allus-company-data 0.0.6

Reference Python SDK for the allus company-data API: typed, plaintext, slug-keyed conclusions with transparent decryption.

allus-company-data (Python)

The Python SDK for the allus company-data API. Point it at a JSON config file and it hands back typed, plaintext, your-slug-keyed conclusions: for each connected person, a map of your request-field slug → plaintext value (plus whether the value is live and when it last changed).

The SDK hides everything else — the OAuth token, the field catalog, the id plumbing, the hybrid decryption, binary fetching, the changes-queue mechanics, JSON-vs-XML. The platform is zero-knowledge: the API only ever holds ciphertext, so all decryption happens inside the SDK with your service private key. The person's own field choices are never exposed — you only ever see the request slots you configured.

This SDK is one of six language ports that share an identical API surface. This manual is the Python view of it.

Contents: TL;DR — fetch new updates · Quickstart · Every call · The typed value model · The changes pump · Webhooks · Company documents · Rate limits · Errors · How it's wired

Deeper reference pages live in docs/: config · model · pump · webhooks · errors.

---

TL;DR — fetch new updates

pip install allus-company-data

Point a config.json at your service keys:

{
  "api_url": "https://api.allme.fyi",
  "client_id": "svc_xxx",
  "client_secret": "xxx",
  "service_private_key": "/path/to/service.pem",
  "key_passphrase": "xxx",
  "cache_dir": "./allus-cache"
}

Drain everything new, handled one update at a time:

from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("config.json")

def handle(change):
    # one update at a time: event, person, slug, value, live, at
    print(change.event, change.person_id, change.slug, change.value,
          "live" if change.live else "snapshot", change.at)

client.process_changes(handle)   # returns when the feed is empty

process_changes pulls every pending change, decrypts it, and hands them to your callback ONE BY ONE, acking each only after your code returns. Crash mid-batch? The next run replays exactly what wasn't acked — nothing is lost, and the API keeps no backlog of its own. Run it on a schedule (cron / systemd timer); there is no daemon/follow mode by design. Connections, binary values, and webhooks are documented below.

---

Quickstart

Requires Python ≥ 3.11.

pip install allus-company-data
# or, working from this repo:  pip install -e '.[dev]'      # from sdks/python/
python -c "import allus_company_data; print(allus_company_data.__version__)"

1. Write a config file

A single JSON file holds everything. Any field can be overridden by an ALLUS_* env var, so secrets needn't live in the file. No SDK method ever takes a key, passphrase, or secret as an argument — they all come from here.

allus.json:

{
  "api_url": "https://api.allme.fyi",
  "client_id": "svc_1a2b3c…",
  "client_secret": "…",
  "service_private_key": "./service-CRM.pem",
  "key_passphrase": "…",

  "account_private_key": "./account.pem",
  "account_passphrase": "…",

  "webhooks": {
    "wh_abc123": "hmac_secret_for_that_webhook"
  },

  "cache_dir": "./allus-cache",
  "format": "json"
}

Field	Required	Meaning
api_url	yes	API base, e.g. https://api.allme.fyi.
client_id / client_secret	yes	The registered client_credentials credentials for one service.
service_private_key	yes	Path to the OpenSSL-encrypted PKCS#8 PEM you downloaded from the portal.
key_passphrase	yes	Decrypts that PEM in memory at startup.
account_private_key / account_passphrase	only for encrypt_payload webhooks	The company account key, used to unwrap an encrypted webhook envelope.
webhooks / webhook_secret	webhook auth — HMAC (default)	Per-webhook HMAC secrets keyed by webhook id (matched via the X-Allus-Webhook-Id header). A single-webhook service can use a flat "webhook_secret": "…" instead of the map.
webhook_bearer_token	webhook auth — bearer	Verify Authorization: Bearer <token> deliveries.
webhook_basic	webhook auth — basic	{"username","password"} — verify HTTP Basic deliveries.
webhook_header	webhook auth — header	{"name","value"} — verify a custom-header delivery.
webhook_auth_none	webhook auth — none	true — explicit opt-out; verifyWebhook always passes (use only behind your own gateway). Configure at most one webhook auth method (two+ → ConfigError).
cache_dir	no (default ./allus-cache)	Durable local buffer for the changes pump. Must be writable + durable.
format	no (default json)	Wire format json or xml. Invisible in the output.

