lazy fetch: whichever you call first performs it, and the result is cached, so repeated calls don't re-fetch.

Every 200 carries X-Allus-Content-Sha256, the sha256 of the served artifact — the raw bytes on the bytes shape, the served value string on either JSON shape; handle.content_sha256 is that header (and handle.content_type the Content-Type), so you can record what you received and later show your archived copy has not drifted. It is the platform's word, not a signature. There is no variant selection.

A frozen (share-once) answer is retained for 90 days. After that the endpoint returns 410 company_data.file_expired, which surfaces as an ApiError whose details carry the answer's content_sha256 and expired_at — your archived copy is then the only one, and you can still prove what it is:

try:
    data = handle.bytes()
except ApiError as e:
    if e.error_key == "company_data.file_expired":
        log(e.details["content_sha256"], e.details["expired_at"])

Change(id, event, person_id, slug?, value?, live?, at)

A change-feed / webhook event.

Attribute Meaning
id The stable server change-row id — your dedup key (captured before the server delete).
event connection_created, connection_deleted, field_updated, field_deleted, consent_accepted, consent_declined, document_status_changed, document_sealed, message_received.
person_id The person the change is about (may be None).
slug, value, live Present only on field_updated; value is typed exactly like Value.value (incl. a lazy BinaryHandle for binaries). Connection/consent/document events carry no slot/value.
document_id, status document_id is present on document_status_changed and document_sealed; status only on document_status_changed — which document moved lifecycle state and to what (no slug/value). See Company documents.
signer_first_name, signer_last_name, signer_name_verified, note Present only on document_status_changed. The names and note arrive encrypted to your service key; the SDK decrypts them, so these are plaintext.
sealed_at, plain_sha256 Present only on document_sealed — when the platform sealed a file document, and the SHA-256 of its unencrypted PDF bytes.
connection_id, message_id, person_public_key, message_body Present only on message_received — a person messaged your service. message_body is the decrypted text. See Messaging.
verified, verified_at, verified_expires_at Present on field_updated, with the same meaning as on Value.
verified_method, verified_provider, verification_id The proof metadata, same meaning and same all-or-none rule as on Value.
at datetime of the change. (There is no separate updated_at on a change.)

.raw

Every model carries .raw — the underlying hardened API dict — for debugging or an edge case the SDK didn't model. It still never contains the person's source field.

See docs/model.md for the full reference.


The changes pump

The changes feed is a server-side drain-on-fetch queue: GET /api/company-data/changes?limit=N returns up to N events (default 100, max 500) and deletes exactly those rows in the same transaction — no offset/cursor, and the API keeps no copy afterward. So consumption can't be a plain list: a consumer crash mid-batch would lose events the API already deleted, and a huge backlog must not materialize in memory. process_changes solves both.

Per run, repeating until the feed is empty then returning:

  1. Replay first. Deliver any un-acked events already in the local buffer (from a previous crashed run), oldest-first.
  2. Drain. When the buffer is empty, fetch one batch and persist it to the durable file buffer (fsync) BEFORE handing anything out. This is the backup the API no longer has.
  3. Deliver one-by-one. For each buffered event, oldest-first: decrypt its value at delivery (never on disk), build the typed Change, call handler.
  4. Ack / retry / dead-letter. On success, remove the event from the buffer (ack). On a handler error, retry with backoff up to max_retries; then either move it to the dead-letter store and continue (on_error="deadletter", default — one poison event never wedges the stream) or stop and re-raise (on_error="halt"). A DecryptError on a buffered event (corrupt/truncated ciphertext, rotated key) is dead-lettered immediately — re-decrypting can't fix it, so it does not burn retries (under on_error="halt" it re-raises). Either way it never propagates out and wedges replay.
  5. Repeat until a drain returns empty and the buffer is drained → return.

The durable buffer

  • Plain files under cache_dir (zero extra dependencies): pending/ for un-acked events, deadletter/ for ones that exhausted retries.
  • Stored events keep their ciphertext value — no plaintext PII is ever written to disk. Decryption happens only at delivery.
  • Writes are crash-safe (temp file → fsync → atomic rename → dir fsync). Files are named with a monotonic, zero-padded sequence so they replay oldest-first.

Crash safety, at-least-once, and idempotency

A batch is durably buffered before any delivery, and acked per-item only after the handler succeeds. The ack can't be atomic with your side-effects — a crash between your handler's success and its ack re-delivers that event on the next run. That makes delivery at-least-once, so:

Your handler must be idempotent. Dedup on Change.id.

Change.id is the stable server change-row id, captured before the server delete, so it survives crash + replay unchanged.

No follow mode

process_changes returns when the feed empties. You schedule re-runs — a cron job, a while True: client.process_changes(handle); time.sleep(5) loop, a worker queue, whatever fits. The feed is cheap to poll (see Rate limits).

Worked example

import time
from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

def handle(change):
    # Idempotent: skip anything we've already applied.
    if seen(change.id):
        return
    match change.event:
        case "field_updated":
            store_value(change.person_id, change.slug, change.value, live=change.live)
        case "field_deleted":
            clear_value(change.person_id, change.slug)
        case "connection_deleted":
            drop_person(change.person_id)
        case "connection_created" | "consent_accepted" | "consent_declined":
            note_event(change.person_id, change.event, change.at)
    record_seen(change.id)

# Schedule your own re-runs; process_changes itself returns when empty.
while True:
    client.process_changes(handle, batch_size=200, max_retries=5)
    time.sleep(5)

If a handler keeps failing, the event lands in the dead-letter store instead of blocking the stream; inspect with client.dead_letters() and re-drive with client.retry_dead_letters(handle) after fixing the cause. See docs/pump.md.


Webhooks

Webhooks are the lower-latency push alternative to polling the changes feed. The platform POSTs each change event to your configured webhook URL with:

  • X-Allus-Webhook-Id — which webhook this is (selects the HMAC secret from config).
  • X-Allus-Signature — HMAC-SHA256(rawBody, secret) as lowercase hex.
  • the body — the same slug-keyed Change shape as the pull feed (JSON or XML).

