pipeline-check 1.15.0

Security scanner for CI/CD pipelines, IaC, and cloud: GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Terraform, Kubernetes, and more, scored against the OWASP CI/CD Top 10.

Pipeline-Check

Find security risks in your CI/CD pipelines before attackers do.

Full documentation: https://dmartinochoa.github.io/pipeline-check/

Pipeline-Check is a security scanner for GitHub Actions, GitLab CI, Jenkins, CircleCI, Azure DevOps, Bitbucket Pipelines, Buildkite, Drone, Harness, Tekton, Argo Workflows, and Google Cloud Build, plus Terraform, CloudFormation, Kubernetes, Helm, Dockerfile, OCI image manifests, and live AWS, Azure, and GCP accounts. It maps every finding to the OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks, SLSA, NIST SSDF, PCI DSS, SOC 2, the CIS GitHub Benchmark, and twelve other frameworks, and scores each scan A through D so you can gate merges on the result.

1260+ checks across 39 providers, mapped to 18 compliance standards, with 120 autofixers, plus 56 attack chains correlating findings into MITRE ATT&CK-mapped kill chains. A dataflow taint engine catches multi-step and cross-job propagation that single-rule scanners miss.

Quick start | Usage guide | Providers | How it works | CI integration | Compliance | vs. Checkov / KICS / Semgrep | Docs

---

🚀 Quick start

pip install pipeline-check          # Python >= 3.11
                                    # `pipeline-check` and `pipeline_check` both work

pipeline_check                      # auto-detects every provider in cwd
pipeline_check init                 # scan + baseline + tuned config (smart init)
pipeline_check --policy pr-gate     # PR gate: block on new HIGH+ findings
pipeline_check explain GHA-001      # full per-check reference (severity, fix, controls)
pipeline_check -p github -o json    # short flags work too
pipeline_check --pipeline aws       # force the live-AWS scan
pipeline_check --man recipes        # copy-paste recipes for the common workflows

🔐 Want to verify the wheel was built by this repo in CI before installing it? Every tagged release ships SLSA Build L3 provenance and PEP 740 attestations. See Verifying a release.

Or run from the published container image (no Python install needed):

# Docker Hub
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/scan" dmartinochoa/pipeline-check

# GHCR (same image, different registry)
docker run --rm -v "$PWD:/scan" ghcr.io/dmartinochoa/pipeline-check

The image is multi-arch (linux/amd64 + linux/arm64), ships with SLSA build provenance and an SBOM attached to the manifest, and is tagged per release (:1.0.4), per commit (:sha-<short>), and :latest on master. /scan is the image working directory, so mounting your repo there lets auto-detect Just Work.

Run pipeline_check with no flags in any supported repo. It walks the working directory for every supported provider's canonical file (.github/workflows/, .gitlab-ci.yml, Jenkinsfile, cloudbuild.yaml, Chart.yaml, template.yml, Dockerfile, …). One match runs a single-provider scan; two or more matches automatically switch to multi-provider mode (equivalent to --pipelines X,Y,Z) so cross-provider attack chains (XPC-NNN) fire. When nothing matches, the CLI exits with a usage error; pass --pipeline aws explicitly to scan a live AWS account.

No API tokens required. CI configs are parsed from disk; AWS uses the standard boto3 credential chain. The GitHub Actions provider can optionally follow remote reusable-workflow refs over HTTPS via --resolve-remote (off by default; see docs/providers/github.md for the full opt-in surface).

PR review comments

Pipe findings into pull-request review comments on the changed lines via the bundled composite action:

on: pull_request
permissions:
  contents: read
  pull-requests: write
jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: dmartinochoa/pipeline-check/.github/actions/pipeline-check-pr@v1
        with:
          severity-threshold: MEDIUM

Each finding lands as a review comment on its precise line (when the rule emits a Location); everything else goes into a single PR-level summary comment. See .github/actions/pipeline-check-pr/README.md for inputs, idempotency, and fork-PR fallback behavior.

