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AI-assisted security review for code diffs and whole repositories.

Project description

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Tests PyPI Python License

AI-assisted security review for code diffs and whole repositories.

The tool has two review paths:

  • Diff Review audits a pull request or unified diff in one command.
  • Repository Review fans out across a whole repository, reviews focused units, deduplicates candidates, verifies findings, and checks coverage with a gate.

Diff Review is fast and reads only the change, so it catches what is visible in the diff. Cross-file business logic and invariants that span files need context from across the repository, which is Repository Review's job, so a clean Diff Review does not by itself clear the repository.

Security knowledge is data. Vulnerability classes, language guides, framework guides, and protocol guides live in markdown under each review domain's knowledge/ directory, for example codejury/domains/web/knowledge/, so adding a stack or class is usually a data change rather than a Python code change. The web domain is the default and evm reviews Solidity smart contracts, selected with --domain or detected automatically.

Install

pip install codejury
codejury install-slash-command

That is the whole setup. pip install codejury pulls everything a normal review needs, the Anthropic and OpenAI backends and the Claude Code subscription transport, with no extras to choose. codejury install-slash-command drops the /codejury-review command into both the Claude Code and Codex command directories, so it works in either agent: run it on a repository directory for a whole-repository review, or on a diff file or git range for a diff review.

Configure a Model Backend

Set a provider key, or run keyless on your Claude Code subscription with --executor subscription:

export CODEJURY_MODEL=claude-opus-4-8
export CODEJURY_API_KEY=...
export CODEJURY_API_BASE=...   # optional gateway or proxy
export CODEJURY_WIRE_API=chat  # set responses for a GPT-5 reasoning model, see below

An OpenAI GPT-5 reasoning model answers on the Responses API, not Chat Completions, so set CODEJURY_WIRE_API=responses or pass --wire-api responses for the base model, otherwise the call comes back blank and the review fails loud. Chat is the default and fits the other models.

The CLI loads a .env from the working directory at startup, so a project can set its provider config once instead of exporting it every session. A value already exported in the shell wins over the file, and a missing file is fine. The auto-load is a CLI convenience, so importing the library directly does not read .env.

Useful flags:

  • --provider anthropic|openai|litellm
  • --model <model>
  • --api-key <key>
  • --api-base <url>
  • --wire-api chat|responses
  • --retries <n>
  • --timeout <seconds>

Cross-Model Review

A single-model run needs only the setup above. For stronger verification, both review paths name three model roles, finder, challenger, and judge. The finder finds, the challenger refutes, the judge confirms before a deletion. Each role defaults to the base --model. Put a different vendor in any seat for cross-model review, where uncorrelated blind spots catch what one model misses, and a deletion needs the judge to be a distinct model from the challenger so no lone skeptic drops a real finding. With the judge not distinct, nothing is refuted, the recall-safe default.

Each role takes a full backend, the same five fields as the base, every one unset by default: CODEJURY_<ROLE>_PROVIDER, _MODEL, _API_KEY, _API_BASE, _WIRE_API, with <ROLE> one of FINDER, CHALLENGER, JUDGE, and the matching --<role>-provider, --<role>-model, --<role>-api-key, --<role>-api-base, --<role>-wire-api flags. An unset field inherits the base, so override only the seat you want to change, and a role that switches vendor brings its own key since the base key belongs to the base vendor. For example a Claude base finder challenged by GPT and confirmed by Claude:

export CODEJURY_CHALLENGER_PROVIDER=openai
export CODEJURY_CHALLENGER_MODEL=...             # a GPT model, the skeptic
export CODEJURY_CHALLENGER_API_KEY=...
export CODEJURY_CHALLENGER_WIRE_API=responses    # the GPT-5 reasoning models speak Responses
export CODEJURY_JUDGE_MODEL=...                  # a Claude model, the confirmer, distinct from the challenger

The same CODEJURY_FINDER_* / CODEJURY_CHALLENGER_* / CODEJURY_JUDGE_* and the matching --finder-* / --challenger-* / --judge-* flags work on both review diff and review repository. Note that review repository --run finds with one model, the finder, and a seat that runs on the subscription supplies its own review, so it ignores that seat's backend flags while the others still apply.