Env overrides use the ALLUS_ prefix of the field name, e.g. ALLUS_CLIENT_SECRET, ALLUS_KEY_PASSPHRASE, ALLUS_ACCOUNT_PASSPHRASE, ALLUS_WEBHOOK_SECRET. A missing/invalid config (or an unreadable PEM / wrong passphrase) raises ConfigError at construction — fail fast.

2. First call — list a connection's values

from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

# Iterate every connected person (lazy, auto-paged).
for conn in client.connections():
    print(conn.display_name, conn.person_id)
    for slug, val in conn.values.items():
        print(f"  {slug} = {val.value!r}  (live={val.live}, updated={val.updated_at})")
    break  # just the first one for the demo

Or fetch one connection by id:

conn = client.connection("019xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx")
email = conn.values["work_email"].value        # "[e-mail]"  (a str)

client = Client.from_env() builds the same client entirely from ALLUS_* env vars (no file).

---

Every call

Client is the only object you construct. Build it from config, then:

Client.from_config(path, **kwargs) -> Client     # from a JSON file (env overrides secrets)
Client.from_env(**kwargs)          -> Client      # entirely from ALLUS_* env vars

kwargs are advanced/optional: http (an injected HttpClient), logger (a logging.Logger), sleep (a Callable[[float], None], for tests).

request_fields()

request_fields() -> list[RequestField]

Your request-field definitions — fetched once from GET /api/company-data/request-fields and cached for the life of the client (it types every value). Returns your request config, never the person's fields.

• Params: none.
• Returns: list[RequestField] — each RequestField(slug, label, type, one_time, mandatory, raw). mandatory is true when the field is mandatory-to-provide or mandatory-to-stay-connected.
• Raises: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError.

for f in client.request_fields():
    flag = "mandatory" if f.mandatory else "optional"
    print(f"{f.slug:20} {f.type:10} {flag}{' (one-time)' if f.one_time else ''}")

connections(limit, offset)

connections(limit: int = 100, offset: int = 0) -> Iterator[Connection]

A lazy generator that auto-pages GET /api/company-data/connections?limit&offset and yields one typed Connection at a time (bounded memory for a large book). Each conn.values[slug] is already decrypted (or a lazy binary handle).

• Params: limit — page size (default 100); offset — starting offset.
• Returns: Iterator[Connection].
• Raises: AuthError, ApiError, DecryptError (per value, at access), RateLimitError (after the iterator's bounded internal backoff — see Rate limits).

Heavily rate-limited. Use for the initial full sync + occasional reconciliation only — never as a poll substitute for the changes feed. The generator paces itself within the limit (backs off on Retry-After).

# Initial full sync, streaming so a 100k-connection book never lands in memory.
for conn in client.connections(limit=200):
    upsert_local_record(conn)

connection(id)

connection(id: str) -> Connection

Fetch one connection by its connection id (GET /api/company-data/connections/{id}).

• Params: id — the connection id (Connection.id).
• Returns: one Connection. Note: this endpoint returns {connection_id, user_id, values} and no display_name/connected_at, so those identity fields are None here (the list endpoint carries them).
• Raises: AuthError, ApiError (404 if unknown), DecryptError, RateLimitError.

conn = client.connection(conn_id)
phone = conn.values.get("mobile")
if phone:
    print(phone.value, "live" if phone.live else "snapshot")

logs(limit, offset)

logs(limit: int = 50, offset: int = 0) -> list[LogEntry]

The service's activity log (GET /api/company-data/logs?limit&offset) — ops events only (email / purge / webhook), never person field data.