All secrets/keys come from config; the helpers take no key or secret arguments. Use the raw request body bytes (do not re-serialize a parsed body — the HMAC is over the exact bytes the platform sent).

Delivery contract — effectively unique, rarely replayed

Each queued event is POSTed once, and only HTTP 200 counts as delivered — a 202, a 204, a 3xx redirect and every 4xx/5xx are all treated as a failure. On anything other than 200 (or a timeout or connection error) the event is not retried in place: it and the rest of the webhook's queue move to a durable server-side backlog and the webhook is marked bad. The backlog is delivered later, either automatically when the webhook next probes healthy, or when you drain it yourself with GET /api/company-data/changes?webhook_id=… (delete-on-read).

So deliveries are effectively unique — with one rare exception. If your endpoint processed an event but the platform never saw your 200 (your response timed out, or you crashed after committing but before responding), the event is treated as failed and replayed on recovery, so you receive it again. Nothing caps that at two: a failed probe leaves its backlog row in place, so every later recovery attempt whose 200 is likewise lost replays the same event once more. Inside that window the contract is at-least-once — plan for one or more repeats, not for exactly one.

Do not use change.id as an idempotency key here. On the webhook path the id is neither reliably stable nor reliably fresh, and a receiver cannot tell which one it is holding. A live delivery is built with no change row behind it, so its id is minted for that single POST — the later replay of the same event is rebuilt from a durable backlog row and therefore carries a different id. But a replayed delivery carries that row's id, and the row stays in place until it is delivered successfully, so a re-attempted replay arrives with the same id — which changes again if the event is re-backlogged after a further failure. An id check therefore misses the duplicate you are most likely to see and matches only a rarer one; it is not a contract. If you need strict idempotency, key on the content — event + person + slug/document + payload — never on the id.

Webhooks and the pull feed are alternative integrations — consume one, never both. The id-dedup guidance in the changes-pump section above applies to the pump only, where change.id is the real server change-row id.

In a web route (Flask)

from flask import Flask, request, abort
from allus_company_data import Client, WebhookError

app = Flask(__name__)
client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

@app.post("/allus/webhook")
def allus_webhook():
    try:
        change = client.handle_webhook(request.get_data(), dict(request.headers))
    except WebhookError:
        abort(401)              # bad / unknown signature, or unparseable envelope

    # Do NOT carry the pump's id-dedup over here: the webhook id is not an
    # idempotency key (see "Delivery contract" above). Key on content if you need one.
    apply_change(change)
    return ("", 200)   # 200 — the ONLY status allus counts as delivered

verify_webhook / parse_webhook let you split the steps if you prefer:

if not client.verify_webhook(raw_body, headers):
    abort(401)
change = client.parse_webhook(raw_body, headers)

Config-driven secrets

Per-webhook HMAC secrets live in the config webhooks map, keyed by webhook id; the SDK reads X-Allus-Webhook-Id off the request and looks up the matching secret. A single-webhook service can use the flat "webhook_secret": "…" shortcut (or ALLUS_WEBHOOK_SECRET). An unknown/unconfigured id ⇒ verification returns False (and handle_webhook raises WebhookError).

The encrypt_payload account-key envelope

If a webhook has encrypt_payload enabled, the body is replaced by a {"_enc":1,…} envelope encrypted to your company account key (and the HMAC is over that envelope — the final bytes sent). parse_webhook/handle_webhook unwrap it transparently using the configured account_private_key + account_passphrase, then decrypt the inner field value with the service key — so an encrypted-payload Change is identical to a plain one. If you receive such a webhook without an account_private_key configured, you get a WebhookError.

The account-key envelope uses OAEP-SHA1 (OpenSSL's default), distinct from the OAEP-SHA256 used for person field values — the SDK handles this difference internally; you only supply the account key in config.

See docs/webhooks.md.


Company documents

Documents are content your service issues to people (a quote, a contract, a JSON payload, a PDF) — the mirror image of the request slots. They come in two shapes:

  • Broadcast — no target. Sent to every connection on the service. Plaintext — you can't single-key-encrypt one value to all your connections, so a broadcast value is stored as-is.
  • Per-person — targeted at one connection (connection_id= / person_user_id= / share_code=). Automatically end-to-end encrypted to that recipient's public key before it leaves the process. The server only ever stores ciphertext.

The encryption rule, plainly: every per-person document is automatically end-to-end encrypted to the recipient's public key — for any is_private value. Broadcast documents are plaintext. is_private is a device-display-only flag (it picks lock-screen vs decrypt-on-load on the recipient's device), not what decides encryption — so is_private=True with no per-person target raises ConfigError. As everywhere in this SDK, no method ever takes a key or secret argument — the recipient key is fetched for you, and your own service key comes from config.

Creating documents

payload_kind picks the body:

  • payload_kind="json" — pass json_value= (a JSON-serializable object).
  • payload_kind="file" — pass file_bytes= (+ file_mime=); the bytes are uploaded. For a per-person file the bytes are encrypted automatically too.
from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

# 1. BROADCAST plaintext json doc — every connection sees it, no target.
notice = client.create_document(
    kind="document",
    name="2026 price list",
    payload_kind="json",
    json_value={"plan": "pro", "monthly": 49, "currency": "EUR"},
)

# 2. PER-PERSON doc — auto-encrypted to that recipient's public key.
#    Target it by ANY one of connection_id / person_user_id / share_code.
contract = client.create_document(
    kind="document",
    name="Service agreement",
    payload_kind="json",
    is_private=True,                       # display-only; needs a per-person target
    connection_id="019xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",
    json_value={"tier": "enterprise", "term_months": 12},
)

# A per-person FILE — the bytes are encrypted for the recipient automatically.
# plain_sha256 (SHA-256 of the raw PDF bytes) is computed for you when omitted;
# it is required by the server for a signable file document
# (requires_signature/requires_acceptance) and ignored on a json document.
with open("agreement.pdf", "rb") as fh:
    pdf_bytes = fh.read()
    pdf = client.create_document(
        kind="legal_document",
        name="Signed agreement",
        payload_kind="file",
        person_user_id="019yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy",
        file_bytes=pdf_bytes,
        file_mime="application/pdf",
        requires_signature=True,
        # plain_sha256=compute_plain_sha256(pdf_bytes),  # optional — computed for you otherwise
    )