Diff Review

Diff Review is the fast coded path. It audits a unified diff with either a standard single model call or an adversarial Finder, Challenger, and Judge pass.

codejury review diff [--file <file> | --git-range <range>] [options]
# review a diff file
codejury review diff --file changes.diff

# review a git range
codejury review diff --repository /path/to/app --git-range origin/main...HEAD

# review stdin
git diff HEAD~1 | codejury review diff

# use adversarial mode for extra recall on subtle cross-file logic
codejury review diff --file changes.diff --mode adversarial

# emit SARIF and fail on HIGH or CRITICAL findings
codejury review diff --file changes.diff --format sarif --fail-on high

# review with no provider key, riding your Claude Code subscription
codejury review diff --file changes.diff --executor subscription

# carry fetched source provenance into the report, see Fetch Verified Source
codejury review diff --file changes.diff --source-meta target/codejury-source.json

# run adversarial mode with a keyless Claude finder and judge plus an OpenAI challenger on its own key
codejury review diff --file changes.diff --mode adversarial \
  --challenger-provider openai --challenger-api-key "$OPENAI_API_KEY"

Diff Review takes the same --executor auto|api|subscription as Repository Review, see Review Strategy. The default auto calls the provider when a seat has a key and falls back to your Claude Code subscription for a keyless Anthropic seat. Unlike the repository agent, the diff agent answers from the diff in the prompt and reads no files.

codejury review diff --dry-run uses a mock provider and a built-in demo diff, so it needs no API key.

Repository Review

Repository Review is the recall-first path for whole repositories. A whole codebase is too large for one useful model call, so the tool creates a workspace, builds a unit worklist, and reviews focused units instead of doing one shallow pass.

codejury review repository <repository> (--scaffold | --run | --finalize | --gate) [--invariants <file>] [options]

From an Agent

In Claude Code or Codex, one command runs the whole review, scaffold, fan-out, finalize, and gate:

/codejury-review <target> [--coded] [--domain auto|web|evm] [--effort low|medium|high] [--invariants <file>] [--workspace <path>]

--coded picks the engine and the model backend together. Without it, the default, a repository is reviewed by the agent fan-out on your Claude Code subscription, so your .env provider config is not used. With it, codejury's own coded engine reviews the repository through --run on --executor api, so your .env provider config is used throughout. The slash command announces the choice on its first line, so which backend ran is never a guess. In the default fan-out mode the agent maps the attack surface, fills the authorization model, runs one focused sub-review per unit, records findings, and leaves deterministic post-processing to code. PoCs run only against sandbox or dev environments, never production.

From the CLI

The slash command runs these four steps for you. Only the second, the find step, changes: --run drives the coded engine below, or an agent fans out over the units, the default when the slash command runs it. Scaffold, finalize, and gate are the same either way. Run them yourself for a headless or CI review, or to drive the coded engine without an agent:

codejury review repository /path/to/repository --scaffold     # build the workspace and unit worklist
codejury review repository /path/to/repository --run          # coded multi-pass review to convergence
codejury review repository /path/to/repository --finalize     # dedup candidates, verify, write findings
codejury review repository /path/to/repository --gate         # check coverage, non-zero until it is met

--run reviews every unit each pass, cycles lenses until convergence, verifies inline, and writes the confirmed findings/, so on the coded path --finalize is optional. See Review Strategy for how each unit is reviewed. --finalize deduplicates and verifies the candidates an agent fan-out proposed, the step the agent path needs, records refuted candidates in _refuted.md and PoC reconciliation in _pocs.md, and writes the confirmed findings/ and the ranked findings.json. --gate fails until the workspace has an enumerated surface, reviewed units, and calibrated candidates. Add --strict-coverage to also fail when a source file is owned by no unit, instead of noting it. Add --poc on finalize to generate and run an executable PoC for each confirmed finding when the domain binds a PoC backend, such as the EVM Foundry reproducer. It is off by default since it calls a model and a compiler per finding. A PoC runs locally only, it never forks a network, broadcasts, or holds a key, and it only adds evidence, so a finding is kept whether or not its PoC reproduces.