• Params: limit (default 50), offset (default 0).
• Returns: list[LogEntry] — each LogEntry(type, message, metadata, at, raw).
• Raises: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError.

for entry in client.logs(limit=20):
    print(entry.at, entry.type, entry.message)

process_changes(handler, **options)

process_changes(handler: Callable[[Change], None], **options) -> None

The crash-safe changes pump: drains the feed through handler one Change at a time, durably buffering each batch before delivery, with per-item ack and retry → dead-letter → continue. Runs until the feed is empty, then returns — there is no follow/daemon mode (you schedule re-runs yourself). Delivery is at-least-once, so your handler must be idempotent (dedup on Change.id). See The changes pump for the full model.

• Params: handler — your callback; called with one Change. A return is an ack; an exception triggers retry.
• Options (keyword-only): batch_size (clamped to ≤ 500, default 100), max_retries (default 3), on_error ("deadletter" — default — or "halt"), backoff (Callable[[int], float], attempt → seconds).
• Returns: None (when the feed is empty + the buffer is drained).
• Raises: AuthError, ApiError, RateLimitError (during a drain); ValueError (bad on_error); whatever the handler raises if on_error="halt" and retries are exhausted.

def handle(change):
    if already_processed(change.id):      # idempotency — dedup on the stable id
        return
    if change.event == "field_updated":
        store(change.person_id, change.slug, change.value)
    elif change.event in ("connection_deleted", "field_deleted"):
        remove(change.person_id, change.slug)
    mark_processed(change.id)

client.process_changes(handle)            # returns when the feed is empty

logger is not a process_changes option in this SDK — pass it once to the Client constructor (Client.from_config("allus.json", logger=my_logger)).

Advanced changes primitives

drain_batch(max: int = 100)                      -> list[Change]   # raw, UNBUFFERED — you own durability
dead_letters()                                   -> list[dict]      # the local dead-letter store
retry_dead_letters(handler, **options)           -> int             # re-drive dead-lettered events; returns count re-driven

• drain_batch(max) — fetches one batch (clamped ≤ 500) and returns the decrypted Changes directly. It does not persist anything, so a crash loses what the API already deleted. Prefer process_changes for safe consumption.
• dead_letters() — each dict is the stored (ciphertext) event plus a flattened error and attempts.
• retry_dead_letters(handler, **options) — same max_retries / on_error / backoff options as process_changes; on success a record is removed, on repeated failure it stays dead-lettered (or re-raises under "halt"). Dead letters are never re-fetched from the API — the local store is their only home.

for dl in client.dead_letters():
    print("stuck:", dl["id"], dl["error"], "after", dl["attempts"], "attempts")

n = client.retry_dead_letters(handle)     # after you've fixed the bug
print(f"re-drove {n} dead letters")

Webhook helpers (on the client)

The webhook receiver helpers are also exposed as Client methods (they delegate to the module functions, fully config-driven — no key/secret arguments):

client.verify_webhook(raw_body: bytes, headers: dict) -> bool
client.parse_webhook(raw_body: bytes, headers: dict)  -> Change
client.handle_webhook(raw_body: bytes, headers: dict) -> Change   # verify + parse

• verify_webhook — recomputes HMAC-SHA256(raw_body, secret) and constant-time-compares it to X-Allus-Signature. Returns True/False; never raises for a bad signature.
• parse_webhook — body → a typed Change. Does not verify. Handles JSON, XML, and the encrypt_payload account-key envelope. Raises WebhookError on a malformed/unparseable body.
• handle_webhook — verify then parse; raises WebhookError on a bad/unknown signature, otherwise returns the Change. The typical one-liner inside a route.

The same three are importable as standalone functions (from allus_company_data import verify_webhook, parse_webhook, handle_webhook), which take the config and the decrypt/type closures explicitly — but inside an app you'll almost always use the client methods. See Webhooks.

---

The typed value model

You work with these objects and nothing else (from allus_company_data import …):

RequestField { slug, label, type, one_time, mandatory }     # YOUR request config
Connection   { id, person_id, display_name, connected_at, values: {<slug>: Value} }
Value        { value, live, updated_at }
Change       { id, event, person_id, slug?, value?, live?, document_id?, status?, at }
Document     { id, kind, name, description, status, payload_kind, is_private, value, metadata, created_at, updated_at }
LogEntry     { type, message, metadata, at }

Keyed by your slug

conn.values["work_email"].value → "[e-mail]". The key is the stable, explicit slug you set per request field in the portal — rename the label freely, the slug is the contract. The person's source field is never exposed: no source slug, no field_id, not even via .raw.

