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asqav

Python SDK for asqav.com, the evidence layer for AI agents.

Every agent action gets a signed, hash-chained compliance receipt: ML-DSA-65 (FIPS 204, post-quantum), timestamped against independent witnesses, and verifiable by anyone - auditor, counterparty, regulator - without an Asqav account and without trusting us.

Zero native dependencies. Cryptography runs server-side.

Install

pip install asqav

Quick start

pip install asqav
export ASQAV_API_KEY=<paste your key here>
import asqav
asqav.init()
agent = asqav.Agent.create("my-first-agent")
receipt = agent.sign("test", {"hello": "world"})
print("Receipt:", receipt.verification_url)

The printed link is your signed receipt; anyone can open it. To keep the key out of your shell profile, install the CLI with pip install "asqav[cli]" and run asqav login once; asqav.init() then reads the saved key. asqav quickstart prints these steps again.

Check it from the shell with asqav verify <signature_id>, where the id is the last part of the receipt URL. A fresh receipt reads Signature: valid with Anchor: pending until its timestamp anchor confirms.

asqav.govern(agent_name="my-agent") folds init() and Agent.create() into one call.

Verify it without an account

This is the point of the whole thing - the receipt stands on its own:

Run this right now, with no key and no signup:

import asqav

result = asqav.verify("sig_example_regulator_cold_verify_2026")
print(result["verified"])     # False -- and that is the point, see below
print(result["chain_hash"])   # recomputed on your machine from the canonical bytes

That id is a shape example: its signature bytes are placeholders and its kid resolves to no key, so the verifier returns verified: false instead of waving it through. Swap in a signature_id of your own for a receipt that passes. A verifier that says no when the evidence is absent is the only kind worth having.

From the shell (the cli extra provides the asqav command):

pip install "asqav[cli]"
asqav verify <your_signature_id>

Offline or air-gapped, snapshot the keys once and verify with no network at all. This re-derives the signature itself, so it needs the verify extra (dilithium-py for ML-DSA-65, cryptography for the Ed25519 and ES256 axes - without it those signatures report INCOMPLETE rather than verifying):

pip install "asqav[verify]"
import asqav, json

jwks = asqav.fetch_jwks()                     # online, once
json.dump(jwks, open("jwks.json", "w"))

receipt = json.load(open("receipt.json"))     # offline from here
result  = asqav.verify_receipt_offline(receipt, json.load(open("jwks.json")))
assert result["verdict"] == "PASS", result["axes"]

Pass predecessor=prev_receipt to check the hash-chain link too. Guide: offline and air-gapped verification.

No account? Queue locally

from asqav.local import local_sign, LocalQueue

local_sign("my-agent", "api:openai:chat", {"model": "gpt-4o"})  # -> ~/.asqav/queue/

import asqav
asqav.init(api_key="sk_...")
LocalQueue().sync()            # {"synced": N, "failed": M}

Data handling modes

The SDK picks the safer default for where you point it:

  • Cloud (*.asqav.com): hash-only. A SHA-256 fingerprint is computed locally and only the hash plus action_type, agent_id, session_id, model_name, tool_name is sent. Prompts and tool arguments never leave your side.
  • Self-hosted: full payload, so the server can run policy checks and richer audit.
asqav.init(api_key="...", base_url="https://api.asqav.com", mode="hash-only")

High-value actions

For regulated or high-risk actions, pass envelope fields that an auditor will look for:

sig = agent.sign(
    "payment.wire_transfer",
    {"amount_eur": 850000, "beneficiary_iban": "DE89370400440532013000"},
    receipt_type="protectmcp:decision",
    risk_class="high",                 # low | medium | high | unknown
    issuer_id="legal:Acme GmbH",       # LEI, EIN, CIK or W3C DID
    iteration_id="task-2026-Q2-4821",  # logical task, distinct from session
    invocation_ref="toolu_abc123",  # one tool invocation; no uniqueness, de-dup, or exactly-once
)

nonce is an opaque per-call token (12 random bytes when omitted). The cloud refuses a value a live signature for the same agent in the same organisation already holds, answering HTTP 409, so the field bounds replay while that earlier receipt is inside its validity window. A receipt whose valid_until has passed frees the token; one signed with no expiry keeps it.

CLI

asqav whoami                       # active key source, validated
asqav init                         # print a ready-to-paste snippet
asqav verify <signature_id>        # verify a receipt (no key needed)
asqav sign --agent-id ID --action-type T --action-json action.json
asqav agents list | create | revoke
asqav replay-verify <agent_id> <session_id> [--strict]
asqav audit-pack export --start ISO --end ISO --output-file bundle.json
asqav payloads erase <signature_id>          # right-to-erasure

Full command reference: asqav.com/docs/cli.

Framework integrations

Native callbacks under asqav.extras.* for LangChain, CrewAI, LiteLLM, OpenAI Agents and others, plus a pytest plugin. Adapters install behind documented extras (asqav[langchain], asqav[litellm], asqav[openai-agents]). See integrations and pytest plugin.

What a receipt does not prove

Stated plainly, because an auditor will ask:

  • Not that the action ran, or ran once. A receipt records a decision and the bytes that passed through, never the effect. A retry produces a second receipt.
  • Not that the policy was correct. policy_digest proves which policy artefact existed, not that it was the right one.
  • Not that the environment was intact. No field here carries a remote attestation result.
  • Tamper-evident, not tamper-proof. Modification is detectable, not prevented.

The full list is in the IETF profile under "What a Compliance Receipt Does Not Prove".

Reference

Topic Docs
Threat-framework mappings (MITRE, OWASP, NIST AI RMF, ISO 42001, EU AI Act) threat-framework-mapping
NSA CSI U/OO/6030316-26 receipt fields nsa-mcp-csi-alignment
Build provenance (executable_hash, sbom_digest, SLSA) executable-hash-and-sbom-provenance
Witness policy and multi-witness anchoring multi-witness-anchoring
Binding tool output (result_digest) result-digest
Configuration-change receipts configuration-change-receipts
Code-authorship receipts code-authorship-receipts
Structured receipts (optional schema) structured-receipts
Bring-your-own DLP / policy detectors scanning
Audit Pack export compliance
Independent verification protocol independent-verification

Requirements

Python 3.10+. Uses httpx. Zero native dependencies.

Standards

Profiled in the IETF Internet-Draft draft-marques-asqav-compliance-receipts, an Independent Submission profiling draft-farley-acta-signed-receipts. Aligns with NIST FIPS 204 (ML-DSA), RFC 8785 (JCS) and NSA CSI U/OO/6030316-26.

Docs · SDK guide · Repository · Discovery descriptor

License

The SDK uses Elastic License 2.0. The standalone asqav/verifier/verify_receipt.py file has an Apache-2.0 header; its terms are included in licenses/Apache-2.0.txt. The broader verifier package and oracle remain under Elastic terms.

Wheels and source distributions include these terms and the file-scope NOTICE. Their combined license expression describes the separate file scopes; it does not offer a choice of licenses for the SDK.

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