codejury 0.20.0

AI code security review for diffs and whole repositories.

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AI code security review for diffs and whole repositories.

codejury runs two paths matched to their nature.

• Diff Review is coded. It audits a pull request diff for newly introduced exploitable risk, as a single balanced LLM call or an adversarial Finder, Challenger, and Judge pass that trades roughly 3x the cost for extra recall on subtle flaws that span files. One command in, findings out.
• Repo Review is agent driven. A whole repository is too large for one LLM call, so codejury scaffolds a workspace and hands an interactive agent such as Claude Code or Codex a methodology to run. The agent maps the attack surface, traces inputs to sinks across files, verifies issues with a real PoC, and iterates over rounds with a persistent memory.

Security knowledge is data, not code. Vulnerability classes live in codejury/data/vulnerabilities/*.md with a vulnerable and a secure example per language, and the stack guides live under data/languages, data/frameworks, and data/protocols. The engine stays language neutral and names no framework, so adding a stack is a drop-in markdown file.

Install

pip install codejury                       # core
pip install "codejury[anthropic]"          # add a backend, also openai or litellm
codejury install-slash-command             # Claude Code, ~/.claude/commands/
codejury install-slash-command --agent codex   # Codex, ~/.codex/prompts/

install-slash-command copies the /codejury-review command into the agent's command directory. The command body is the same for every agent, only the directory differs, so pass --dir for any other agent. The repo review itself is agent neutral, so even without the command you can run codejury review and tell any agent to follow the methodology it writes.

Diff Review

# audit a diff file
codejury diff --diff-file changes.diff

# audit a git range in a repo
codejury diff --repo /path/to/app --git-range origin/main...HEAD

# from stdin
git diff HEAD~1 | codejury diff

# adversarial mode, more recall on subtle flaws, about 3x the cost
codejury diff --diff-file changes.diff --mode adversarial

# CI gate and SARIF
codejury diff --diff-file changes.diff --format sarif --fail-on high

Configure a backend with --provider, --model, --api-key, --api-base, or the CODEJURY_API_KEY, CODEJURY_MODEL, and CODEJURY_API_BASE environment variables. codejury diff --dry-run exercises the engine with a mock provider and no key, and falls back to a built in demo diff when you pass none.

Choosing a Model and Mode

Detection quality is dominated by the model first, then the mode. On real diff probes:

• A strong model at the Claude Sonnet tier in standard mode caught every planted vulnerability with almost no false positives. A weaker model raised false positives in both modes, so the model is the lever that matters most.
• Adversarial mode did not lower false positives over standard on those probes and costs about 3x. Reach for it to gain recall on subtle logic that spans files, not as a way to cut false positives.

Default to standard mode with a strong model, set with --model or CODEJURY_MODEL. False positives are held down by the do not report list and the post filter, not by the mode.

Use in CI with GitHub Actions

Audit every pull request and surface findings in the code scanning tab. Copy examples/codejury-pr-review.yml into .github/workflows/, add a CODEJURY_API_KEY repository secret, and it will

1. diff the pull request against its base with --git-range origin/<base>...HEAD,
2. write SARIF and upload it with github/codeql-action/upload-sarif,
3. fail the check on a HIGH or CRITICAL finding with --fail-on high.

The job makes one model call per pull request in standard mode. The SARIF is uploaded even when the gate fails, so findings always show up on the pull request.

Repo Review

Repo Review does not scan and print findings. It sets up a review for an agent to run, because a whole repository needs many rounds of reading, cross-file tracing, and PoC work that an agent does, not a single call.

codejury review /path/to/your/repo

This detects the stack, seeds the entrypoint inventory and the downstream trace targets from a deterministic scan, writes the methodology to <workspace>/METHODOLOGY.md, and prints a short pointer. It creates the workspace:

entrypoints/   the candidate entrypoint files to start from
issues/        one write-up per confirmed or suspected issue
pocs/          a runnable PoC per issue, same name as the issue
analysis/      _trace_targets.md, the round ledger, and trace notes
security-review-memory.md

Then run it with an interactive agent. In Claude Code or Codex:

/codejury-review /path/to/your/repo

Any agent works, the slash command is just a shortcut. Without it, tell the agent to follow the METHODOLOGY.md the scaffold wrote.

The agent follows METHODOLOGY.md: it maps the attack surface including non HTTP sources, traces each input to its sink through the downstream layers, runs an Authorization Model pass for missing-auth and IDOR, and follows a control into a library when an entrypoint delegates it. It keeps going until a Completeness Gate passes, two consecutive rounds that add nothing new. It confirms each issue with a real PoC against a sandbox or dev environment and asks you for any credential or test data it needs. Only a reproduced PoC is a confirmed finding, and nothing runs against production.

The supported stacks today are Python with Django, Celery, Flask, and FastAPI, Go with Gin and Echo, JavaScript and TypeScript with Express and NestJS, and the OAuth and OIDC protocol. The methodology still works on an unguided stack, it just leans more on the agent's own knowledge.

Findings

Each finding carries a file and line, a severity and category, a concrete exploit scenario, a recommendation, and a confidence. A false positive filter drops test paths, mock paths, and low confidence noise. The model is also told not to report dependency CVEs, style notes, speculation, or risks that only matter when production config leaks.

Extending

Knowledge is data, so extending codejury is a drop-in markdown file with no code change.

• A vulnerability class: codejury/data/vulnerabilities/<class>.md with frontmatter of title, impact, tags, and triggers, plus a vulnerable and a secure example.
• A language or framework: codejury/data/languages/<lang>.md or codejury/data/frameworks/<lang>/<framework>.md, declaring its detect signals, entrypoint markers, and downstream logic layers.
• A protocol such as OAuth: codejury/data/protocols/<name>.md, detected by language neutral content tokens.