Value(value, live, updated_at)

Attribute	Meaning
value	The typed plaintext (see the table below).
live	True if the person chose "keep connected" (auto-updates); False for a one-time snapshot.
updated_at	datetime of when this answer last changed (per-answer, rides on the Value).

Value types (from the field's type)

Field type	Python value
email, phone, url, text	str
address, bank, creditcard	dict — the decrypted plaintext is a JSON object, parsed for you
date, date_of_birth	datetime.date (falls back to the raw string if it can't be parsed)
photo, document, legal_document	a lazy BinaryHandle — see below

addr = conn.values["home_address"].value     # dict, e.g. {"street": "...", "city": "...", ...}
dob  = conn.values["birthday"].value          # datetime.date(1990, 5, 17)

Binary fields — the lazy BinaryHandle

A photo/document value is a BinaryHandle. Nothing is fetched or decrypted until you call .bytes() or .save():

handle = conn.values["passport_scan"].value   # BinaryHandle (no network yet)

data = handle.bytes()                          # GET the slot file → decrypt → file bytes
n    = handle.save("/tmp/passport.jpg")        # same, written to disk; returns bytes written
print(handle.value_url)                         # the opaque slot-keyed URL it fetches from

.bytes() GETs the slot-keyed file endpoint, unwraps the API's {"encrypted": true, "value": <wrapper>} envelope, decrypts with your service key, parses the inner JSON envelope ({"full": "data:…"} for photos, {"file": "data:…"} for documents) and base64-decodes the data URI into the file bytes. The result is cached on the handle, so repeated calls don't re-fetch.

Change(id, event, person_id, slug?, value?, live?, at)

A change-feed / webhook event.

Attribute	Meaning
id	The stable server change-row id — your dedup key (captured before the server delete).
event	connection_created, connection_deleted, field_updated, field_deleted, consent_accepted, consent_declined, document_status_changed.
person_id	The person the change is about (may be None).
slug, value, live	Present only on field_updated; value is typed exactly like Value.value (incl. a lazy BinaryHandle for binaries). Connection/consent/document events carry no slot/value.
document_id, status	Present only on document_status_changed — which document moved lifecycle state and to what (no slug/value). See Company documents.
at	datetime of the change. (There is no separate updated_at on a change.)

.raw

Every model carries .raw — the underlying hardened API dict — for debugging or an edge case the SDK didn't model. It still never contains the person's source field.

See docs/model.md for the full reference.

---

The changes pump

The changes feed is a server-side drain-on-fetch queue: GET /api/company-data/changes?limit=N returns up to N events (default 100, max 500) and deletes exactly those rows in the same transaction — no offset/cursor, and the API keeps no copy afterward. So consumption can't be a plain list: a consumer crash mid-batch would lose events the API already deleted, and a huge backlog must not materialize in memory. process_changes solves both.

Per run, repeating until the feed is empty then returning:

1. Replay first. Deliver any un-acked events already in the local buffer (from a previous crashed run), oldest-first.
2. Drain. When the buffer is empty, fetch one batch and persist it to the durable file buffer (fsync) BEFORE handing anything out. This is the backup the API no longer has.
3. Deliver one-by-one. For each buffered event, oldest-first: decrypt its value at delivery (never on disk), build the typed Change, call handler.
4. Ack / retry / dead-letter. On success, remove the event from the buffer (ack). On a handler error, retry with backoff up to max_retries; then either move it to the dead-letter store and continue (on_error="deadletter", default — one poison event never wedges the stream) or stop and re-raise (on_error="halt"). A DecryptError on a buffered event (corrupt/truncated ciphertext, rotated key) is dead-lettered immediately — re-decrypting can't fix it, so it does not burn retries (under on_error="halt" it re-raises). Either way it never propagates out and wedges replay.
5. Repeat until a drain returns empty and the buffer is drained → return.