---

🧩 Supported providers

Provider	Input	Auto-detect	Checks
AWS	Live account via boto3	--region	71 checks · CodeBuild, CodePipeline, CodeDeploy, ECR, IAM, PBAC, S3, CloudTrail, CloudWatch Logs, Secrets Manager, CodeArtifact, CodeCommit, Lambda, KMS, SSM, EventBridge, Signer
Azure (live)	Live account via Azure SDK	--subscription-id	50 checks · ACR, Key Vault, App Service, Monitor, Network, SQL, Storage, VM, Entra ID
GCP (live)	Live account via Google Cloud SDK	--gcp-project	50 checks · Artifact Registry, Compute Engine, IAM, KMS, Logging, Network, Cloud Run, Cloud Storage, Cloud SQL
Terraform	terraform show -json plan or raw *.tf source	--tf-plan / --tf-source	AWS-parity shift-left checks, pre-provisioning
CloudFormation	YAML or JSON template	--cfn-template	~63 AWS-parity shift-left checks; resolves !Ref / !Sub / !GetAtt intrinsics (unresolved values treated as strict)
Pulumi	Pulumi.yaml + stack config + project source	--pulumi-path	14 checks · PULUMI-001..014 · plaintext secrets, wildcard IAM, public resources, insecure state backend, unpinned plugins, deploy-time exec (Python / TypeScript / Go / C#, no Pulumi CLI needed)
GitHub Actions	.github/workflows/*.yml	--gha-path	114 checks · GHA-001..073, GHA-086..123 + TAINT-001..003/009 · SHA pinning, script injection, OIDC trusted-publishing abuse, agentic-CLI / IaC-apply RCE, prompt injection, trust_remote_code model loads, unpinned model refs, unsafe pickle deserialization, unreviewed AI-generated changes, compromised-action and npm-worm IOCs, $GITHUB_ENV poisoning. Full reference →
Gitea / Forgejo Actions	.gitea/ or .forgejo/workflows/*.yml	--gitea-path	Reuses the full GitHub Actions rule pack; GitHub-only reputation rules pass silently without --resolve-remote metadata
GitHub Actions run forensics	Live Actions REST API	--pipeline runs	7 checks · RUN-001..007 · audits run history for what actually executed (fork-originated runs, privileged-trigger runs that fired, and via --audit-runs-logs secrets leaked in run logs, fork runs that minted a cloud OIDC token, fork runs that executed on a self-hosted runner, a known-compromised action confirmed running incl. tag-repoint, and third-party actions pinned by a mutable tag that ran with secrets) vs. what the static config could do
GitLab pipeline run forensics	Live GitLab REST API	--pipeline gitlab_runs	5 checks · GLRUN-001..005 · audits pipeline history for what actually executed (merge-request pipelines that fired, and via --audit-runs-logs fork merge-request pipelines that ran untrusted code, secrets leaked in fork job traces, fork pipelines that minted a cloud OIDC token, fork pipelines that ran on a self-managed runner) vs. what the static .gitlab-ci.yml could do
GitLab CI	.gitlab-ci.yml	--gitlab-path	52 checks · GL-001..050 + TAINT-004/008 · CI_JOB_TOKEN cross-project scope, DinD TLS bypass, debug-trace secret leaks, MR-pipeline IaC apply + prod deploy, disabled native scanners, trust_remote_code + unpinned + pickle model loads, agentic-CLI prompt injection + autoland, long-lived publish token vs OIDC trusted publishing, mutable include: component:
Bitbucket Pipelines	bitbucket-pipelines.yml	--bitbucket-path	39 checks · BB-001..039 · PR-pipeline IaC apply + prod deploy, trust_remote_code model loads, untrusted PR context into an agentic AI CLI, unsafe pickle deserialization, unpinned model pulls, agentic-CLI output pushed without review
Azure DevOps	azure-pipelines.yml	--azure-path	38 checks · ADO-001..038 · incl. IaC apply on a PR-validated pipeline, trust_remote_code model loads, untrusted PR context into an agentic AI CLI, unsafe pickle deserialization, unpinned model pulls, agentic-CLI output pushed without review
Jenkins	Jenkinsfile (Declarative / Scripted)	--jenkinsfile-path	42 checks · JF-001..042 · incl. untrusted PR/build context into an agentic AI CLI, agentic-CLI output pushed without review, the model-load supply-chain triad (trust_remote_code, unpinned model revision, unsafe pickle deserialization), secret echoed to the build log
CircleCI	.circleci/config.yml	--circleci-path	38 checks · CC-001..038 · incl. Go-module-verification bypass, the model-load triad (trust_remote_code, unpinned model revision, unsafe pickle deserialization), untrusted PR/build context into an agentic AI CLI, agentic-CLI output pushed without review
Google Cloud Build	cloudbuild.yaml	--cloudbuild-path	28 checks · GCB-001..027
Buildkite	.buildkite/pipeline.yml	--buildkite-path	18 checks · BK-001..016 + TAINT-005
Drone CI	.drone.yml / .drone.yaml	--drone-path	22 checks · DR-001..017 · image / plugin pinning, privileged steps, ${DRONE_*} injection, fork-PR exposure, pipe-to-shell, dangerous shell idioms, sensitive host-path mounts
