o1js-scan
Community package:
o1js-scanis listed in the official o1js Community Packages directory.
A fast, dependency-free static analyzer for zk circuit soundness bugs in:
- o1js / Mina zkApps (TypeScript
.ts/.js) — Kimchi circuits from@methodbodies - Noir (
.nr) — Aztec's Rust-like ZK DSL (including aztec-nr-shaped patterns)
The security-critical bugs usually aren't in the proving system — they're in the
application's own constraints: witnesses the prover controls but the circuit
never binds. o1js-scan is the under-constrained-signal scanner for Circom's
cousins in the Mina and Noir ecosystems.
pip install o1js-scan
# or: pipx install o1js-scan
# or: npm install -D o1js-scan
o1js-scan path/to/zkapp # o1js + Noir (auto)
noir-scan path/to/circuits # same binary — Noir-friendly alias
noir-scan . --lang noir --fail-on high --sarif noir.sarif
Example
Given a vault whose withdraw amount is a prover-controlled witness that is
never bound to on-chain state:
$ o1js-scan examples/vulnerable_vault.ts --include-examples
LOW O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_RECIPIENT vulnerable_vault.ts:23 fn=withdraw Recipient `to` is prover-chosen in `withdraw`
HIGH O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS vulnerable_vault.ts:23 fn=withdraw Unconstrained witness `amount` flows to send_amount in `withdraw`
o1js-scan: 2 finding(s) [1 high, 1 low] in 1 file(s) — fails (--fail-on high)
$ echo $?
1
--include-examples is needed here only because the demo file lives under
examples/, which the path classifier downgrades by default so that a repo's
own sample code cannot fail its build. The same contract in your src/ reports
HIGH with no flag.
The HIGH finding is the drainable bug. The fixed contract
(examples/safe_vault.ts) drops it and exits 0, keeping only the informational
LOW on the prover-chosen recipient:
$ o1js-scan examples/safe_vault.ts --include-examples
LOW O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_RECIPIENT safe_vault.ts:23 fn=withdraw Recipient `to` is prover-chosen in `withdraw`
o1js-scan: 1 finding(s) [1 low] in 1 file(s) — passes (--fail-on high)
$ echo $?
0
See examples/ for the o1js and Noir vulnerable/fixed pairs.
Contents
- Install
- Usage · Suppressing a finding
- GitHub Action
- What it detects — o1js · Noir
- Known limitations · Where this tool stops
- Privacy and private code
- Post-quantum review
- Compatibility · How it works
- Contributing
Install
pip install o1js-scan
For an isolated global CLI install, use pipx:
pipx install o1js-scan
For Node/npm-based Noir, Aztec, or o1js app repositories, install the npm wrapper:
npm install -D o1js-scan
npx noir-scan . --lang noir --fail-on high
The npm package is a thin wrapper around the same Python analyzer and requires
Python 3.8+ on PATH (python3 or python). Set O1JS_SCAN_PYTHON to choose a
specific interpreter.
Or from source:
git clone https://github.com/auditinfra-io/o1js-scan
cd o1js-scan
pip install -e .
No third-party Python dependencies. Python 3.8+. The noir-scan console script is
installed alongside o1js-scan (same entry point), including through the npm
wrapper.
Usage
# scan a directory (recursively; skips node_modules, target/, .git, …)
o1js-scan path/to/project
# Noir-only / o1js-only
noir-scan circuits --lang noir
o1js-scan src --lang o1js
# scan a single file
o1js-scan src/MyContract.ts
noir-scan src/main.nr
# machine-readable output for CI
o1js-scan src --json
# SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning (writes o1js-scan.sarif by default)
o1js-scan src --sarif
noir-scan . --lang noir --sarif noir.sarif
# choose which severity fails CI (critical|high|medium|low|none; default high)
o1js-scan src --fail-on medium
# test code is excluded by default (both backends); opt back in
o1js-scan src --include-tests
# example code is downgraded to LOW by default; keep original severity
o1js-scan src --include-examples
o1js-scan --version
Exit code is 1 when a finding at or above the --fail-on level (default
high) is present and 0 otherwise — so you can drop it straight into CI.
With the default, a low/medium finding (including the informational recipient
rule below) does not fail the build; use --fail-on none to only report,
or --fail-on medium to gate more strictly. A missing scan path exits 2 with
an error on stderr, so a typo can't silently pass CI as a clean run. Every run
prints a one-line summary (counts by severity and the gate verdict) to stderr.