The durable buffer

• Plain files under cache_dir (zero extra dependencies): pending/ for un-acked events, deadletter/ for ones that exhausted retries.
• Stored events keep their ciphertext value — no plaintext PII is ever written to disk. Decryption happens only at delivery.
• Writes are crash-safe (temp file → fsync → atomic rename → dir fsync). Files are named with a monotonic, zero-padded sequence so they replay oldest-first.

Crash safety, at-least-once, and idempotency

A batch is durably buffered before any delivery, and acked per-item only after the handler succeeds. The ack can't be atomic with your side-effects — a crash between your handler's success and its ack re-delivers that event on the next run. That makes delivery at-least-once, so:

Your handler must be idempotent. Dedup on Change.id.

Change.id is the stable server change-row id, captured before the server delete, so it survives crash + replay unchanged.

No follow mode

process_changes returns when the feed empties. You schedule re-runs — a cron job, a while True: client.process_changes(handle); time.sleep(5) loop, a worker queue, whatever fits. The feed is cheap to poll (see Rate limits).

Worked example

import time
from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

def handle(change):
    # Idempotent: skip anything we've already applied.
    if seen(change.id):
        return
    match change.event:
        case "field_updated":
            store_value(change.person_id, change.slug, change.value, live=change.live)
        case "field_deleted":
            clear_value(change.person_id, change.slug)
        case "connection_deleted":
            drop_person(change.person_id)
        case "connection_created" | "consent_accepted" | "consent_declined":
            note_event(change.person_id, change.event, change.at)
    record_seen(change.id)

# Schedule your own re-runs; process_changes itself returns when empty.
while True:
    client.process_changes(handle, batch_size=200, max_retries=5)
    time.sleep(5)

If a handler keeps failing, the event lands in the dead-letter store instead of blocking the stream; inspect with client.dead_letters() and re-drive with client.retry_dead_letters(handle) after fixing the cause. See docs/pump.md.

---

Webhooks

Webhooks are the lower-latency push alternative to polling the changes feed. The platform POSTs each change event to your configured webhook URL with:

• X-Allus-Webhook-Id — which webhook this is (selects the HMAC secret from config).
• X-Allus-Signature — HMAC-SHA256(rawBody, secret) as lowercase hex.
• the body — the same slug-keyed Change shape as the pull feed (JSON or XML).

All secrets/keys come from config; the helpers take no key or secret arguments. Use the raw request body bytes (do not re-serialize a parsed body — the HMAC is over the exact bytes the platform sent).

In a web route (Flask)

from flask import Flask, request, abort
from allus_company_data import Client, WebhookError

app = Flask(__name__)
client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

@app.post("/allus/webhook")
def allus_webhook():
    try:
        change = client.handle_webhook(request.get_data(), dict(request.headers))
    except WebhookError:
        abort(401)              # bad / unknown signature, or unparseable envelope

    # Same idempotency rule as the pump: dedup on change.id.
    if not seen(change.id):
        apply_change(change)
        record_seen(change.id)
    return ("", 204)

verify_webhook / parse_webhook let you split the steps if you prefer:

if not client.verify_webhook(raw_body, headers):
    abort(401)
change = client.parse_webhook(raw_body, headers)

Config-driven secrets

Per-webhook HMAC secrets live in the config webhooks map, keyed by webhook id; the SDK reads X-Allus-Webhook-Id off the request and looks up the matching secret. A single-webhook service can use the flat "webhook_secret": "…" shortcut (or ALLUS_WEBHOOK_SECRET). An unknown/unconfigured id ⇒ verification returns False (and handle_webhook raises WebhookError).

The encrypt_payload account-key envelope

If a webhook has encrypt_payload enabled, the body is replaced by a {"_enc":1,…} envelope encrypted to your company account key (and the HMAC is over that envelope — the final bytes sent). parse_webhook/handle_webhook unwrap it transparently using the configured account_private_key + account_passphrase, then decrypt the inner field value with the service key — so an encrypted-payload Change is identical to a plain one. If you receive such a webhook without an account_private_key configured, you get a WebhookError.