Harness CI/CD	Harness pipeline YAML (.harness/)	--harness-path	18 checks · HARNESS-001..018 · step image digest pinning, untrusted <+codebase.*> / <+trigger.*> expression injection into step commands, privileged steps, literal secrets in pipeline / stage variables, pipe-to-shell installs, TLS-verification bypass, sensitive host-path mounts, untrusted context into an agentic AI CLI, AI output autolanding without review, model trust_remote_code / unsafe-pickle deserialization (model-load RCE), AI model pulled without a pinned revision, secret echoed to the step log, dangerous shell idiom (eval / sh -c), supply-chain gates (no signing / SBOM / SLSA provenance / vuln-scan)
Tekton	Task / Pipeline / *Run YAML	--tekton-path	19 checks · TKN-001..016 + TAINT-006
Argo Workflows	Workflow / WorkflowTemplate YAML	--argo-path	20 checks · ARGO-001..017 + TAINT-007 · over-privileged / default service account, untrusted-parameter manifest injection
Argo CD	Application / AppProject YAML + argocd-* ConfigMaps	--argocd-path	19 checks · ARGOCD-001..019 · sourceRepo / destination wildcards, RBAC wildcards, mutable source refs, web terminal, drift-detection bypass. Reference →
Dockerfile	Dockerfile / Containerfile	--dockerfile-path	31 checks · DF-001..031 · image digest pinning, lifecycle scripts, TLS / loader-hijack env, unpinned COPY --from
Modelfile	Modelfile · HF config.json	--modelfile-path	5 checks · MODEL-001..005 · unpinned base model, third-party-hub (hf.co) source, local weights blob, remote LoRA adapter, model config custom code (auto_map)
Kubernetes	Manifest YAML (Deployment, Pod, …)	--k8s-path	44 checks · K8S-001..044 · image digest pinning, securityContext, hostPath / host-namespace, RBAC blast radius, admission-webhook fail-open
Helm	Chart directory (Chart.yaml) or .tgz	--helm-path	Renders via helm template, runs the 44 K8S-* rules on the result, plus 17 chart-supply-chain checks (HELM-001..017) read off Chart.yaml / Chart.lock / values.yaml: digest gaps, floating dependency versions, non-HTTPS repos, compromised-chart registry, values.yaml secrets, chart SSTI. Requires Helm 3 on PATH
Developer environment	.vscode/ · .devcontainer/ · .claude/settings.json · .mcp.json	--devenv-path	8 checks · DEV-001..008 · config that auto-executes on repo open (folder-open tasks, devcontainer lifecycle, committed Claude Code hooks, remote fetch-and-execute, executable-path / env hijack, committed MCP command servers, committed credentials)
OCI image manifest	docker buildx imagetools inspect --raw <ref> JSON	--oci-manifest	16 checks · OCI-001..009 + ATTEST-001..007 · provenance annotations, SLSA / SBOM attestations, base-image attribution, weak-digest and foreign-layer detection
SCM (GitHub / GitLab / Bitbucket)	Platform REST API	--scm-platform / --scm-repo	55 checks · SCM-001..055 · branch protection, rulesets, Actions governance, environment protection, deploy keys, webhooks, code/secret scanning (GitHub full pack; GitLab + Bitbucket get a universal subset plus a small platform pack). Full reference →
Package registries (npm · PyPI)	npm: package.json / lockfile / .npmrc. PyPI: requirements*.txt / pyproject.toml / lockfiles	--npm-path / --pypi-path	npm: 20 checks (NPM-001..020) · PyPI: 20 checks (PYPI-001..021) · version pinning, lockfile integrity / hashes, install-time scripts, dependency-confusion, curated compromised-package registry, plus provenance / untrusted-ref / OpenSSF-Scorecard signals behind --resolve-remote. Full reference →
↳ Maven	pom.xml / settings.xml	--maven-path	18 checks · MVN-001..018 · floating versions / -SNAPSHOT, HTTP repos, weak checksum policy, plaintext credentials, build-time plugin RCE, compromised-package registry. Reference →
↳ NuGet	*.csproj / NuGet.config / lockfiles / dotnet-tools.json	--nuget-path	19 checks · NUGET-001..019 · floating versions, HTTP feeds, lockfile reproducibility, dependency-confusion, plaintext feed credentials, signature-validation enforcement, build-time MSBuild exec. Reference →
↳ Composer	composer.json / composer.lock / auth.json	--composer-path	14 checks · COMPOSER-001..014 · floating constraints, HTTP repos, curl-pipe-shell hooks, allow-plugins wildcard, credential leaks, compromised-package registry
↳ Cargo	Cargo.toml / Cargo.lock	--cargo-path	14 checks · CARGO-001..014 · floating versions, mutable git refs, alternate registries, build.rs compile-time exec, compromised-crate registry
↳ Go modules	go.mod / go.sum	--gomod-path	12 checks · GOMOD-001..012 · go.sum integrity, replace-directive hijack, insecure module hosts, executable tool directives, compromised-module registry
↳ RubyGems	Gemfile / Gemfile.lock / .bundle/config	--rubygems-path	13 checks · GEM-001..013 · floating constraints, HTTP sources, mutable git refs, dependency confusion, credential leaks, compromised-gem registry