Test code is excluded by default — both backends. Tests deliberately build invalid values and bad transactions to prove the asserts reject them, so a finding there is the point of the test rather than a circuit bug. A file counts as test code when:
- its name matches
*.test.ts/*.spec.ts(and the.js/.jsx/.tsx/.mjs/.cjsvariants), or*_test.nr/test_*.nr; - it sits under a
test/,tests/,__tests__/,spec/or__mocks__/directory; - (Noir only, content-based) the function carries a
#[test]/#[test(...)]attribute, or sits inside amod test { … }/mod tests { … }block — block-scoped, so a test module at the foot of a production file does not silence the rest of it.
Pass --include-tests to report them.
Example code is downgraded, not dropped. A finding in an examples/ or
example/ directory, or in a file named *.eg.ts (.nr and the other JS/TS
extensions too), is lowered to LOW with a note — still reported, no longer
able to fail a build. Example code is deliberately simplified, and flagging a
framework's own examples as vulnerabilities is noise; but it is copied into
production far more often than test code is, which is why it is downgraded
rather than hidden. Pass --include-examples to keep the original severity.
Whenever either policy applies, the run prints a line to stderr saying so —
e.g. 6 file(s) skipped as test code, 1 finding(s) downgraded as examples — so
a quiet scan is never silently quiet. The counts also appear in SARIF under
invocation.properties. Note the trade-off: detection is path-based only
(no describe(/it( parsing), so a production circuit stored under tests/
will be skipped — the stderr line is how you notice.
Directories skipped when walking a tree: node_modules, target (nargo),
.git, dist, build, __pycache__, .venv, venv.
Suppressing a reviewed finding
Silence a finding you've triaged without loosening the gate, with an inline comment on — or on the line above — the flagged line:
this.send({ to, amount }); // o1js-scan-disable-line O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS
// o1js-scan-disable-next-line
this.send({ to, amount });
let inv = unsafe { hint(x) }; // o1js-scan-disable-line NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS
List one or more rule ids to suppress only those; a bare directive (no ids) suppresses every rule on the target line.
As a library:
from o1js_scan import analyze_file, analyze_project
for path, finding in analyze_project("src", lang="auto"):
print(path, finding.rule_id, finding.severity.value, finding.title)
GitHub Action
Add the scanner to CI in a few lines. Findings appear as annotations on the PR diff and as alerts in the repository's Security → Code scanning tab.
# .github/workflows/o1js-scan.yml
name: o1js-scan
on: [push, pull_request]
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write # required to upload SARIF to code scanning
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: auditinfra-io/o1js-scan@v0.10.0
with:
path: src # optional, defaults to the repo root
lang: auto # auto | o1js | noir
# version: 0.10.0 # optional, pin the scanner version
# fail-on-findings: true # optional, fail the job on any high/critical
Noir-only CI recipe
Recommended for Noir projects that want code-scanning alerts and a high-severity gate:
- uses: auditinfra-io/o1js-scan@v0.10.0
with:
path: .
lang: noir
fail-on-findings: true
Or without the Action:
pip install o1js-scan
noir-scan . --lang noir --fail-on high --sarif noir.sarif
pre-commit (optional)
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
- repo: local
hooks:
- id: noir-scan
name: noir-scan
entry: noir-scan
language: system
pass_filenames: false
args: [".", "--lang", "noir", "--fail-on", "high"]
Inputs: path (default .), lang (auto|o1js|noir, default auto),
version (PyPI version to install, default latest), upload-sarif (default
true), fail-on-findings (default false), include-tests (default
false), include-examples (default false). Output: sarif-file. SARIF
upload needs security-events: write and code scanning enabled.