# is_private without a target → ConfigError (a broadcast can't be locked).

Listing, reading, updating, deleting

list_documents(*, person_user_id=None, status=None, limit=100)        -> Iterator[Document]
document(document_id)                                                     -> Document
document_file(document_id)                                                -> bytes    # #491: the file BYTES
flow_run_document(run_id, output_key)                                     -> bytes    # the run's OWN (service-key) copy of one output document
update_document_status(document_id, status)                              -> Document
update_document_metadata(document_id, *, metadata=None, name=None,
                         description=None)                               -> Document
delete_document(document_id)                                            -> None
# All this service's documents, newest first (optionally filter by person and/or status).
# A lazy generator: it pages GET /api/company-data/documents with its cursor (`limit` is
# the page size, 1–500) and fetches the next page only once this one is consumed.
for doc in client.list_documents(status="offering"):
    print(doc.id, doc.name, doc.status, doc.payload_kind, "private" if doc.is_private else "shared")

doc = client.document(contract.id)

# For a json doc, .json() returns the plaintext object — a per-person doc is
# decrypted with your service key on demand; a broadcast doc is already plaintext.
print(doc.json())

# #491: download a FILE document's bytes (metadata methods don't include them).
# A BROADCAST document is served plaintext and is returned as-is. A PER-PERSON /
# private document is encrypted to the RECIPIENT's key — the company cannot
# decrypt that, so this raises ApiError('documents.recipient_encrypted') instead
# of a doomed decrypt attempt.
try:
    pdf_bytes = client.document_file(contract.id)
except ApiError as e:
    if e.error_key == "documents.recipient_encrypted":
        # This is a per-person document; only the recipient can read it. For a
        # generated flow document, download the company's OWN copy of that output instead:
        pdf_bytes = client.flow_run_document(run.id, "out_1")
    else:
        raise

# Move it through its lifecycle / edit its metadata.
client.update_document_status(contract.id, "active")
client.update_document_metadata(contract.id, name="Service agreement (v2)",
                                metadata={"renewal": "auto"})

client.delete_document(notice.id)

A Document carries id, kind, name, description, status, payload_kind, is_private, value, metadata, created_at, updated_at, plain_sha256, sealed_at, signatures (and .raw). Use .json() on a payload_kind="json" document to get the decrypted plaintext object.

A contract-flow-generated document can also read status="waiting" — a run-participant copy whose signer has not been reached yet in the run's signing line. It is read-only: update_document_status raises with error_key="documents.run_managed" (409) if you try to write status on a run-participant document while it is waiting, ready_to_sign or offering — that status moves only through flow generation, the run's own advance, sign/accept, or a run cancel/decline. Such a document's run_signatures carries the WHOLE run's signing line — one entry per (output document, participant), in line order, each {output_key, name, party_key, document_id, position, status, action, acted_at}; every document of the run carries the same summary.

The document seal

Completing every required signature/acceptance on a signable document is not the same as sealing it. When the last one is recorded the platform attempts, on that same request, to append a Signatures page and sign the whole PDF with a platform certificate, replacing every party's copy with the sealed PDF — the platform's own attestation, layered over each signer's existing act. The attempt can fail (no PDF bytes on the completing act, a byte mismatch, the sealing service unavailable, or a custodian-completed ward act, which never carries bytes) without affecting the signatures themselves or the document's completed status — it is simply left unsealed, and any party can seal it afterwards from their own device or the owning company's portal (no SDK call triggers a seal). doc.sealed_at is None until a seal actually succeeds; doc.plain_sha256 is the SHA-256 of the document's unencrypted PDF bytes (None on a json document, and on a file document with no stored plaintext hash — such a document cannot be sealed). Each entry of doc.signatures additionally carries plain_sha256 (the hash the signer's client computed over the bytes it showed), signer_first_name, signer_last_name (the acting human's own profile name) and signer_name_verified (True iff the submitted name matched that account's verified ID name) beside its existing action, method, content_sha256, ip, user_agent, created_at members.

Reacting to a status change in the feed

When someone advances one of your documents (e.g. signs it), the platform emits a document_status_changed change. In a process_changes handler it carries .document_id and .status (and no slug/value — it's a lifecycle event, not a field value), plus the acting signer's .signer_first_name, .signer_last_name, .signer_name_verified and the person's optional cancellation .note. The names and the note arrive encrypted to your service key; the SDK decrypts them, so you read plaintext.

When the platform seals a file document (never a JSON contract) it emits a separate document_sealed change carrying .document_id, .sealed_at and .plain_sha256, so you never need a follow-up document(id) call just to learn a document sealed. A webhook receives it only when it subscribes to document_sealed (or has an empty event filter, which receives every event); a subscription to document_status_changed alone does not deliver it.

def handle(change):
    if change.event == "document_status_changed":
        # the document moved lifecycle state (offering → ready_to_sign → active → …)
        on_document_status(change.document_id, change.status)
    elif change.event == "document_sealed":
        on_document_sealed(change.document_id, change.sealed_at, change.plain_sha256)
    elif change.event == "field_updated":
        store(change.person_id, change.slug, change.value)

client.process_changes(handle)

Messaging

Your service can hold a conversation with a connected person — the same messaging surface the person already uses, with your service as the counterpart. Two shapes:

  • 1-on-1 — send_message(connection_id, text). End-to-end encrypted: the SDK encrypts one copy to the person's public key and one to your service key before anything leaves the process, so the person reads it in their app and you can re-read your own outbound text. The platform stores ciphertext only.
  • Broadcast — broadcast_message(text). One plaintext message to every person connected to the service (one body cannot be single-key-encrypted to all of them, exactly as for a broadcast document). It seeds each person's ordinary 1-on-1 thread; their reply comes back end-to-end encrypted.

send_message answers 201 with the created message carrying message_id, and returns that id — the value you hand back as the acknowledgement boundary.