Each CI provider checks for: dependency pinning, script injection, credential leaks, deploy approval gates, artifact signing, SBOM generation, Docker security, package integrity, timeout enforcement, vulnerability scanning, TLS verification, and more. The Kubernetes provider focuses on workload posture (image digest pinning, securityContext, hostPath / host-namespace exposure, RBAC blast radius, Secret hygiene). The Helm provider renders charts via helm template and runs the Kubernetes rule pack on the result, plus seventeen chart-supply-chain rules (HELM-001--017: legacy apiVersion: v1, missing Chart.lock digests, non-HTTPS dependency / home / sources URLs, non-pinned dependency versions, missing maintainers / description / appVersion, missing kubeVersion range, stale Chart.lock > 90 days) read straight off the on-disk chart files. See docs/providers/ for the full per-check reference.

---

⚙️ How it works

                 +-----------+
  Config files   |  Scanner  |   1260+ checks across 39 providers
  or live APIs ---->         +---> Findings (check_id, severity, resource)
                 +-----------+
                       |
                 +-----------+
                 |  Scorer   |   Severity-weighted: CRITICAL=20, HIGH=10, MED=5, LOW=2
                 |           +---> Score 0-100, Grade A/B/C/D
                 +-----------+
                       |
                 +-----------+
                 |   Gate    |   --fail-on, --min-grade, --max-failures, --baseline
                 |           +---> Exit 0 (pass) or 1 (fail)
                 +-----------+
                       |
                 +-----------+
                 | Reporter  |   Terminal, JSON, HTML, SARIF 2.1.0
                 +-----------+

Every finding is annotated with compliance controls from all enabled standards, so a single scan satisfies multiple audit frameworks.