What it detects (o1js)
| Rule | Severity | What it means |
|---|---|---|
O1JS_MISSING_STATE_PRECONDITION |
high | this.x.get() read without a matching requireEquals(...) / getAndRequireEquals(). A bare get() adds no account precondition, so the proof doesn't bind x to its on-chain value — a prover can substitute any value. |
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS |
high / medium | A @method argument (a prover-controlled private witness) flows into a send amount (this.send(...) or a same-method AccountUpdate.create*(...).send(...)) or a state .set(...) and is never asserted. Direct analog of an under-constrained Circom signal. High when it reaches a value transfer. |
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_PROVABLE_WITNESS |
high / medium / low | A Provable.witness(...) local flows into a send/state effect with no in-circuit assertion. The witness callback runs outside the circuit (it's only a prover hint), so the result is a fresh prover-controlled value — the other witness source besides @method args. It must be re-derived and asserted (x.assertEquals(<recomputed>)) or bound to state. High on a send amount (this.send(...) or same-method AccountUpdate.create*). |
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_RECIPIENT |
low | A @method argument is used only as the to: recipient of a send. This is usually intended (a user names their own withdrawal destination) and is informational — it only matters if the destination is meant to be a fixed treasury or a state-recorded address. Does not trip the CI exit-code gate. |
O1JS_WITNESS_NOT_BOUND_TO_STATE |
medium | A witness is only trivially constrained (e.g. > 0, or compared against a constant) before an effect — never tied to on-chain state. Confirm the off-chain orchestration makes this safe, or the balance is drainable up to its standing value. |
O1JS_STALE_MERKLE_ROOT |
high | A method recomputes a Merkle root from a prover-supplied witness (computeRootAndKey / calculateRoot) but binds none of the recomputed roots to the current on-chain root. Without a this.root.requireEquals(...) / assertEquals against the live root, a prover can pass a witness for a fabricated or stale tree — forging membership or replaying old state. Binding may live in an undecorated same-class helper (this.verifyX(witness)); one level of helper propagation covers that. |
O1JS_UNVERIFIED_PROOF |
high | A @method parameter typed as Proof<...> / SelfProof / DynamicProof / *Proof is never .verify()'d before its public fields are used. Passing a Proof does not verify it — without an explicit verify the prover can supply an arbitrary proof object, and any use of its publicOutput is unconstrained. Also fires when .verifyIf(flag) is gated by an unconstrained @method argument and the proof's public fields are read, because the prover can make the condition false. |
O1JS_UNASSERTED_BOOL |
high / medium | An o1js predicate (equals / lessThanOrEqual / …) returns a Bool and adds no constraint unless the result is asserted or used. HIGH when the call is a bare discarded statement; MEDIUM when assigned to a local that is never referenced again. |
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_SENDER |
high / medium | this.sender.getUnconstrained() returns the tx sender without proving it. HIGH when that value (or a local from it) flows into an assert / state .set / send (vacuous check); MEDIUM otherwise. Prefer this.sender.getAndRequireSignature(), or the expanded idiom AccountUpdate.createSigned(sender). Stays quiet when (1) the same @method also calls this.sender.getAndRequireSignature() anywhere (signature requirement is method-scoped), or (2) the witnessed sender value is the argument to AccountUpdate.createSigned(...) / an AccountUpdate.create(...).requireSignature() on that same key (argument identity required — a createSigned on a different key does not suppress). |
MissingRangeCheck |
high | A raw Field (not the range-checked UInt64/UInt32) is used as a transfer amount. A Field is an element mod p and is not range-bounded. |
O1JS_WEAK_PERMISSIONS |
high / medium | editState / send set to proofOrSignature() or none(), letting the zkApp account key bypass the circuit by signing. Also flags setVerificationKey / setPermissions left at signature / proofOrSignature / none (Mina's documented upgrade training wheels); HIGH when combined with a weak editState/send in the same permissions.set. |
O1JS_LOGIC_OUTSIDE_PROOF |
high | Security logic (assert / approve / send / state .set) inside Provable.asProver(...) or a Provable.witness* callback. Those callbacks run outside the circuit — a malicious prover can delete them and still produce a verifying proof. |
O1JS_APPROVE_WITHOUT_BINDING |
medium | A @method calls approve / approveAccountUpdate / approveBase without reading balanceChange / publicKey and without assertCanMint / assertCanBurn / a forEachUpdate conservation check — the Mina FlawedTokenContract archetype. |
O1JS_VACUOUS_ASSERT |
high / medium | An assert that is satisfied by construction: x.assertEquals(x), x.equals(x).assertTrue(), or Bool(true).assertTrue(). HIGH for self-comparisons (almost always a typo); MEDIUM for constant Bool asserts. |
O1JS_CONDITIONAL_ASSERT |
