o1js-scan
A fast, dependency-free static analyzer for zk circuit soundness bugs in:
- o1js / Mina zkApps (TypeScript
.ts/.js) — Kimchi circuits from@methodbodies - Noir (
.nr) — Aztec's Rust-like ZK DSL (including aztec-nr-shaped patterns)
The security-critical bugs usually aren't in the proving system — they're in the
application's own constraints: witnesses the prover controls but the circuit
never binds. o1js-scan is the under-constrained-signal scanner for Circom's
cousins in the Mina and Noir ecosystems.
pip install o1js-scan
o1js-scan path/to/zkapp # o1js + Noir (auto)
noir-scan path/to/circuits # same binary — Noir-friendly alias
noir-scan . --lang noir --fail-on high --sarif noir.sarif
Install
pip install o1js-scan
Or from source:
git clone https://github.com/auditinfra-io/o1js-scan
cd o1js-scan
pip install -e .
No third-party dependencies. Python 3.8+. The noir-scan console script is
installed alongside o1js-scan (same entry point).
Usage
# scan a directory (recursively; skips node_modules, target/, .git, …)
o1js-scan path/to/project
# Noir-only / o1js-only
noir-scan circuits --lang noir
o1js-scan src --lang o1js
# scan a single file
o1js-scan src/MyContract.ts
noir-scan src/main.nr
# machine-readable output for CI
o1js-scan src --json
# SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub code scanning (writes o1js-scan.sarif by default)
o1js-scan src --sarif
noir-scan . --lang noir --sarif noir.sarif
# choose which severity fails CI (critical|high|medium|low|none; default high)
o1js-scan src --fail-on medium
o1js-scan --version
Exit code is 1 when a finding at or above the --fail-on level (default
high) is present and 0 otherwise — so you can drop it straight into CI.
With the default, a low/medium finding (including the informational recipient
rule below) does not fail the build; use --fail-on none to only report,
or --fail-on medium to gate more strictly. A missing scan path exits 2 with
an error on stderr, so a typo can't silently pass CI as a clean run. Every run
prints a one-line summary (counts by severity and the gate verdict) to stderr.
Directories skipped when walking a tree: node_modules, target (nargo),
.git, dist, build, __pycache__, .venv, venv.
Suppressing a reviewed finding
Silence a finding you've triaged without loosening the gate, with an inline comment on — or on the line above — the flagged line:
this.send({ to, amount }); // o1js-scan-disable-line O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS
// o1js-scan-disable-next-line
this.send({ to, amount });
let inv = unsafe { hint(x) }; // o1js-scan-disable-line NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS
List one or more rule ids to suppress only those; a bare directive (no ids) suppresses every rule on the target line.
As a library:
from o1js_scan import analyze_file, analyze_project
for path, finding in analyze_project("src", lang="auto"):
print(path, finding.rule_id, finding.severity.value, finding.title)
GitHub Action
Add the scanner to CI in a few lines. Findings appear as annotations on the PR diff and as alerts in the repository's Security → Code scanning tab.
# .github/workflows/o1js-scan.yml
name: o1js-scan
on: [push, pull_request]
permissions:
contents: read
security-events: write # required to upload SARIF to code scanning
jobs:
scan:
runs-on: ubuntu-latest
steps:
- uses: actions/checkout@v4
- uses: auditinfra-io/o1js-scan@v0.7.1
with:
path: src # optional, defaults to the repo root
lang: auto # auto | o1js | noir
# version: 0.7.1 # optional, pin the scanner version
# fail-on-findings: true # optional, fail the job on any high/critical
Noir-only CI recipe
- uses: auditinfra-io/o1js-scan@v0.7.1
with:
path: .
lang: noir
fail-on-findings: true
Or without the Action:
pip install o1js-scan
noir-scan . --lang noir --fail-on high --sarif noir.sarif
pre-commit (optional)
# .pre-commit-config.yaml
- repo: local
hooks:
- id: noir-scan
name: noir-scan
entry: noir-scan
language: system
pass_filenames: false
args: [".", "--lang", "noir", "--fail-on", "high"]
Inputs: path (default .), lang (auto|o1js|noir, default auto),
version (PyPI version to install, default latest), upload-sarif (default
true), fail-on-findings (default false). SARIF upload needs
security-events: write and code scanning enabled.