Inbound messages arrive on the changes pump / webhook as a message_received event — a person→company message only. A broadcast raises no event of its own.

def handle(change):
    if change.event != "message_received":
        return
    print(change.person_id, change.message_body)   # already decrypted for you

    # Reply on the same connection. person_public_key rides the event, so no
    # second key lookup is needed.
    client.send_message(
        change.connection_id,
        "Thanks — we're on it.",
        person_public_key=change.person_public_key,
    )

    # Acknowledge what you handled. REQUIRED: without it the message stays
    # unread forever, your unread count grows, and the person never sees a read
    # receipt. Sending a reply does NOT acknowledge anything.
    client.mark_messages_read(change.connection_id, change.message_id)

client.process_changes(handle)

mark_messages_read is bounded by the boundary message: a message that arrived while you were working is not swept, and a repeat is a no-op. The boundary must be a message the person sent on that connection — anything else is refused with ApiError("company_data.ack_boundary_invalid") (400).

# One plaintext announcement to everyone connected to the service.
client.broadcast_message("We're closed on Friday.")

Refusals surface as ApiError carrying the platform error_key:

error_key Status Meaning
messages.messaging_not_entitled 403 The company's plan does not include messaging.
messages.not_connected 403 The person is not connected to this service.
messages.messaging_suspended 403 Messaging is suspended for this service (or the whole company).
messages.broadcast_suspended 403 Broadcast alone is suspended for this service.
messages.encryption_required 400 A 1-on-1 body was not a valid encrypted wrapper.
messages.broadcast_audience_too_large 422 The service has more connections than a broadcast allows.
messages.rate_limited 429 Too many 1-on-1 messages to the same person.
company_data.ack_boundary_invalid 400 The ack boundary is not a message the person sent on that connection.

Contract-flow runs (company side)

The company is one bound party of a contract flow — a multi-step, per-party form the platform walks to gather (and end-to-end encrypt) answers, optionally finishing at a document-generating leaf. These calls cover the company's turn:

trigger_flow_run(flow_id, *, connection_id, bindings, source_files=None) -> FlowRun
stage_run_file(flow_id, source_user_id, sealed_value)      -> str      # staged file name
upload_answer_file(run_id, slug, for_user_id, sealed_value) -> str     # answer file name
flow_run_source_file(run_id, source_key)                   -> dict     # the sealed wrapper
published_flow(flow_id)                                    -> PublishedFlow
flow_runs(*, status="awaiting_company")                    -> list[FlowRun]
flow_run(run_id)                                            -> FlowRun
flow_run_answers(run)                                        -> FlowRunAnswers
submit_flow_answers(run, fill, *, party_pubkeys=None)       -> FlowRun
generate_flow_document(run)                                  -> dict
process_flow_run(run_id, fill_node, *, party_pubkeys=None)  -> FlowRun
identity()                                                    -> dict           # #491 gap 3
  • trigger_flow_run(flow_id, connection_id=..., bindings={...}) starts a run bound to a connection and the flow's other parties, pinning the flow's latest published version.
  • trigger_flow_run reads the flow's latest published version first (published_flow(flow_id) — its version, definition and the service's request-field types) and sends it as flow_version. When that version's text elements show the customer's shared values ({{party.field}} tags), it opens those values from the connection with the service key and seals them per recipient — ONE wrapper of the non-private values, and each private value on its own — to the company (the service key) and to the customer, and sends them as tag_values; the connection's values_private decides which values are private (a slug it does not name is private). A newer publish in between (flows.version_changed) is re-read and retried once; a customer key that changed (flows.tag_values_stale) is re-read and retried once; a stale SERVICE key raises a ConfigError — rebuild the client with the service's current private key. The run carries owner_tag_values (the owning company's profile values the text names, plaintext) and tag_values (the company's sealed set).
  • flow_runs(status=...) / flow_run(run_id) list / fetch runs. flow_runs reads every page of the run list, newest first, following its cursor. status=None returns everything; the default "awaiting_company" is the actionable queue.
  • flow_run_answers(run) — a run's answers as a FlowRunAnswers, reading the company's service-key answer copies: .answers is the decrypted {slug: plaintext} map, .unreadable the list of slugs whose answer the service key could not open (empty when every answer opened). An unreadable answer is left out of .answers and never fails the call. Accepts a loaded FlowRun or a run id (fetched via flow_run).
  • submit_flow_answers / generate_flow_document / process_flow_run fill the company's current node, advance the run (encrypting one answer copy per bound party), and — at a document-mode leaf — generate its output documents. See the method docstrings for the full per-party encryption details.
  • generate_flow_document(run) returns {"documents": [...], "status": ...} — one {output_key, party_key, document_id, position} per produced (output document, participant). A leaf can produce several named output documents (e.g. "Contract" and "Addendum"); position is the step's 1-based place in the run's ONE signing line (one signer at a time, across every output), None for a party an output's signer list does not name. A repeat answers the same set.
  • A FlowRun's participants are FlowRunParticipant(party_key, person_user_id, connection_id, documents); documents is that participant's own copy of each output document — FlowRunParticipantDocument(output_key, name, document_id, document_status, requires_signature, requires_acceptance, position, action, acted_at), ordered by line position.
  • identity() (#491 gap 3) — this client's own {"company_user_id": ..., "service_id": ...} from GET /api/company-data/whoami. trigger_flow_run's company-side binding must use company_user_id (the person party's user_id comes from the connection) — without this call it was unconstructible through the SDK.

Participant PDFs. A leaf output rule's PDF is a company template, a flow field's answer (source_field, source key field:<slug>, a field of type pdf_document) or what a bound customer shared on its connection (source_connection, source key conn:<party>:<request_slug>). A rule whose source the run does not hold does not match; the next rule is tried.