medium | An assert inside if <flag> { ... } where <flag> is a prover-controlled @method Bool (or a local from .toBoolean()). A JS conditional does not constrain the circuit the way Provable.if does. Inline comparisons stay unreported for precision. |
False-positive guards (o1js)
The analyzer is designed to stay quiet on correct code:
- Signature-gated methods are skipped. A
@methodthat callsthis.requireSignature()(orgetAndRequireSignature,AccountUpdate.createSigned,Signature.verify) is owner/admin-gated — its arguments are chosen by the key holder, not an arbitrary prover — so its witnesses are not flagged. This is the o1js equivalent ofonlyOwner. - State-bound witnesses are skipped. An argument asserted equal to (or
bounded by an ordering comparison against) a
getAndRequireEquals()-derived value is sound and won't be reported. This covers both the direct form —amount.assertLessThanOrEqual(bal)— and the chained formamount.lessThanOrEqual(bal).assertTrue(). Binding that lives in an undecorated same-class helper (this.verifyX(arg)) is also recognized (depth 1 only). - Verified proofs are skipped. A
Proof/SelfProof/DynamicProof/*Proof-typed argument on which.verify()is called is constrained by the verified circuit — witness findings on it (and itspublicOutput/publicInput) are suppressed. A.verifyIf(flag)is credited only when the condition is not an unconstrained method argument, or is itself asserted. The same applies to the canonical OffchainState wrapperthis.offchainState.settle(proof)(the framework verifies insidesettle). A hand-rolled.settle(proof)is not assumed to verify. The inverse case (proof-typed arg never verified and not OffchainState-settled) is reported asO1JS_UNVERIFIED_PROOF. - Asserted / used Bools are skipped. A predicate chained with
.assertTrue()/.assertFalse(), nested inProvable.if(...), or assigned to a local that is later referenced, is not reported asO1JS_UNASSERTED_BOOL. - Authenticated senders are skipped.
this.sender.getUnconstrained()does not fire when the same@methodalso callsthis.sender.getAndRequireSignature(), or when that witnessed value is passed toAccountUpdate.createSigned(...)/ authenticated via.requireSignature()on an AccountUpdate built from it (argument identity required). - Comments and string literals are stripped before analysis, so an
assertinside a string can't create a false result.
What it detects (Noir)
The same soundness idea — under-constrained witnesses — applies to
Noir (.nr) circuits. Point the scanner at .nr
files (or use --lang noir) and it analyzes them with the Noir rule set.
Same lexical, dependency-free approach. Calibrated against aztec-nr oracle /
unsafe idioms — see docs/noir_calibration.md.
| Rule | Severity | What it means |
|---|---|---|
NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS |
high | A value bound from an unsafe { ... } block — the result of an unconstrained fn (oracle / Brillig hint) — that is never re-constrained by an assert / assert_eq (or a confirming helper / merkle check). The hint runs outside the circuit. Analog of O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_PROVABLE_WITNESS. |
NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_INPUT |
medium | A private (witness) input of fn main that flows into no assert / assert_eq and is not part of the public output. Analog of O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS. |
NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_PUBLIC_INPUT |
medium | A public input of fn main that reaches no constraint and no output — the circuit never reads it. The dual of the private-witness rule: the verifier supplies the value and believes the statement is about it, while the circuit ignores it (e.g. a merkle_root: pub Field that is never checked, so membership was never actually proven). MEDIUM because a deliberately unused public input is also a legitimate idiom for binding a proof to a context (nonce / chain id / recipient), which is indistinguishable lexically — so it does not gate CI at the default --fail-on high. |
NOIR_UNCHECKED_CAST |
medium | A prover-controlled value cast to a narrow unsigned type (as u8/u16/u32) with no range assertion. Analog of o1js MissingRangeCheck. |
NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_ARRAY_INDEX |
medium | A prover-controlled value used as an array index (arr[i]) with no check of any kind on it. Noir's implicit bounds check establishes only that the index is in range — not that it is the correct index — so the prover stays free to select any element and still produce a verifying proof. This is the selector-freedom bug behind Merkle path positions, note selection and allow-list membership. Suppressed when the index is range-bounded, pinned by an equality, bounded before a cast (index.assert_max_bit_size::<8>(); let i = index as u32;), or when the value read back is itself pinned by an assert_eq. |
NOIR_UNASSERTED_BOOL |
high / medium | A comparison whose bool result is discarded. Analog of o1js O1JS_UNASSERTED_BOOL. |
NOIR_CONDITIONAL_ASSERT |
