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grundnorm (Python SDK)

Resolve a legal norm by its open identifier (ELI/ECLI) and a date, and get back its canonical, sealed meaning as an independently verifiable signed object. The SDK recomputes the content hash and verifies every Ed25519 signature locally — you never have to trust the server.

  • Deterministic, zero-LLM read path. Honest not_found instead of a guess.
  • Point-in-time: [validFrom, validUntil).
  • Python 3.9+. One dependency: cryptography.

Install

pip install grundnorm

Use

from grundnorm import GrundnormClient

# Defaults to the public GDPR demonstrator. For a pilot:
#   GrundnormClient(endpoint="https://.../api/grundnorm/resolve", api_key="nlk_...")
client = GrundnormClient()

r = client.resolve(
    id="http://data.europa.eu/eli/reg/2016/679/art_5",
    jurisdiction="EU",
    at="2026-07-07",   # omit for "today"
)

if r.status == "found":
    print(r.norm["atoms"])          # subject / modality / action / condition / exception / scope + evidence
    print(r.verification["verdict"])  # one discriminated verdict, never a boolean

resolve() verifies the seal by default. Skip with verify=False, or verify a stored envelope later:

from grundnorm import verify
v = verify(norm, {"id": ..., "jurisdiction": ..., "at": ...})  # pass the question you asked
# {"verdict", "hash_ok", "view_consistent", "envelope_consistent", "at_within_sealed_window",
#  "status_sealed", "provenance_consistent", "request_bound", "unsealed_fields",
#  "signatures", "quorum", "attestation"}

verify() returns ONE discriminated verdict, and deliberately no boolean beside it. A boolean next to a status is an invitation to read the boolean, and it can only ever answer a narrower question than its name suggests. The closed set (VERDICTS), evaluated in fixed precedence:

verdict meaning
verified_authoritative The trust gate. Everything re-derives AND the keys are known non-demo institutions with a pin-anchored quorum (>=2 pinned valid signatures incl. >=1 pinned sovereign).
verified_not_authoritative Bytes, envelope and signatures all re-derive, but the keys are not. Every current demo record lands here: the demo keys are derived from a seed held in the source tree, so they carry no custody guarantee. And all three demo signers derive from the SAME seed, so a demo seal is cryptographically one party signing three times, not a three-institution consensus.
content_tampered The sealed preimage does not produce seal.contentHash.
view_inconsistent The served atoms/purpose are not what the sealed content projects to.
envelope_contradicts_seal The envelope claims an identifier, jurisdiction, domain, label, legal force or validity window that the sealed content contradicts.
out_of_sealed_window The date served falls outside the record's own sealed validity window.
not_sealed The record is not served as sealed.
signature_invalid A signature does not verify, or there are none.
signature_duplicated A public key repeats — one key cannot satisfy a two-signer quorum.
provenance_unsupported The served provenance is not what the signatures derive.
status_rule_violated The D5 witness is present and an atom's status does not re-execute.
answers_different_question The response does not answer the request that was passed in.
malformed Not a resolvable body.

A verdict this client does not know MUST be rejected, never defaulted into a success branch: adding one is a version bump. is_verified(verdict) exists for the coarse split and is a function, never a field, so a boolean cannot end up sitting beside the status again.

Neither verified state establishes that the meaning is jurist-correct. That is graded by an independent jurist against a blind labelled set, and that number does not exist yet.

Pass the question you asked. resolve() does it for you. Calling verify(norm) bare leaves request_bound: None and a signed response for one identifier replays as the answer to another.

What the signature does not cover is listed in unsealed_fields, not left implicit: version, supersedesHash, conflict, the ledger/anchor metadata, and set membership of the signatures — a valid signature can be dropped and the record still verifies with a smaller quorum, because the sealed preimage does not enumerate who was meant to sign. Closing that needs a signed commitment to the record set, not a bigger per-record hash.

What verify() re-derives (no trust required)

  1. Hash: sha256(canonicalize(norm["canonical"]["content"])) equals norm["seal"]["contentHash"], where canonicalize = JSON with keys sorted recursively (UTF-16 order), no whitespace, UTF-8.
  2. View integrity: the English atoms/purpose are exactly what the sealed canonical.content projects to (view_consistent); canonical.content is the source of truth.
  3. Signatures: each seal.signatures[].signatureHex is a valid Ed25519 signature by that signer's publicKeyHex over the UTF-8 bytes of the seal.contentHash hex string.
  4. Status (when a classification witness is present): each atom's status (fixed/needs_review/for_the_court) re-executes from the deterministic rule applied to the sealed per-atom signals (status_re_derivable). A mismatch fails ok. None = no witness (older seals) → not re-derivable, no penalty. Bounded: proves the rule was applied to sealed inputs; it does not prove the deontic decomposition is faithful to the article (that is the jurist gate).