What it detects (o1js)
| Rule | Severity | What it means |
|---|---|---|
O1JS_MISSING_STATE_PRECONDITION |
high | this.x.get() read without a matching requireEquals(...) / getAndRequireEquals(). A bare get() adds no account precondition, so the proof doesn't bind x to its on-chain value — a prover can substitute any value. |
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS |
high / medium | A @method argument (a prover-controlled private witness) flows into a this.send amount or a state .set(...) and is never asserted. Direct analog of an under-constrained Circom signal. High when it reaches a value transfer. |
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_PROVABLE_WITNESS |
high / medium / low | A Provable.witness(...) local flows into a send/state effect with no in-circuit assertion. The witness callback runs outside the circuit (it's only a prover hint), so the result is a fresh prover-controlled value — the other witness source besides @method args. It must be re-derived and asserted (x.assertEquals(<recomputed>)) or bound to state. High on a send amount, medium on a state write, low on a recipient. |
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_RECIPIENT |
low | A @method argument is used only as the to: recipient of this.send(...). This is usually intended (a user names their own withdrawal destination) and is informational — it only matters if the destination is meant to be a fixed treasury or a state-recorded address. Does not trip the CI exit-code gate. |
O1JS_WITNESS_NOT_BOUND_TO_STATE |
medium | A witness is only trivially constrained (e.g. > 0, or compared against a constant) before an effect — never tied to on-chain state. Confirm the off-chain orchestration makes this safe, or the balance is drainable up to its standing value. |
O1JS_STALE_MERKLE_ROOT |
high | A method recomputes a Merkle root from a prover-supplied witness (computeRootAndKey / calculateRoot) but binds none of the recomputed roots to the current on-chain root. Without a this.root.requireEquals(...) / assertEquals against the live root, a prover can pass a witness for a fabricated or stale tree — forging membership or replaying old state. Binding may live in an undecorated same-class helper (this.verifyX(witness)); one level of helper propagation covers that. |
O1JS_UNVERIFIED_PROOF |
high | A @method parameter typed as Proof<...> / SelfProof / DynamicProof / *Proof is never .verify() / .verifyIf()'d. Passing a Proof does not verify it — without an explicit verify the prover can supply an arbitrary proof object, and any use of its publicOutput is unconstrained. |
O1JS_UNASSERTED_BOOL |
high / medium | An o1js predicate (equals / lessThanOrEqual / …) returns a Bool and adds no constraint unless the result is asserted or used. HIGH when the call is a bare discarded statement; MEDIUM when assigned to a local that is never referenced again. |
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_SENDER |
high / medium | this.sender.getUnconstrained() returns the tx sender without proving it. HIGH when that value (or a local from it) flows into an assert / state .set / send (vacuous check); MEDIUM otherwise. Prefer this.sender.getAndRequireSignature(), or the expanded idiom AccountUpdate.createSigned(sender). Stays quiet when (1) the same @method also calls this.sender.getAndRequireSignature() anywhere (signature requirement is method-scoped), or (2) the witnessed sender value is the argument to AccountUpdate.createSigned(...) / an AccountUpdate.create(...).requireSignature() on that same key (argument identity required — a createSigned on a different key does not suppress). |
MissingRangeCheck |
high | A raw Field (not the range-checked UInt64/UInt32) is used as a transfer amount. A Field is an element mod p and is not range-bounded. |
O1JS_WEAK_PERMISSIONS |
high / medium | editState / send permission set to proofOrSignature() or none(), letting the zkApp account key bypass the circuit by signing. |
False-positive guards (o1js)
The analyzer is designed to stay quiet on correct code:
- Signature-gated methods are skipped. A