medium | An assert inside if <flag> { ... } where <flag> is a prover-controlled bare bool or a local derived from prover-controlled values. A constraint inside a conditional only applies when the condition is true, so a prover-chosen branch can skip the check. Inline comparisons (if x != 0) are left alone for precision; assigning the guard to a local (let gate = x != 0; if gate) is reported unless gate is itself asserted. |
NOIR_CONDITIONAL_CONSTRAIN |
medium | A constrain_* / confirm_* / verify_* call only under a prover-controlled if, while an unsafe hint still reaches the output. |
NOIR_UNUSED_CHECK_RESULT |
high / medium | A check_* / confirm_* / verify_* / constrain_* result is discarded (bare call) or assigned and never asserted — the check does not bind the circuit. |
NOIR_VACUOUS_CONSTRAINT |
high / medium | A constraint that is satisfied by construction: a self-comparison (assert(x == x), assert_eq(x, x), x >= x) or a constant condition (assert(true)). It adds no restriction, but the line reads as a check — which makes it more dangerous than a missing constraint, because review stops there. HIGH for a self-comparison (almost always a typo for a real check: assert(computed == expected) mistyped as assert(expected == expected)); MEDIUM for a constant, which is more often a placeholder. x != x is not flagged — that is unsatisfiable, a liveness bug rather than a silent soundness hole. |
NOIR_UNSAFE_MISSING_SAFETY |
low | An unsafe { ... } block with no adjacent // Safety: comment. Informational; does not fail CI at default --fail-on high. |
False-positive guards (Noir)
- Assert / let-hop / same-file confirm helpers bind
unsafehints. - Call-site names
constrain_*/confirm_*/verify_*/check_(non_)membership*/public_data_storage_readcredit args (with unused-result detection for discarded checks). - Documented intentional unconstrained (requires adjacent
// Safety:):random(),avm::…, and kernel/rollup/discovery deferred wording. - Tuple
let+ asserted flags bind merkle witnesses passed into membership checks.
Example:
$ noir-scan examples/noir_unconstrained.nr --include-examples
HIGH NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS noir_unconstrained.nr:16 fn=main Unconstrained `unsafe` result `inv` in `main`
LOW NOIR_UNSAFE_MISSING_SAFETY noir_unconstrained.nr:16 fn= `unsafe` block without a `// Safety:` comment
noir-scan: 2 finding(s) [1 high, 1 low] in 1 file(s) — fails (--fail-on high)
$ noir-scan examples/noir_constrained.nr --include-examples
noir-scan: no findings (or no Noir / o1js sources found)
As with the o1js example above, --include-examples is only needed because
these demo files live under examples/.
Known limitations
The analyzer is a lexical, name-matching pass, not a dataflow engine. Keep these blind spots in mind when triaging — they are known and intentional for this dependency-free design, not bugs:
-
Only simple aliases are followed. Witness tracking follows plain same-method aliases such as
const q = qty, but not derived expressions or destructuring:const q = qty; this.send({ to: dest, amount: q }); // followed const q = qty.add(1); this.send({ to: dest, amount: q }); // not followed const slot = this.root; slot.get(); // missing precondition missed
-
Cross-method binding is depth-1 only. An undecorated same-class helper called as
this.verifyX(arg)can state-bind a caller's argument (one level). Deeper chains (@method→ helper A → helper B) and free/imported functions are not followed. Local-variable aliasing of the helper argument also stays a documented limitation. -
Unasserted-Bool detection is statement-shaped. Tier A only flags bare expression statements whose outermost call is a Bool predicate with nothing chained after it. Predicates nested inside
Provable.if(...), or assigned and later used, are not flagged. Complex control-flow uses of a Bool local may still be missed if the name is never referenced (failure mode: miss, not a false positive). -
Signature-gating is method-level and substring-based.
_method_is_signature_gatedtreats a whole@methodas owner-gated if it contains a signature idiom, and it recognizes a verifier only when the receiver name literally containssignature— sosig.verify(admin, msg)is not recognized as gating, while an unrelated signature check elsewhere in a large method can over-suppress. It is all-or-nothing per method. -
Sender authentication is name-based and same-method only.
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_SENDERsuppresses whenthis.sender.getAndRequireSignature()orAccountUpdate.createSigned(<that sender>)appears in the same@methodbody. A signature requirement that lives only in a helper (this.requireSenderSig()→getAndRequireSignatureinside) is not followed — failure mode is a false positive on correct code that wraps the idiom, not a missed real bug. -
Noir cross-crate helpers are recognized by name convention only (no
Nargo.toml/ import resolution). Prefer miss over false positive.
These are the reason findings are a starting point for human review, not proofs. A dataflow-aware rewrite is deliberately out of scope for the lexical analyzer.
Where this tool stops
o1js-scan is deliberately a shallow, single-file lexical pass — no parser, no dataflow, no solver. That is what makes it dependency-free and instant in CI, and it is also a hard ceiling. The limitations above aren't a backlog; they're consequences of the design.