  • Connection sources are copied at run start. For every answered pdf_document request slot a rule of the pinned version names, the caller reads the customer's shared file, seals its envelope JSON once per distinct bound user (the company's own copy to the service key) and stages each with stage_run_file(flow_id, source_user_id, sealed_value) (POST /api/company-data/flows/{flowId}/run-files) — source_user_id the customer bound to the source's party, whose shared PDF the copy is; the copy is stored in that customer's home region — then passes source_files=[{"source_key", "for_user_id", "file"}] to trigger_flow_run. A list that is not exactly the required set, or whose copy was staged for another customer than the one bound to its source's party, is refused with ApiError flows.source_files_invalid; its details carry missing ([{source_key, for_user_id, source_user_id}]) and unexpected ([file]), and nothing is written. Staging a copy for a customer that is not connected to the service is refused flows.source_user_invalid.
  • FlowRun.source_files is the company's own copies, {source_key: file} ({} when none). flow_run_source_file(run_id, source_key) returns the stored copy — a wrapper that opens with the service key (GET /api/company-data/flow-runs/{runId}/source-files/{sourceKey}).
  • A company turn can answer a binary field. upload_answer_file(run_id, slug, for_user_id, sealed_value) (POST /api/company-data/flow-runs/{runId}/answer-files) uploads one bound party's sealed copy; upload one per bound party, then submit {"_enc_file": file} as each party's value. An answer that is such a file reference reads as answered in the run's answer map.
  • Generation uploads the held source PDFs. generate_flow_document (and process_flow_run at a document leaf) fetches the company's own copy of every source of the leaf's rules the run holds — a source_field whose own answer is a file (slots/{slug}/file), a source_connection in source_files — decrypts it, seals it under the call's one-time key and uploads it to /generate/inputs before generating with inputs: [{source_key, input}]. flows.generate_inputs_mismatch refuses inputs that are not the held set; flows.source_pdf_invalid refuses a source that is not a usable PDF (the run stays generating).

The party that answers a run's last step generates the contract — the customer role included. When your company is a CUSTOMER of another company's service and its answer completes a document-mode leaf, the run parks at generating until you generate:

customer.generate_flow_document(connection_id, run)   -> dict   # POST /api/company-connections/{connection_id}/flow-runs/{run_id}/generate

Pass the run as re-read after your leaf submit. The answer map comes from your OWN copy of the run's answers, decrypted with the account key — every party's answers are sealed to every bound party, so that copy holds the whole run and no service key is involved. The held source PDFs are uploaded first from your own copies (answer-files, decrypted with the account key), as on the service client. Returns {documents, status} — one {output_key, party_key, document_id, position} per produced (output document, participant); a repeat answers the same set. Raises ConfigError when the run's current step is not bound to your company.

me = client.identity()
run = client.trigger_flow_run(
    flow_id, connection_id=conn.id,
    bindings={"company": me["company_user_id"], "person": conn.person_id},
)

# Later, once the run is complete:
answers = client.flow_run_answers(run.id).answers   # {slug: plaintext} — the company's copies

# If the flow's output_mode is "document", download the company's OWN copy of every
# output document (encrypted to the SERVICE key, unlike a per-person document_file()):
run = client.flow_run(run.id)
own = next(p for p in run.participants if p.party_key == run.company_party_key)
for doc in own.documents:
    pdf_bytes = client.flow_run_document(run.id, doc.output_key)  # see Company documents above
  • Raises: AuthError, ApiError (404 on flow_run/flow_run_document for an unknown run — flows.run_not_found — or, on flow_run_document, an output the run did not produce or a company that is not a bound party — flows.no_document), DecryptError, RateLimitError, ValidationError (from submit_flow_answers on a slug failing field-type validation, or a value outside its field's minimum/maximum).

Plugin fields on a flow step

A flow step can hold a plugin element (kind: "plugin"): blocks (search_select, text, number, date) answered by picks and typed values, inputs the company wired to earlier flow keys, and outputs the plugin computes. When such a step is the company's turn, the service client talks to the plugin through the platform's forwarder:

plugin_pass(run_id)                                                          -> PluginPass
plugin_options(run_id, slug, block, query="", picks=None, values=None, draft=None) -> PluginOptions
plugin_outputs(run_id, slug, picks=None, values=None, draft=None)            -> PluginOutputs | PluginPicksInvalid
check_flow_value(run, slug, value, draft=None)                               -> None  # raises the bound ValidationError
  • plugin_pass — POST /api/company-data/flow-runs/{run_id}/plugin-pass → PluginPass(pass_, forwarder_url, plugins=[{"id", "public_key"}], specs={slug: spec}). Issued only while the run awaits your party on that step; it lives ten minutes. The two calls below fetch one themselves.
  • plugin_options — the options of one block: query is the search text ("" lists everything), picks the ids picked so far by block key, values the typed block values so far → PluginOptions(options=[{"id", "label"}], more) (more: the list was cut — narrow the query).
  • plugin_outputs — the outputs for picks and values → PluginOutputs(outputs={key: value}), or PluginPicksInvalid (picks_invalid is True) when the picks no longer fit the inputs or each other: clear them and pick again. Call it again whenever an input changes, before you submit.
  • draft is the current step's not-yet-submitted answers (slug → plaintext). The plugin's inputs are read from ONE live answer map: the run's answers you can read, overlaid with draft for the current step's slugs, plugin answers expanded, constants computed. Each input is converted to its declared type (number → a JSON number, date → YYYY-MM-DD, boolean → a JSON boolean, text → a string).
  • Another party's private value is never sent to a plugin. A source is private when its slug is in the run's private_slugs, when it is a constant that reads a private source, or when it is a current-step draft value whose field's default reads a private source (whatever the draft value is). A plugin answer's outputs are never private, whatever inputs produced them. A run read with no private_slugs list treats every other party's value as private. A REQUIRED input that is unwired, unanswered, private or not convertible raises PluginInputUnavailable (input, source, reason: unwired | unanswered | other_party_private | not_convertible); an OPTIONAL one is left out of the call.
  • The call itself: the request is sealed to the plugin's public key with the platform wrapper and carries the public half of a fresh RSA-2048 reply key made for that call; it is posted to {forwarder_url}/call with a plain requests.post that carries no allme credential and uses the URL exactly as the pass names it; the reply is opened with the reply key. A 409 plugin.key_changed reseals once with the key it returns; a 401 or 403 fetches a new pass once. Any other refusal is an ApiError carrying the forwarder's status and key (plugin.not_responding, plugin.busy, plugin.rate_limited, plugin.unavailable, …); a plugin that publishes no key reads plugin.not_responding.