What it REPORTS but does not prove

  • quorum — a signature count (valid_signatures, has_sovereign, meets = >=2 incl. one sovereign). The sovereign role is pin-anchored where a pin exists, but an unpinned signer's claimed role is taken on trust. For a spoof-proof gate read the verdict.
  • attestation — honest flags the SDK cannot prove: custody ("unverified" for the demo), independence (as asserted), ledger ("unanchored", or "claimed_unverified:<backend>" for a record claiming an anchor the SDK cannot verify — it never says "anchored:"), key_provenance ("pinned_oob" = known non-demo pin; "pinned_demo" = only forgeable demo pins; "in_band_response" = no pin / substitution), demo_keys (True iff any valid signature matched a forgeable demo pin → not authoritative), classification ("rule_reexecuted", "not_present", "rule_unsupported", or "witness_partial" — the record seals definitions or modulations whose status the witness does not cover, so the rule cannot be re-derived for the WHOLE record).
  • Key pinning (key_provenance, per-signature pinned) is tamper-evidence of a snapshot, not proof of institutional independence: a single-party demo key is pinned (pinned_demo) yet custody stays "unverified" and the verdict never reaches verified_authoritative. It is not a key-transparency log.

Breaking changes in 0.7.0

absence gained two values, and a consumer testing absence == "proven" needs to know why it may now read false where 0.6.0 said true:

value meaning
scope_does_not_cover the proof verifies, but the epoch's SIGNED covers window excludes the queried date
stale the epoch is older than the freshness it promises (head.at + freshness.hours vs observedAt)

Both mean the same thing in different words: the proof is impeccable and answers a different question. Measured against the live endpoint on 2026-08-23, a query with no at returned absence: "proven" while epoch.coversQuery in the same body was false.

New field epoch.fresh (true | false | null). null = nothing was promised, which does not penalise.

Breaking changes in 0.6.0

Two fields were renamed on verify_absence() because their names were broad enough to be read as the verdict they sat beside, and one of them sat one line from attested_not_authoritative:

0.5.x 0.6.0
attested statement_present
supported version_supported

The negative response also changed shape. absenceProof (one) became absenceProofs (an array), and epoch.provedIdentity became epoch.provedIdentities. A query that names no domain asks about EVERY domain, and the server used to fill the gap with a default and prove the absence of a key the caller never named. There is now one proof per domain asked, and absence reads proven only if every one of them verifies.

Upgrade from 0.5.x: verify() in 0.4.0–0.5.1 returned hash_ok: True for content that cannot be canonicalized at all. Treat any verdict from those versions as unverified and re-check with 0.6.0.

Negative answers

A 404 is not an empty body: it is a statement signed by the operator, so a negative is attributable rather than something anyone could fabricate offline.

from grundnorm import verify_absence, is_attested
v = verify_absence(body, {"id": id, "jurisdiction": j, "at": at})  # pass the question you asked
v["verdict"]              # attested_not_authoritative | proof_invalid | statement_tampered | ...
v["absence"]              # "not_offered" | "proven" | "invalid" | "present_out_of_scope" | "scope_does_not_cover" | "stale"
(v["epoch"] or {}).get("scope")   # READ THIS FIRST: completeness, covers, freshness, known exclusions
(v["epoch"] or {}).get("headOk")  # the epoch head verified on its own, not vouched for by this answer

verdict and absence are two axes and are never collapsed into one field. A statement can be perfectly authentic and carry no proof at all (not_offered), and a proven absence still says nothing about the law: it establishes that the identity is not in the set the operator committed to, under the scope in epoch.scope. Read the scope before the root.

Errors

  • Nothing sealed for (id, date) → returns NotFound (a normal outcome).
  • Bad key, bad input, or server error → raises GrundnormError (.status, .code).

Demonstrator note: the demo corpus (GDPR sample) is signed by demo keys, not institutions, and its accuracy is not yet jurist-graded. See the project's DEMO-TRUTHFULNESS.md.

Reporting a defect

Write to support@nexusquantum.legal. There is no public issue tracker: the repository is not open yet, and pointing this package at a URL that 404s would promise a channel that does not exist.

Security defects in the verifier are the ones we most want to hear about — every one reported so far has been a class rather than an instance, and each is credited in the CHANGELOG.

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