The Workspace

Scaffold creates a private workspace holding:

inventory/      attack surface, authorization model, seeded entrypoints, severity rubric
units/          one review unit per candidate entrypoint
candidates/     agent proposals, one write-up per candidate finding
findings/       confirmed findings, written by --run or finalize
pocs/           runnable PoCs, when available
findings.json   ranked machine-readable findings
METHODOLOGY.md  full review process
_stack.md       detected stack notes
_refuted.md     refuted candidates and why
_pocs.md        PoC reconciliation, planned versus delivered

To seed intent invariants, the business rules only you know that a static read cannot infer, keep an invariants file with the repository and pass --invariants <path> to scaffold. It imports the file into inventory/_invariants.md and never overwrites an edited one, so clear the workspace with --fresh to replace it. Write one rule per line as only <who> may <operation> <asset>, under <condition>. Leave it out to seed nothing.

Review Strategy

A --run chooses how each unit is reviewed:

  • --executor auto is the default. Each seat, the finder and the skeptic, calls the provider when it has a reachable key and falls back to a headless claude -p subscription agent for a keyless Anthropic seat, so a keyless run works with no provider key. A keyless non-Anthropic seat, such as an OpenAI finder with no key, is a loud error, it has no subscription to fall back to. This is what lets a Claude finder ride your subscription while an OpenAI challenger uses its own key.
  • --executor api makes one grounded model call per unit and requires a key, a missing key is a loud startup error, the same point as auto. Facts ground that call in a tool-extracted call graph, storage layout, and read and write sets when the domain binds a facts backend, such as the EVM Slither backend, which is what gives a smart contract review its call relationships and co-locates a cross-function path the file slices would otherwise split. A domain with a backend, the EVM domain, grounds with facts by default, except at --effort low, the cheap fast tier where the pass stays file-slice only. When the toolchain is absent or the target does not compile the review degrades to file-slice review with a loud note rather than failing. Pass --no-facts to force it off for a faster pass, or --facts to force it on where it is not the default.
  • --executor subscription always runs each unit and its verification as a headless claude -p agent that reads and traces the files itself with read-only tools, using your Claude Code access and no provider key. Use it when you want a tool-using agent rather than a single grounded call even where a key is present.

The subscription backend keeps a Claude Agent SDK session alive across calls by default, amortizing the Claude Code startup that a fresh claude -p per call would pay on a many-call Repository Review run. The SDK ships in the base install. Set CODEJURY_CLAUDE_TRANSPORT=process for one claude -p per call. An unknown transport value fails at startup rather than silently falling back.

--effort low|medium|high is the one depth dial, each level fixing three things at once:

--effort Shots per lens Skeptics to drop a candidate Facts default
low 1 1 Off
medium (default) 2 1 On
high 3 2 On

--min-lens-shots and --votes override the shot and skeptic columns, and --facts or --no-facts overrides the facts column.

On the subscription backend the concurrency within a pass defaults to 2 so a wide fan-out does not trip the shared rate cap, and to 6 on an API key, override it with --concurrency.

Set a distinct --judge-model, the confirmer, from the challenger to enable cross-model verification. The challenger refutes a finding and the judge must agree before it is dropped, so a deletion needs two models. With the judge not distinct from the challenger, the verify stage refutes nothing, the recall-safe default.