The answer you then submit for the plugin slug is the plugin answer's JSON string:

answer = json.dumps({
    "plugin": "Flex", "type": "cao",
    "blocks": [{"key": "cao", "kind": "search_select", "label": "CAO", "id": "hrc", "value": "Horeca Fictief"}],
    "outputs": [{"key": "min_wage", "type": "number", "label": "Minimum wage", "value": 9.5}],
})
client.submit_flow_answers(run, {"age": "19", "cao": answer, "wage": "14.20"})

Blocks go in declared order with their labels from the spec's snapshot; an answer without an outputs array is unfinished and reads as unanswered.

Defaults, minimums and maximums. A flow field may carry default, min and max, each an expression in the constants language (plugin outputs included, e.g. max(cao.min_wage, cao.agreement_wage)). submit_flow_answers computes min/max over the same live answer map (your fill as the draft) and refuses a value outside them with a ValidationError naming the bound (bound: "min" | "max", bound_value) before anything is encrypted; a bound that computes to None is no bound. check_flow_value(run, slug, value, draft) applies the same check on its own, before you submit. A value derived from another party's private source — a field whose default reads one — is submitted marked source_private (a run with no private_slugs list counts every other party's value as private). Routing evaluates every edge over the answers with plugin answers expanded, plus the computed constants.

FlowRun.private_slugs lists the slugs whose answers came from a private source — metadata, never a value; None when the API did not send it (unknown).

The customer role. CustomerClient has the same three with a leading connection_id, over POST /api/company-connections/{connection_id}/flow-runs/{run_id}/plugin-pass, reading its inputs from its own copies of the run's answers (decrypted with the account key):

customer.plugin_pass(connection_id, run_id)
customer.plugin_options(connection_id, run_id, slug, block, query, picks, values, draft)
customer.plugin_outputs(connection_id, run_id, slug, picks, values, draft)
customer.check_flow_value(run, slug, value, draft=None)   # raises the same bound ValidationError

Call check_flow_value before encrypt_flow_answer seals a value. customer.submit_flow_answers reads the run once and marks every answer derived from another party's private source (the same rule) source_private: True before it is sent.

The wire shape of each answers[].values[].value is the sealed wrapper serialized as a JSON string. submit_flow_answers and customer.submit_flow_answers send it that way, whether values[].value is the dict encrypt_flow_answer returns or a string; encrypt_flow_answer itself still returns the dict.

The evaluator helpers (exported, pure): expand_plugin_answers(answers, plugin_slugs) — a new dict where each finished plugin answer becomes its summary (the blocks' values joined by " / ") plus slug.<block>, slug.<block>.id (a search_select pick's id) and slug.<output>, and an unfinished one is removed; plugin_answer_summary(plaintext); plugin_answer_view(plaintext) → {"blocks": [{label, value}], "outputs": [{label, type, value}]} or None; resolved_constants(constants, answers, reference_date, plugin_slugs=None) expands first when given the slugs. The math ops include variadic max and min, which skip what is not a number.


Rate limits

Endpoint Limit Use it for
changes (the pump) generous Poll as often as you like — it's a cheap drain-on-fetch queue.
request-fields, logs moderate Occasional reads.
connections, connection(id), binary /file heavily limited Initial full sync + occasional reconciliation only — never as a poll substitute.

A 429 carries Retry-After. The SDK backs off and retries automatically:

  • The transport (HttpClient) retries a 429 a bounded number of times honoring Retry-After, then surfaces RateLimitError.
  • The connections(...) generator additionally backs off per Retry-After on a surfaced RateLimitError and retries the page a bounded number of times before re-raising — so it paces itself within the limit instead of hammering.

If you catch a RateLimitError, its .retry_after is the seconds to wait (or None when the header was absent).

Your client_credentials token requests (/oauth2/token) are on their own rate-limit bucket, separate from person logins — but it is keyed by source IP, not by your client_id, so it is shared with every other client_credentials caller reaching the API from the same address (another service on your network, a second client on the same host). Caching the token, as described under How it's wired below, is what keeps that shared window from being spent needlessly — by you or anyone else behind the same IP. Every rate-limit refusal — this 429, and the platform's 503 when its own limiter store is unreadable — now carries a populated .error_key, readable off the same RateLimitError/ApiError.


Errors

All from allus_company_data. Same taxonomy + names across all six SDKs.

Error When
ConfigError Missing/invalid config, unreadable key file, or wrong passphrase — at construction (fail fast).
AuthError Token fetch/refresh failed (bad client_id/secret, revoked client); or a 401 survives the one automatic refresh-and-retry.
ApiError(status, error_key, message, details) Any non-2xx from the API; carries the HTTP status, the platform error_key (when present), message, and details — the error body's remaining fields (e.g. a 410 company_data.file_expired's content_sha256 + expired_at).
DecryptError A ciphertext wrapper is malformed, the key is wrong, or the GCM tag mismatches. Surfaces when a binary value's bytes are read, on a change event (the pump dead-letters it; a webhook parse raises it) and from flow-run routing and generation. connections/connection never raise it for a value — they mark it unreadable — and flow_run_answers lists such an answer under unreadable.
WebhookError Signature verification failed, or an envelope couldn't be unwrapped/parsed.
RateLimitError(retry_after) A 429 from a rate-limited endpoint. Subclass of ApiError (status fixed at 429); carries retry_after (seconds, or None).
ValidationError A value failed its field type (slug, field_type), or a flow field's minimum/maximum (bound, bound_value).
PluginInputUnavailable A required plugin input is unwired, unanswered, another party's private value, or not convertible (input, source, reason).
from allus_company_data import (
    Client, ConfigError, AuthError, ApiError,
    DecryptError, WebhookError, RateLimitError,
)

try:
    client = Client.from_config("allus.json")
    for conn in client.connections():
        ...
except ConfigError as e:
    ...   # fix the config / key file
except RateLimitError as e:
    wait(e.retry_after or 60)
except ApiError as e:
    log(e.status, e.error_key, e.message)

One request waits 45 seconds for the platform's answer. The SDK's own transport — for Client, CustomerClient and OAuthClient alike — waits 45 seconds for the platform's answer to one request, and the call then fails as it does when the connection drops; a requests.Session you pass in keeps its own limit. A request given up may still have completed on the platform.