So it is worth being explicit about what this tool can and cannot tell you:
- A clean run is not an audit. It means no shape this scanner recognizes matched — not that the circuit is sound. Bug classes that need dataflow, path sensitivity, or constraint solving are out of reach for a tool of this shape, in any language.
- A finding is a lead, not a verdict. Every rule here is a heuristic with a documented false-positive class.
That trade is the right one for a linter you run on every commit. If you're working on something where the difference matters — a protocol holding real value, a circuit you can't afford to get wrong — treat this as the first pass and budget for a real review.
For deeper analysis, the separate full scanner is maintained in the
audit-engine-cli repository.
o1js-scan is the intentionally lightweight, open scanner; the full scanner's
proprietary detection knowledge and implementation details are not reproduced
here. For access or a more complete circuit review, reach out:
auditinfracorp@proton.me.
Privacy and private code
The installed CLI analyzes files locally. It has no telemetry, network
client, account, or upload step, and its Python runtime has no third-party
dependencies. Running o1js-scan path/to/private-repo does not send the source
or findings anywhere.
Like compiler logs, scanner output can contain paths, identifiers, and source fragments. SARIF also identifies exact repository locations, and the GitHub Action uploads it to GitHub code scanning. Use the same repository and CI access controls you already use for the source being scanned.
Want to contribute a useful false-positive or missed-detection report without sharing an application? Reproduce the syntax with invented names and constants, remove business logic one statement at a time, and verify the synthetic snippet still triggers the same rule before posting it. The privacy-safe contribution guide has a concrete checklist and several ways to help the o1js community without disclosing a private circuit.
This boundary does not prevent the open scanner from getting better. Public o1js documentation and repositories can support new rules and compatibility fixtures; synthetic examples can test false positives and missed constraints; and parser resilience, diagnostics, SARIF, performance, packaging, and calibration can all improve without publishing a private audit technique or client code. The open scanner should make independently explainable claims; private research can remain in the separate audit engine.
Post-quantum review
Quantum risk is related to circuit security, but it is not a missing-constraint
rule. o1js-scan does not determine whether a signature, hash, commitment, the
Kimchi proof system, or Mina itself meets a post-quantum security target. Those
answers depend on the concrete primitive and parameters, platform assumptions,
the deployment's required lifetime, and its migration plan—not merely on a
TypeScript identifier that a lexical scanner can see.
Inspired by O(1) Labs' Qubit or Not Qubit, the post-quantum review guide turns that boundary into an o1js-specific inventory and crypto-agility checklist. Use it alongside this scanner rather than interpreting a clean scan as a post-quantum assessment.
Compatibility
Works on o1js 1.x and 2.x. o1js-scan analyzes TypeScript source as text
and has no runtime dependency on o1js — nothing is version-pinned. It keys
on the modern require* precondition API (getAndRequireEquals,
requireEquals, requireSignature, getAndRequireSignature), the
@method / @method() / @method.returns(...) decorators, annotated @state
fields, this.send({...}), low-level AccountUpdate.balance.subInPlace(...)
transfers, and Permissions.*. The established forms remain compatible across
the 1.x → 2.x boundary, while the scanner also accepts the newly documented
decorator and low-level transfer variants.
The 2.x owner-auth idiom this.sender.getAndRequireSignature() is recognized
as signature-gating. (Legacy assertEquals preconditions are still accepted,
so older code isn't broken either.)
Equivalent constraint spellings are normalized for analysis: instance
assertEquals(...), static Provable.assertEqual(Type, ...), and
equals(...).assertTrue() equality chains all bind the same operands. Method
extraction is brace-balanced after length-preserving comment and string
masking, and accepts multiline decorators, nested callback-shaped parameter
types, TypeScript access modifiers, and multiline identity aliases (including
parenthesized and as Type forms).
Noir analysis targets Noir syntax used by Aztec / nargo projects (.nr); it
does not invoke nargo or compile circuits.
How it works
It's a lexical analyzer, not a full TypeScript or Noir parser — o1js and Noir sources are brace-delimited and regex-tractable, and the output is meant to be triaged by a human. That keeps it dependency-free and instant to run in CI. Findings are a starting point for review, not proofs.
Roadmap / contributing
Contributions welcome — new rule families, more FP guards, and real-world
calibration archetypes are all valuable. See CONTRIBUTING.md.
Run the tests and linter with:
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest # unit tests + Noir/o1js corpus
ruff check . # lint
npm run format:check # prettier, npm wrapper only
License
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.
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