The account-key envelope uses OAEP-SHA1 (OpenSSL's default), distinct from the OAEP-SHA256 used for person field values — the SDK handles this difference internally; you only supply the account key in config.

See docs/webhooks.md.

---

Company documents

Documents are content your service issues to people (a quote, a contract, a JSON payload, a PDF) — the mirror image of the request slots. They come in two shapes:

• Broadcast — no target. Sent to every connection on the service. Plaintext — you can't single-key-encrypt one value to all your connections, so a broadcast value is stored as-is.
• Per-person — targeted at one connection (connection_id= / person_user_id= / share_code=). Automatically end-to-end encrypted to that recipient's public key before it leaves the process. The server only ever stores ciphertext.

The encryption rule, plainly: every per-person document is automatically end-to-end encrypted to the recipient's public key — for any is_private value. Broadcast documents are plaintext. is_private is a device-display-only flag (it picks lock-screen vs decrypt-on-load on the recipient's device), not what decides encryption — so is_private=True with no per-person target raises ConfigError. As everywhere in this SDK, no method ever takes a key or secret argument — the recipient key is fetched for you, and your own service key comes from config.

Creating documents

payload_kind picks the body:

• payload_kind="json" — pass json_value= (a JSON-serializable object).
• payload_kind="file" — pass file_bytes= (+ file_mime=); the bytes are uploaded. For a per-person file the bytes are encrypted automatically too.

from allus_company_data import Client

client = Client.from_config("allus.json")

# 1. BROADCAST plaintext json doc — every connection sees it, no target.
notice = client.create_document(
    kind="document",
    name="2026 price list",
    payload_kind="json",
    json_value={"plan": "pro", "monthly": 49, "currency": "EUR"},
)

# 2. PER-PERSON doc — auto-encrypted to that recipient's public key.
#    Target it by ANY one of connection_id / person_user_id / share_code.
contract = client.create_document(
    kind="document",
    name="Service agreement",
    payload_kind="json",
    is_private=True,                       # display-only; needs a per-person target
    connection_id="019xxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxxx",
    json_value={"tier": "enterprise", "term_months": 12},
)

# A per-person FILE — the bytes are encrypted for the recipient automatically.
with open("agreement.pdf", "rb") as fh:
    pdf = client.create_document(
        kind="legal_document",
        name="Signed agreement",
        payload_kind="file",
        person_user_id="019yyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyyy",
        file_bytes=fh.read(),
        file_mime="application/pdf",
    )

# is_private without a target → ConfigError (a broadcast can't be locked).

Listing, reading, updating, deleting

list_documents(*, person_user_id=None, status=None, limit=100, offset=0) -> list[Document]
document(document_id)                                                     -> Document
update_document_status(document_id, status)                              -> Document
update_document_metadata(document_id, *, metadata=None, name=None,
                         description=None)                               -> Document
delete_document(document_id)                                            -> None

# All this service's documents (optionally filter by person and/or status).
for doc in client.list_documents(status="offering"):
    print(doc.id, doc.name, doc.status, doc.payload_kind, "private" if doc.is_private else "shared")

doc = client.document(contract.id)

# For a json doc, .json() returns the plaintext object — a per-person doc is
# decrypted with your service key on demand; a broadcast doc is already plaintext.
print(doc.json())

# Move it through its lifecycle / edit its metadata.
client.update_document_status(contract.id, "active")
client.update_document_metadata(contract.id, name="Service agreement (v2)",
                                metadata={"renewal": "auto"})

client.delete_document(notice.id)

A Document carries id, kind, name, description, status, payload_kind, is_private, value, metadata, created_at, updated_at (and .raw). Use .json() on a payload_kind="json" document to get the decrypted plaintext object.

Reacting to a status change in the feed

When someone advances one of your documents (e.g. signs it), the platform emits a document_status_changed change. In a process_changes handler it carries .document_id and .status (and no slug/value — it's a lifecycle event, not a field value):

def handle(change):
    if change.event == "document_status_changed":
        # the document moved lifecycle state (offering → ready_to_sign → active → …)
        on_document_status(change.document_id, change.status)
    elif change.event == "field_updated":
        store(change.person_id, change.slug, change.value)

client.process_changes(handle)

---

Rate limits

Endpoint	Limit	Use it for
changes (the pump)	generous	Poll as often as you like — it's a cheap drain-on-fetch queue.
request-fields, logs	moderate	Occasional reads.
connections, connection(id), binary /file	heavily limited	Initial full sync + occasional reconciliation only — never as a poll substitute.