A connection closed before the answer is tried once more. When the platform closes the connection without sending a single byte of the answer (requests reports RemoteDisconnected), the SDK sends the request once more and reports only the second failure; this also holds for a requests.Session you pass in. A reset or a broken pipe is not resent. A request is never sent again once any byte of its answer has arrived, after the 45 seconds ran out, or when the connection could not be opened. The SDK cannot tell a reused connection from a new one, so a first request on a new connection closed this way is sent again too. A request the platform acted on before its connection died with no answer at all runs twice.

503 db.writes_paused — saving is paused, retry. While the platform cannot complete a save in every region, any call that is not a GET, the change-feed drains (process_changes, drain_batch) and OAuthClient.poll_result can answer ApiError with status 503 and error_key db.writes_paused, sent with Retry-After: 30. Nothing was written (a drain drained nothing), so wait 30 seconds and repeat the same call; the SDK does not retry it. Reads and token requests keep working.

503 platform.out_of_order — the platform is out of order, retry. While the region serving a call is being rebuilt, every call — reads, the change-feed drains (process_changes, drain_batch) and the OAuthClient calls included — can answer ApiError with status 503 and error_key platform.out_of_order, sent with Retry-After: 300. The request was not processed (a drain drained nothing), so wait 300 seconds and repeat the same call; the SDK does not retry it. The client_credentials token request keeps working; every other /oauth2/token grant answers it.

See docs/errors.md.


How it's wired

Everything below is what the SDK hides so your code only ever sees conclusions.

Auth / token. An HttpClient owns a client_credentials-only token. On the first call (or when the cached token nears expiry) it POSTs client_id/client_secret to {api_url}/oauth2/token and caches the bearer token + its expiry; refresh is automatic. A mid-flight 401 triggers exactly one refresh-and-retry, then AuthError. The token is scoped server-side to one service, so every call is implicitly that service's data.

Regions. The configured api_url is the platform's global front door and also the starting point for every request, including the token request. A client_credentials token is minted at your company's home region, and the token response names that region's base in an api_url member — the SDK stores it and sends every subsequent request there, token requests included, because the token is valid only at that region and a company that moves region is followed by the next mint. A data call that still reaches the front door is refused with 421 + error_key: region.rebase_required, carrying the same api_url; the SDK stores it and retries the call exactly once. The SDK does not validate a server-returned api_url against anything — it stores the base the server names and uses it. An absent or empty api_url is never stored and the response surfaces as the error it is.

Slug resolution. request_fields() is fetched once and cached; its slug→type map types every value (so address parses to a dict, photo becomes a lazy binary handle, etc.). A value or a change naming a slug that map does not carry — a request slot configured after the client started — refetches the catalog ONCE, and a slug still absent afterwards is remembered and never asked for again. The connection/changes endpoints return values keyed by your request slug — the person's source field is dropped server-side and never reaches the SDK.

Decryption (zero-knowledge). The service private key is loaded once at construction from the configured encrypted PEM + passphrase into an in-memory RSA key. A decrypt closure over it is handed to every model factory and the pump — the key never appears in a method signature. Each value is a hybrid wrapper ({"_enc":1,"k":rsa_oaep_sha256(aesKey),"iv":…,"d":aes256gcm(…)}); the SDK RSA-OAEP-SHA256 unwraps the AES key, then AES-256-GCM decrypts the payload. The platform only ever holds ciphertext — it never sees your plaintext.

Binary fetch. A binary value is a lazy BinaryHandle over a slot-keyed value_url. On .bytes()/.pages()/.metadata()/.save() it GETs that file endpoint once and classifies the response — the raw-bytes shape on its Content-Type, the two JSON shapes on the body's encrypted member: an encrypted answer ({"encrypted":true,"value":…}) runs the same service-key decrypt to the JSON envelope, an {"encrypted":false,"value":"<envelope>"} answer carries that envelope in the clear, and a plaintext answer's body already IS the file. Either way you get the file, its pages and its declared entries, plus the response's X-Allus-Content-Sha256 on .content_sha256. (Slot-keyed, never source-field-keyed.)

The drain-on-fetch feed. process_changes delegates to a Pump wired to a fetch_changes closure (GET /changes?limit=, returning raw ciphertext events) and a decrypt closure (builds a typed Change). Because the fetch deletes the rows it returns, the pump persists each batch to the durable file buffer (ciphertext at rest) before delivery, acks per-item after your handler succeeds, and replays the buffer on restart — see The changes pump.

Sign in with allme (OAuth, #195)

Relying-party helper for the "Sign in with allme" identity flow. Config-only keys (the idw role):

from allus_company_data import OAuthClient, Claim

oauth = OAuthClient.from_config("idw-config.json")  # {api_url, oauth_client_id, oauth_redirect_uri, oauth_client_secret?, oauth_private_key?, oauth_key_passphrase?, authorize_url?}
url = oauth.authorize_url("signin", state="xyz", code_challenge=challenge)   # the button target
# ...user approves; your redirect_uri receives ?code=...
info = oauth.complete_sign_in(code, code_verifier=verifier)  # {user, mode, values(plaintext), values_cipher}

Modes: signin (identity), one_time (frozen claim values, decrypted for you), connect (a lasting connection), 2fa_enroll (opt a person into 2FA — see below). authorize_url(mode, claims=[Claim("email", "email", suggest="email_personal")]); poll_result(state) for the detached response mode.

The sign-in address is the optional authorize_url of the same config (env ALLUS_AUTHORIZE_URL). authorize_url() builds the button link on it, and on the live address https://web.allme.fyi/auth when it is absent. The authorize_url= constructor keyword stays and wins over the config value.

