crawlcheck (Python)
Before your agent reads, cites, connects to or transacts with a domain, ask CrawlCheck. No dependencies; Python 3.8+.
pip install https://crawlcheck.io/sdk/crawlcheck-1.0.1-py3-none-any.whl
from crawlcheck import CrawlCheck
cc = CrawlCheck() # CrawlCheck(key="cc_...") for licensed detail
answer = cc.resolve("example.com") # signed ResolveV1: policy, delivery, files, capabilities, entity, freshness, actions
print(answer["actions"]["read"]["decision"])
receipt = cc.preflight("example.com", action="cite", agent="GPTBot", template="safe_citation")
print(receipt["decision"], [s["why"] for s in receipt["steps"]])
assert cc.verify(receipt)["verified"] # Ed25519, checked locally; the key must be in the published directory
ok, receipt = cc.guard("shop.example", action="transact", confirm=lambda r: input(r["meaning"] + " y/n? ") == "y")
Command line: python -m crawlcheck preflight example.com cite GPTBot, python -m crawlcheck verify receipt.json.
Decisions: allow, warn, require_confirmation, block, unsupported. A policy (max_age_hours, on_warn, require_entity, human_approval, allow, deny) can only make a decision stricter.
Trust
verify_document(doc) and CrawlCheck.verify(doc) return verified, integrity_valid, issuer_trusted and accepted. Act on accepted: offline, issuer_trusted is None and accepted is False, because a document signed with someone else's key can be self-consistent. CrawlCheck.verify and guard check the published key directory, so accepted is decided there.
Preflight inside your MCP client
Wrap an MCP ClientSession so initialize and call_tool are decided before anything is sent (proposal):
from mcp import ClientSession
from mcp.client.streamable_http import streamable_http_client
from crawlcheck import CrawlCheck
from crawlcheck.mcp import McpPreflight, with_preflight, McpPreflightRefused
cc = CrawlCheck()
pf = McpPreflight(cc, confirm=ask_the_user)
await pf.before_connect(url) # McpPreflightRefused before any transport opens: block / unsupported / no confirmation
async with streamable_http_client(url) as (read, write):
async with with_preflight(ClientSession(read, write), cc, server_url=url, preflight=pf) as s:
await s.initialize()
await s.call_tool("search", {"q": "x"})
A refusal raised inside the transport's context arrives in an ExceptionGroup (except* McpPreflightRefused); deciding first, as above, keeps it a plain exception.
Options: lock= (an approved lockfile: changed tools refuse, tools outside it refuse), confirm_destructive=True, allow_warn=True, local="refuse" for stdio servers. Other stacks use McpPreflight(cc).before_connect(url) / before_tool_call(name, annotations).
Catch a split view
Every Resolve answer carries its place in CrawlCheck's transparency log. The client keeps every signed tree head it sees in client.log (plain JSON; persist it and pass it back as log_store=) and treats two heads for one batch, or a head that does not chain to the one before, as a fork with both signed heads as proof. guard() returns False while the client holds one.
import json, os
from crawlcheck import CrawlCheck, new_log_store
store = json.load(open("cc-log.json")) if os.path.exists("cc-log.json") else new_log_store()
client = CrawlCheck(log_store=store)
client.resolve("example.com")
r = client.log_check() # current head, GitHub's witness co-signature (RS256, checked here), the chain down to your heads
print(r["summary"])
json.dump(client.log, open("cc-log.json", "w"))
Use the site's staple
v = client.resolve_for("shop.example.com", headers=response_headers) # or staple="v=ccr1;..."
v["source"] # "staple" (no request made) or "network"
v["decisions"]["transact"]
An expired, foreign or tampered staple is ignored and the signed answer is fetched instead. staple_check(record, host, published_kids) does the offline check on its own. Spec: https://crawlcheck.io/spec/staple
Hold the revocation list offline
import json, os
from crawlcheck import CrawlCheck, new_revocation_store
store = json.load(open("cc-revocations.json")) if os.path.exists("cc-revocations.json") else new_revocation_store()
client = CrawlCheck(revocation_store=store)
client.sync_revocations() # signed, verified, a ?since= delta after the first sync
json.dump(client.revocations, open("cc-revocations.json", "w"))
ok, _ = client.guard("pay.example.com", "transact")
client.last_guard.get("revoked") # set when the held list refused it - no request was made
Owner incidents, suspected impersonations and unconfirmed high-risk field changes are listed. revoked_for(store, domain, action) is the same check on its own; reading and citing are never revoked by this list.
Look up without naming the domain
CrawlCheck(private_lookups=True) makes resolve() and resolve_for() send only the first 2 hex characters of sha256(domain) and verify the matching answer locally. A domain with no public measurement raises CrawlCheckError (404) instead of a just-in-time answer. preflight() and guard() still send the domain: a receipt is bound to it.
Metadata
Release files for crawlcheck 1.5.1
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| crawlcheck-1.5.1.tar.gz | 35.8 kB | With provenance | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| crawlcheck-1.5.1-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 66.2 kB
Release files / crawlcheck-1.5.1.tar.gz
| Download URL | crawlcheck-1.5.1.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 35.8 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
69f25df00638bebf214076ada771ee47ac33631f4ce271eb5015fe59e33db704
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
bfd0bfa2f460d35ec5264cd46ffb3f5073f3873e23e77d313a70912b4bf58a7d
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 15, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / crawlcheck-1.5.1-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | crawlcheck-1.5.1-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 30.3 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
4989bcad9550c36bed141963d261caae6104b30952f722792f8f9fc2b36ecd9e
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
53f7ae93db4d6f30d0b8853c6032aa8ea437b12ae4ab2f967a7ed57bcabd3640
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 15, 2026.
Transparency logSecurity for crawlcheck 1.5.1
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
Full provenance
All 2 files in this release have been uploaded with provenance metadata.
Attestation for crawlcheck-1.5.1.tar.gz
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Oct 15, 2026.
Transparency logA note on package security
PyPI is a repository for distributing packages, not a service for auditing them. While third-party security researchers and our staff do their best to detect and remove malicious packages, PyPI cannot guarantee the quality, security or suitability of any given package.