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package-doctor

CI PyPI Python License: MIT

Tells you which Python dependencies to fix first: the ones being exploited, and the ones nobody is left to patch. Then stops your coding agent from adding another.

package-doctor scan of a ten-dependency project: pillow and litellm under FIX TODAY for CVEs on CISA's known-exploited list; bleach to replace, archived and marked Inactive; nltk to mitigate, with one advisory no release fixes; requests, pyjwt, flask and jinja2 to upgrade; python-dateutil quiet. Seven of ten fail the build.

A demo project with deliberately old pins, scanned on 16 September 2026. Advisory and exploitation data change daily, so the same pins will not read the same later.

In late August 2026, Anthropic's coordinated disclosure programme reported 2,300 vulnerabilities across 392 open source projects. 421 had been patched upstream. Discovery is becoming automated; remediation still needs a human. So the question worth asking about a dependency is not "is it healthy?" It is:

If a vulnerability lands in this package tomorrow, am I exposed, and is anyone home to fix it?

What it does

  • Two axes, not one. A package is escalated only when it sits at a trust boundary - it parses, decodes or authenticates data an attacker can influence - and there is proof nobody is left to ship a fix. mock going quiet is not a finding; an archived auth library is. The boundary call comes from a human-reviewed map of about 1,500 packages, each with its reason.
  • Exploited first. Advisories that affect your pinned version are ranked by CISA's known-exploited list and FIRST EPSS, so hundreds of advisories become the handful worth reading today.
  • Reachability. Each finding says whether, and where, your own code imports the package.
  • A guardrail for coding agents. As a Claude Code hook it checks every install an agent proposes, and blocks invented names, packages published in the last 30 days, and vulnerable or abandoned libraries at a trust boundary - with the reason, so the agent picks something else.

Findings are grouped by what to do about them:

Section Means Fails the build by default
exploited a CVE on CISA's known-exploited list affects your version yes
replace proof nobody is home - archived or marked Inactive - or an unfixable advisory in a project that has gone quiet at a boundary
upgrade advisories affect your version, and a newer release is clear of them at a boundary
mitigate an advisory with no fix anywhere, in a project that is still active no
quiet gone quiet, nothing actually wrong no
unchecked not enough data to judge no

Install

pip install package-doctor

Quick start

package-doctor scan                            # everything your project depends on
package-doctor explain pillow                  # the evidence behind one row
package-doctor check requests pillow==10.0.0   # before adding a dependency

It reads uv.lock, poetry.lock, Pipfile.lock, pyproject.toml, Pipfile, setup.cfg, setup.py and requirements*.txt. Without a lockfile it assumes the newest release a fresh install would get, and marks that version ?.

In CI, one line scans the checkout, fails the job on what needs work at a trust boundary, and writes the report to the job summary:

- uses: binuka200/package-doctor@v1.0.0

It also runs as a pre-commit hook, writes SARIF for code scanning, and lets you accept a known risk on the record, with a reason and an expiry date.

As a Claude Code hook, add this to .claude/settings.json:

{
  "hooks": {
    "PreToolUse": [
      { "matcher": "Bash",
        "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "package-doctor hook claude-code", "timeout": 60 }] }
    ],
    "PostToolUse": [
      { "matcher": "Bash|Edit|Write|MultiEdit",
        "hooks": [{ "type": "command", "command": "package-doctor hook claude-code", "timeout": 60 }] }
    ]
  }
}

PreToolUse checks what an install names before it runs. PostToolUse checks what it pulled in with it, and names written straight into a dependency file.

How accurate is it?

Measured on 60 open source repositories and 13,043 packages, on 16 September 2026:

  • 6,897 of 6,898 pinned versions match OSV's own answer about which advisories affect them.
  • 0 vulnerabilities that pip-audit found and package-doctor missed, over 1,663 found by both.
  • 78,642 reported import sites checked against the source line: 78,612 match outright, and the other 30 are _pytest imports, which pytest ships.
  • 2,218 advisories affecting pinned versions, of which 33 are on CISA's list or above a 10% exploit probability.

The exposure map carries real signal too: among entries decided from what a package does, the ones marked exposed have security advisories 8.6× as often as the ones reviewed and cleared. The method, and its limits, are in accuracy.

Use it alongside pip-audit, not instead of it

pip-audit is the PyPA tool and is better at what it does: telling you, on every commit, which pinned versions have known CVEs. Most of what lands in fix today, upgrade and mitigate here, it would also find.

What it does not do is tell you which of those to fix first, which of them your code actually imports, or which of your dependencies has nobody left to ship a patch at all. That is this tool's job, and it is a different cadence — a quarterly maintenance review rather than a per-commit gate.

Documentation

Contributing

The most useful contribution isn't code — it's arguing with exposure.toml, about 1,500 judgement calls about which packages sit where an attacker can reach, each with a one-sentence reason. A verdict you think is wrong is worth the same: post it in Discussions with the output of package-doctor explain. See CONTRIBUTING.md to get started.

A note on tone

Being listed here is not an accusation. Most unmaintained packages are the work of volunteers who gave what they could, and "no releases since 2021, repository archived" is a fact that helps a user without indicting anyone. Findings are worded that way on purpose. If you find output that reads as a judgement on a maintainer rather than a description of risk, that is a bug — please report it.

Background

The reasoning behind this tool is set out in Rethinking Dependency Maintenance in the Age of AI Vulnerability Research.

License

MIT

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