@methodthat callsthis.requireSignature()(orgetAndRequireSignature,AccountUpdate.createSigned,Signature.verify) is owner/admin-gated — its arguments are chosen by the key holder, not an arbitrary prover — so its witnesses are not flagged. This is the o1js equivalent ofonlyOwner. - State-bound witnesses are skipped. An argument asserted equal to (or
bounded by an ordering comparison against) a
getAndRequireEquals()-derived value is sound and won't be reported. This covers both the direct form —amount.assertLessThanOrEqual(bal)— and the chained formamount.lessThanOrEqual(bal).assertTrue(). Binding that lives in an undecorated same-class helper (this.verifyX(arg)) is also recognized (depth 1 only). - Verified proofs are skipped. A
Proof/SelfProof/DynamicProof/*Proof-typed argument on which.verify()/.verifyIf()is called is constrained by the verified circuit — witness findings on it (and itspublicOutput/publicInput) are suppressed. The same applies to the canonical OffchainState wrapperthis.offchainState.settle(proof)(the framework verifies insidesettle). A hand-rolled.settle(proof)is not assumed to verify. The inverse case (proof-typed arg never verified and not OffchainState-settled) is reported asO1JS_UNVERIFIED_PROOF. - Asserted / used Bools are skipped. A predicate chained with
.assertTrue()/.assertFalse(), nested inProvable.if(...), or assigned to a local that is later referenced, is not reported asO1JS_UNASSERTED_BOOL. - Authenticated senders are skipped.
this.sender.getUnconstrained()does not fire when the same@methodalso callsthis.sender.getAndRequireSignature(), or when that witnessed value is passed toAccountUpdate.createSigned(...)/ authenticated via.requireSignature()on an AccountUpdate built from it (argument identity required). - Comments and string literals are stripped before analysis, so an
assertinside a string can't create a false result.
What it detects (Noir)
The same soundness idea — under-constrained witnesses — applies to
Noir (.nr) circuits. Point the scanner at .nr
files (or use --lang noir) and it analyzes them with the Noir rule set.
Same lexical, dependency-free approach. Calibrated against aztec-nr oracle /
unsafe idioms — see docs/noir_calibration.md.
| Rule | Severity | What it means |
|---|---|---|
NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS |
high | A value bound from an unsafe { ... } block — the result of an unconstrained fn (oracle / Brillig hint) — that is never re-constrained by an assert / assert_eq (or a confirming helper / merkle check). The hint runs outside the circuit. Analog of O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_PROVABLE_WITNESS. |
NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_INPUT |
medium | A private (witness) input of fn main that flows into no assert / assert_eq and is not part of the public output. Analog of O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS. |
NOIR_UNCHECKED_CAST |
medium | A prover-controlled value cast to a narrow unsigned type (as u8/u16/u32) with no range assertion. Analog of o1js MissingRangeCheck. |
NOIR_UNASSERTED_BOOL |
high / medium | A comparison whose bool result is discarded. Analog of o1js O1JS_UNASSERTED_BOOL. |
NOIR_CONDITIONAL_ASSERT |
medium | An assert inside if <flag> { ... } where <flag> is a prover-controlled bare bool. |
NOIR_CONDITIONAL_CONSTRAIN |
medium | A constrain_* / confirm_* / verify_* call only under a prover-controlled if, while an unsafe hint still reaches the output. |
NOIR_UNUSED_CHECK_RESULT |
high / medium | A check_* / confirm_* / verify_* / constrain_* result is discarded (bare call) or assigned and never asserted — the check does not bind the circuit. |
NOIR_UNSAFE_MISSING_SAFETY |
low | An unsafe { ... } block with no adjacent // Safety: comment. Informational; does not fail CI at default --fail-on high. |
False-positive guards (Noir)
- Assert / let-hop / same-file confirm helpers bind
unsafehints. - Call-site names
constrain_*/confirm_*/verify_*/check_(non_)membership*/public_data_storage_readcredit args (with unused-result detection for discarded checks). - Documented intentional unconstrained (requires adjacent
// Safety:):random(),avm::…, and kernel/rollup/discovery deferred wording. - Tuple
let+ asserted flags bind merkle witnesses passed into membership checks.