#498 — a claim IS a request field. You describe what you need and the person picks which of their own fields answers it; you never name a field. A claim carries a mandatory unique name (everything that comes back is keyed by it — values, values_cipher, attestations, and their stored choice for a repeat login), a field type, an optional suggested slug, required, and verified ("only a #311-verified answer will do"). A nameless or duplicate claim raises ConfigError at the call rather than failing at the API. verified is accepted only on the OIDC flow and only for a type allme can verify (today email); elsewhere it is refused with invalid_request rather than quietly dropped.

verified_max_age_days narrows a verified claim to a RECENT verification, and the merge is tighten-only: the app's registered configuration is a FLOOR, a request may only tighten it, and the effective limit is the minimum of the two stated ages. An omitted age tightens nothing — omitting it sends nothing at all, never an explicit null — and a value below 1 raises ConfigError at the call.

complete_sign_in returns {user, mode, two_factor, values, values_cipher, attestations}.

  • user.sub is the person's share code and equals share_code — byte-identical to the id_token's sub. display_name is gone: ask for a name claim and read values["name"].
  • values_cipher is an additive sibling of values, keyed the same way: the raw app-key ciphertext wrapper each plaintext value was decrypted from, exactly as userinfo delivered it. Lets you show that a value really came from encrypted delivery rather than trusting it verbatim. Empty for a mode/claim that carries no ciphertext (signin, or plaintext delivery) — that emptiness is the honest answer.
  • attestations is an additive sibling map keyed by the same claim name, present only for a verified claim under encrypted delivery. Each entry carries a verified boolean the SDK computes itself, in constant time, over the plaintext it just decrypted — plus the raw hash/salt/verified_at/ verified_expires_at. A slug ABSENT from the map is "not attested", never "wrong" (treat that value as unverified); an entry present with verified false is a MISMATCH and you must reject the value. verified_at attests the value as verified at that moment, not verified today; verified_expires_at is when that verification lapses on its own (None = it does not), and an expired attestation is unverified — the computed verified already reads false once it has passed. verified_method, verified_provider and verification_id are the proof metadata read from the opened seal — HOW the value was bound, by WHOM, and the id to quote back to allme in a dispute. All three arrive together or not at all; a seal built before the proof log existed carries none of them and every one reads None.

resolve_userinfo(access_token, fallback_mode=None) is the second half of complete_sign_in — the userinfo read + decrypt + attest, without the token exchange — for a caller whose exchange already ran through a different client (a standards-only third-party OIDC library, say, that verified the id_token itself but cannot read a claim value the id_token never carries). Config-only key handling applies exactly as it does to complete_sign_in: you pass no key or passphrase, only the access token you already hold. Returns the identical shape (values, values_cipher, attestations) and carries the same mismatch-rejection duty on the caller. complete_sign_in is implemented on top of this method. fallback_mode is used only when userinfo itself omits mode — pass the mode your own token response carried, or None if you have none.

Plugin claims. An app may declare a plugin claim; its answer arrives in values[name] as the plugin answer's JSON string. Read it with parse_plugin_value(value) → PluginValue (plugin, type, blocks, outputs; a ValidationError when the value is not a finished plugin answer). A plugin answer is always one-time — the consent screen asks it at every sign-in — and is sealed to your app key but not signed: check an output with the plugin itself when you must rely on it.

Building a plugin

A plugin is your own HTTPS service: GET {base_url}/manifest describes it (with your RSA-2048 public key) and POST {base_url}/call answers sealed requests. The SDK carries the sealing for your server — functions for the plugin's server, never calls on the allme API:

from allus_company_data import plugin_open_request, plugin_seal_reply

# POST /call — body {"request": "<wrapper string>"}
req = plugin_open_request(raw_body, open("plugin-key.pem", "rb").read(), None)   # unencrypted PKCS#8, or pass its passphrase
# req = {field_type, op: "options"|"outputs", block?, query?, picks, values, inputs, reply_key}
return plugin_seal_reply({"options": [{"id": "hrc", "label": "Horeca Fictief"}], "more": False}, req["reply_key"])

load_private_key(pem, passphrase) accepts an unencrypted PKCS#8 PEM with a None passphrase. generate_reply_key_pair() makes an RSA-2048 pair ((private_key, public_key_spki_b64)) and export_public_key_spki(key) exports a public key as base64 SPKI. A request sealed to a key your plugin no longer holds should be answered 409 {"error": "key_unknown"}.

2FA by allme (#436, #481)

Ask a connected person to approve a login inside the allme app. On the same service data client (no new config), via the two_factor sub-client:

from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

# Raise a challenge. idempotency_key is REQUIRED — a repeat within the TTL returns the SAME challenge and
# sends no second push. `context` is plain text shown on the person's card.
ch = client.two_factor.challenge("2I6UF3", idempotency_key="login-8f3c1a", context="Sign-in from Chrome")
if ch.matching_digits:                        # number matching is on for this service
    show_on_login_page(ch.matching_digits)    # the person types these back into the app; the server checks them

# Wait for the terminal outcome — polls result() for you, raises ApiError on timeout.
res = client.two_factor.wait_for_result(ch.challenge_id)   # or result(ch.challenge_id) to poll once yourself
if res.status == "approved":
    grant_login()
  • Burn-on-read. The first read of a terminal state (approved | denied | expired | revoked) delivers it and burns it — a later read is gone. Read it once and persist your own outcome; wait_for_result returns that first terminal read and never re-reads a consumed challenge.
  • Webhook variant. The 2fa_challenge_completed change/webhook carries the same terminal status, so a webhook consumer need not poll. Expiry fires no webhook/Change — only approved/denied/revoked reach the feed, so a lapsed challenge is observable only by polling.
  • Enrollment. Only an enrolled person can be challenged (an un-enrolled share_code is 404). Enrollment is a one-time consent on the web.allme.fyi/auth surface via the OAuth helper's 2fa_enroll mode — a redirect button (oauth.authorize_url("2fa_enroll", state=...)), or server-to-server with response_mode="detached" + poll_result(state), which returns {"enrolled": true, "state": ...} once the person confirms.
  • Errors. 404 (unknown / not-enrolled share code). A 429 is either the plain rate limit (retried with backoff → RateLimitError) or twofa.pending_cap (too many challenges already open for this person) — the latter surfaces immediately as ApiError and is never retried, since a retry cannot clear it.

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