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bastionsupply

MCP supply-chain security scanner. Point it at an MCP server's tool definitions and it flags the supply-chain attacks before you install: tool-poisoning, tool-shadowing, hidden unicode, secret solicitation, dangerous capabilities, and rug-pull drift.

The pre-flight leg of the bastion family:

tool job
bastionsupply scan an MCP server before you trust it
agentbastion prevent — firewall around a running agent
bastionprobe attack — pentest your agent with injections
bastiontrace investigate — forensics on an agent trace

Offline scanning is pure static analysis of what a server claims about itself — no LLM, no network. Its one dependency is bastioncorpus, the shared prompt-injection dataset the whole bastion family uses for attack signatures.

Install

pip install bastionsupply

Use

# offline: scan a tools/list JSON dump
bastionsupply scan tools.json

# live: spawn a stdio MCP server and scan the tools it advertises
bastionsupply scan --stdio "npx -y @some/mcp-server" --live

# live: scan a remote MCP Streamable-HTTP server
bastionsupply scan --http https://some.host/mcp --live

# live: scan every server in an MCP client config
bastionsupply scan --config ~/.config/mcp.json --live

# rug-pull: pin tool hashes now, detect silent changes later
bastionsupply lock tools.json -o supply.lock
bastionsupply verify tools.json --lock supply.lock

# bridge: emit an agentbastion tool policy (default-deny, risky tools blocked)
bastionsupply harden tools.json -o policy.yaml

scan exits non-zero when anything critical or high is found — drop it in CI to fail a build that pulls in a poisoned server.

What it catches

check severity what it means
tool-poisoning critical instructions aimed at the model — in the tool description or a parameter
hidden-unicode critical format / control / private-use chars (zero-width, bidi, tag) hiding in a name, description, or parameter
homoglyph-name critical/high a tool (or parameter) name using look-alike chars — critical when it folds to the same skeleton as a sibling tool (active impersonation), high for a mixed-script name
tool-shadowing high a tool's description talks about other tools — hijacking their behavior
secret-solicitation high a parameter asks the model to hand over an api_key / token / password
sensitive-capability high/med tool exposes exec, delete, network, secret-read, or privilege escalation
rug-pull (verify) — tool definitions changed since you pinned them

Library

from bastionsupply import load_json_file, scan, to_text, to_policy_yaml

report = scan(load_json_file("tools.json"))
print(to_text(report))
print("safe" if report.ok else "risky", report.risk)

Live fetch note

--stdio / --config --live spawn the server process to call tools/list. Only run them on servers you intend to execute. Offline scan tools.json never runs anything. Live fetch is bounded — a hostile server that hangs or streams a giant reply is cut off by the timeout and a per-message size cap, not left to hang or exhaust memory. --http speaks http/https only and never follows redirects (no SSRF to file:// or internal hosts).

MIT.

Metadata

Release files for bastionsupply 0.3.0

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Source distribution for bastionsupply 0.3.0
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