Data Boundary

The tool sends code-derived content to the model provider you configure, so know what leaves the machine before reviewing a proprietary repository:

  • Diff Review on the api row sends the unified diff under review. On the subscription row it sends the diff in the claude -p prompt through your Claude Code account, and the diff agent uses no file tools, so only the diff text leaves the machine, not local files.
  • Under the default --executor auto, each seat follows the api row when it has a key and the subscription row when it falls back to your Claude Code subscription, so what leaves the machine is decided per seat by whether that seat has a key.
  • Repository Review with --executor api sends bounded source snippets, the detected stack notes, the vulnerability guidance, and the findings.
  • Verification with --executor api sends the cited source file and the finding details. On the subscription row, Claude Code receives the finding details and reads the code itself through its read-only tools.
  • A repository seat on the subscription row does not use the configured provider key. It runs Claude Code with read-only file tools, and Claude Code may send prompts and the code it reads through your Claude Code account, so the code does not stay local. The diff agent is narrower, it reads no files and sees only the diff in the prompt.

A custom --api-base or a LiteLLM proxy becomes part of the trust boundary, so the data above also reaches that gateway. Prefer the CODEJURY_API_KEY environment variable over --api-key, since a flag can leak through shell history and process listings. The review workspace and the generated reports hold exploit paths, sensitive file locations, and PoCs, so treat them as sensitive. The workspace is created private, mode 0700.

Fetch Verified Source

Review a deployed contract by first pulling its verified source from a block explorer, then running Repository Review on the local tree:

codejury fetch source --address <address> --out <dir> [options]
codejury fetch source --chain eth --address 0x... --out ./target
codejury review repository ./target --domain evm --run

fetch source queries the Etherscan V2 API, which serves every supported chain from one endpoint with one key, so a single CODEJURY_ETHERSCAN_API_KEY covers eth, bsc, and polygon, chosen with --chain. Pass the key with --api-key or that environment variable. It writes the reconstructed source tree and a codejury-source.json recording the chain, address, compiler, and source URL, and it fails loud on an unverified or malformed response. It never runs a review on its own. Point Diff Review at that metadata file with --source-meta to carry the provenance into the report.

Supported Knowledge

The tool selects a review domain with --domain, auto by default. The web domain is the default for application code. The evm domain reviews Solidity smart contracts for classes such as reentrancy, access control, oracle manipulation, accounting precision, and signature replay.

Current guide coverage in the web domain includes:

  • Python: Django, Flask, FastAPI, Celery
  • Go: Gin, Echo
  • JavaScript and TypeScript: Express, NestJS
  • Protocols: OAuth, OIDC, GraphQL, and MCP

The evm domain ships a Solidity guide and the smart contract vulnerability classes above. Unguided stacks still work, but the agent relies more on general methodology and model knowledge.

Findings

Every reportable finding should have:

  • file and line
  • severity
  • category
  • description
  • exploit scenario
  • recommendation
  • confidence or verification status

The tool is intentionally scoped to real exploitable application security issues. It should not report dependency CVEs, style notes, generic best practices, speculation, or risks that only matter if production configuration leaks.

Model and Mode Guidance

Detection quality is dominated by model quality first, then mode.

  • Use standard mode with a strong model by default.
  • Use adversarial mode when you want extra recall on subtle cross-file logic.
  • Do not use adversarial mode as a false-positive reducer. False positives are controlled by the do-not-report guidance, deterministic filtering, and verification.

GitHub Actions

Use the example workflow:

cp examples/codejury-pr-review.yml .github/workflows/codejury-pr-review.yml

Add CODEJURY_API_KEY as a repository secret. The workflow reviews the pull request diff, uploads SARIF to code scanning, and fails on HIGH or CRITICAL findings.

Extend the Knowledge

Add security knowledge as markdown:

  • Vulnerability class: codejury/domains/<domain>/knowledge/vulnerabilities/<id>.md
  • Language guide: codejury/domains/<domain>/knowledge/guides/languages/<language>.md
  • Framework guide: codejury/domains/<domain>/knowledge/guides/frameworks/<language>/<framework>.md
  • Protocol guide: codejury/domains/<domain>/knowledge/guides/protocols/<protocol>.md

Keep frontmatter and detection signals data-driven. Avoid adding language, framework, or vulnerability-specific detection logic to Python unless the engine itself needs a generic capability.

Development

Run tests in a virtual environment:

python -m venv .venv
. .venv/bin/activate
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest

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