A 429 carries Retry-After. The SDK backs off and retries automatically:

• The transport (HttpClient) retries a 429 a bounded number of times honoring Retry-After, then surfaces RateLimitError.
• The connections(...) generator additionally backs off per Retry-After on a surfaced RateLimitError and retries the page a bounded number of times before re-raising — so it paces itself within the limit instead of hammering.

If you catch a RateLimitError, its .retry_after is the seconds to wait (or None when the header was absent).

---

Errors

All from allus_company_data. Same taxonomy + names across all six SDKs.

Error	When
ConfigError	Missing/invalid config, unreadable key file, or wrong passphrase — at construction (fail fast).
AuthError	Token fetch/refresh failed (bad client_id/secret, revoked client); or a 401 survives the one automatic refresh-and-retry.
ApiError(status, error_key, message)	Any non-2xx from the API; carries the HTTP status, the platform error_key (when present), and message.
DecryptError	A ciphertext wrapper is malformed, the key is wrong, or the GCM tag mismatches. Surfaces when a value is accessed/decrypted.
WebhookError	Signature verification failed, or an envelope couldn't be unwrapped/parsed.
RateLimitError(retry_after)	A 429 from a rate-limited endpoint. Subclass of ApiError (status fixed at 429); carries retry_after (seconds, or None).

from allus_company_data import (
    Client, ConfigError, AuthError, ApiError,
    DecryptError, WebhookError, RateLimitError,
)

try:
    client = Client.from_config("allus.json")
    for conn in client.connections():
        ...
except ConfigError as e:
    ...   # fix the config / key file
except RateLimitError as e:
    wait(e.retry_after or 60)
except ApiError as e:
    log(e.status, e.error_key, e.message)

See docs/errors.md.

---

How it's wired

Everything below is what the SDK hides so your code only ever sees conclusions.

Auth / token. An HttpClient owns a client_credentials-only token. On the first call (or when the cached token nears expiry) it POSTs client_id/client_secret to {api_url}/oauth2/token and caches the bearer token + its expiry; refresh is automatic. A mid-flight 401 triggers exactly one refresh-and-retry, then AuthError. The token is scoped server-side to one service, so every call is implicitly that service's data.

Slug resolution. request_fields() is fetched once and cached; its slug→type map types every value (so address parses to a dict, photo becomes a lazy binary handle, etc.). The connection/changes endpoints return values keyed by your request slug — the person's source field is dropped server-side and never reaches the SDK.

Decryption (zero-knowledge). The service private key is loaded once at construction from the configured encrypted PEM + passphrase into an in-memory RSA key. A decrypt closure over it is handed to every model factory and the pump — the key never appears in a method signature. Each value is a hybrid wrapper ({"_enc":1,"k":rsa_oaep_sha256(aesKey),"iv":…,"d":aes256gcm(…)}); the SDK RSA-OAEP-SHA256 unwraps the AES key, then AES-256-GCM decrypts the payload. The platform only ever holds ciphertext — it never sees your plaintext.

Binary fetch. A binary value is a lazy BinaryHandle over a slot-keyed value_url. On .bytes()/.save() it GETs that file endpoint, unwraps the {"encrypted":true,"value":<wrapper>} envelope, runs the same service-key decrypt to a JSON file-envelope, and base64-decodes its data URI to the file bytes. (Slot-keyed, never source-field-keyed.)

The drain-on-fetch feed. process_changes delegates to a Pump wired to a fetch_changes closure (GET /changes?limit=, returning raw ciphertext events) and a decrypt closure (builds a typed Change). Because the fetch deletes the rows it returns, the pump persists each batch to the durable file buffer (ciphertext at rest) before delivery, acks per-item after your handler succeeds, and replays the buffer on restart — see The changes pump.