Example:
noir-scan examples/noir_unconstrained.nr # HIGH NOIR_UNCONSTRAINED_WITNESS
noir-scan examples/noir_constrained.nr # clean
Known limitations
The analyzer is a lexical, name-matching pass, not a dataflow engine. Keep these blind spots in mind when triaging — they are known and intentional for this dependency-free design, not bugs:
-
Aliasing defeats the taint. Witness tracking matches argument names, so copying a witness through a local hides it:
const q = qty; this.send({ to: dest, amount: q }); // qty is not flagged const slot = this.root; slot.get(); // missing precondition missed
-
Cross-method binding is depth-1 only. An undecorated same-class helper called as
this.verifyX(arg)can state-bind a caller's argument (one level). Deeper chains (@method→ helper A → helper B) and free/imported functions are not followed. Local-variable aliasing of the helper argument also stays a documented limitation. -
Unasserted-Bool detection is statement-shaped. Tier A only flags bare expression statements whose outermost call is a Bool predicate with nothing chained after it. Predicates nested inside
Provable.if(...), or assigned and later used, are not flagged. Complex control-flow uses of a Bool local may still be missed if the name is never referenced (failure mode: miss, not a false positive). -
Signature-gating is method-level and substring-based.
_method_is_signature_gatedtreats a whole@methodas owner-gated if it contains a signature idiom, and it recognizes a verifier only when the receiver name literally containssignature— sosig.verify(admin, msg)is not recognized as gating, while an unrelated signature check elsewhere in a large method can over-suppress. It is all-or-nothing per method. -
Sender authentication is name-based and same-method only.
O1JS_UNCONSTRAINED_SENDERsuppresses whenthis.sender.getAndRequireSignature()orAccountUpdate.createSigned(<that sender>)appears in the same@methodbody. A signature requirement that lives only in a helper (this.requireSenderSig()→getAndRequireSignatureinside) is not followed — failure mode is a false positive on correct code that wraps the idiom, not a missed real bug. -
Noir cross-crate helpers are recognized by name convention only (no
Nargo.toml/ import resolution). Prefer miss over false positive.
These are the reason findings are a starting point for human review, not proofs. A dataflow-aware rewrite is deliberately out of scope for the lexical analyzer.
Compatibility
Works on o1js 1.x and 2.x. o1js-scan analyzes TypeScript source as text
and has no runtime dependency on o1js — nothing is version-pinned. It keys
on the modern require* precondition API (getAndRequireEquals,
requireEquals, requireSignature, getAndRequireSignature), the
@method / @method.returns(...) decorators, @state, this.send({...}),
and Permissions.*, all of which are unchanged across the 1.x → 2.x boundary.
The 2.x owner-auth idiom this.sender.getAndRequireSignature() is recognized
as signature-gating. (Legacy assertEquals preconditions are still accepted,
so older code isn't broken either.)
Noir analysis targets Noir syntax used by Aztec / nargo projects (.nr); it
does not invoke nargo or compile circuits.
How it works
It's a lexical analyzer, not a full TypeScript or Noir parser — o1js and Noir sources are brace-delimited and regex-tractable, and the output is meant to be triaged by a human. That keeps it dependency-free and instant to run in CI. Findings are a starting point for review, not proofs.
Roadmap / contributing
Contributions welcome — new rule families, more FP guards, and real-world
calibration archetypes are all valuable. See CONTRIBUTING.md.
Run the suite with:
pip install -e ".[dev]"
pytest
License
Apache-2.0. See LICENSE.
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