bastionsupply

MCP supply-chain security scanner. Point it at an MCP server's tool definitions and it flags the supply-chain attacks before you install: tool-poisoning, tool-shadowing, hidden unicode, secret solicitation, dangerous capabilities, and rug-pull drift.

The pre-flight leg of the bastion family:

No network, no LLM, no dependencies — pure static analysis of what a server claims about itself, which is exactly where the attack hides.

Install

pip install bastionsupply

Use

# offline: scan a tools/list JSON dump
bastionsupply scan tools.json

# live: spawn a stdio MCP server and scan the tools it advertises
bastionsupply scan --stdio "npx -y @some/mcp-server" --live

# live: scan every server in an MCP client config
bastionsupply scan --config ~/.config/mcp.json --live

# rug-pull: pin tool hashes now, detect silent changes later
bastionsupply lock tools.json -o supply.lock
bastionsupply verify tools.json --lock supply.lock

# bridge: emit an agentbastion tool policy (default-deny, risky tools blocked)
bastionsupply harden tools.json -o policy.yaml

scan exits non-zero when anything critical or high is found — drop it in CI to fail a build that pulls in a poisoned server.

What it catches

Library

from bastionsupply import load_json_file, scan, to_text, to_policy_yaml

report = scan(load_json_file("tools.json"))
print(to_text(report))
print("safe" if report.ok else "risky", report.risk)

Live fetch note

--stdio / --config --live spawn the server process to call tools/list. Only run them on servers you intend to execute. Offline scan tools.json never runs anything.

HTTP/SSE transport isn't implemented yet — stdio covers the common locally-installed case.

MIT.