---

⭐ Key features

Feature	Description
Autofix	--fix emits unified-diff patches; --fix --apply writes in place. 120 fixers cover script injection, secrets, timeouts, pinning, Docker flags, TLS, Kubernetes securityContext, Cloud Build options, Helm chart-supply-chain TODOs, and more.
CI gate	--fail-on HIGH, --min-grade B, --max-failures 5, --fail-on-check GHA-002. Any condition trips exit 1.
Baselines	--baseline prior.json or --baseline-from-git origin/main:report.json. Only gate on new findings.
Diff-mode	--diff-base origin/main scans only files changed by the branch.
PR diff	--pr-diff origin/main re-scans both sides and emits a Markdown PR-comment summarizing which findings the branch introduced, resolved, or preserved. Multiset fingerprint on (check_id, resource) so line shifts on unchanged code don't surface as new. Combine with --fail-on HIGH to gate the PR on introduced findings only. See docs/pr_diff.md.
Suppressions	.pipelinecheckignore (flat or YAML with expires: dates).
Custom secrets	--secret-pattern '^acme_[a-f0-9]{32}$' extends the credential scanner.
Glob selection	--checks 'GHA-*' or --checks '*-008' to scope checks.
Incident-driven filter	--only-known-attacked narrows the run to rules whose detection shape is anchored to a documented real-world incident, CVE, or vendor disclosure (225 rules today). Useful for burning down the incident-driven worklist on a fresh repo without the full pack noise. Composes with --checks as intersection.
Standard audit	--standard-report nist_ssdf prints the control-to-check matrix and coverage gaps.
Custom rule DSL	--custom-rules PATH loads YAML-defined rules that run alongside the built-in catalog. Supports GHA, GitLab, Bitbucket, Azure, CircleCI, Cloud Build, Kubernetes, and Helm. Rule shape: for_each: jsonpath + assert: predicate (eq / regex / exists / len_gt / all_of / not / …). Findings flow through the same scoring, gating, and SARIF as built-ins. See docs/writing_a_custom_rule.md.
Component inventory	--inventory emits the list of resources / workflows / templates the scanner discovered, with per-type metadata (encryption, runtime, tags, lifecycle policies). Filter with --inventory-type 'AWS::IAM::*'; skip checks entirely with --inventory-only. Feeds asset-register dashboards and drift detectors.
STRIDE threat model	--output threatmodel emits a self-contained Markdown threat-model document populated from the scan + inventory: assets, trust boundaries, findings grouped by STRIDE category, implemented controls, top-25 risk register. Mapping is derived from each rule's existing OWASP / CWE tags so re-policing is one table swap. Shaped for SOC 2 / PCI / NIST SSDF evidence packages.
MCP server	pipeline_check --serve runs as a Model Context Protocol server on stdio so AI clients (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, Cursor, Continue, Zed) can drive scans and introspect the rule catalog directly. 11 tools advertised: scan / inventory / explain_check / list_chains / threat_model / scan_pr_diff / etc. The mcp SDK is an optional [mcp] extra so the default install stays slim. See docs/mcp.md.
Editor diagnostics (LSP)	python -m pipeline_check.lsp is the Language Server backing the Pipeline-Check VS Code extension (source · VS Code Marketplace · Open VSX). Same rule registry the CLI uses, surfaced inline as you edit .github/workflows/, .gitlab-ci.yml, azure-pipelines.yml, bitbucket-pipelines.yml, .circleci/, cloudbuild.yaml, .buildkite/, .drone.yml, Jenkinsfile, and Dockerfile. Each diagnostic carries the rule ID, severity, the dynamic recommendation, and a codeDescription link straight to the per-rule docs page. pygls is an optional [lsp] extra so the default install stays slim.
Multi-scanner SARIF ingest	--ingest <file>.sarif (repeatable) absorbs findings from Trivy / Checkov / Snyk / KICS / CodeQL / any conformant scanner. External rules become INGEST-<tool>-<rule-id> Finding rows; the chain engine RE-EVALUATES over the union, so cross-tool chains (e.g. XPC-009 — ingested CVE finding + DF-001 mutable runtime image) fire on compositions no individual scanner would surface. Caps: 25 MiB / 5,000 results per file.
Vulnerable-by-design benchmark	Two complementary regression gates. bench/cases/ is a synthetic set (one minimal fixture per attack pattern, gated at 100% recall in CI). bench/goats/ is the real-world phase: pinned clones of cicd-goat (GHA + 7 Jenkinsfiles), cfngoat, and kubernetes-goat, scanned via the same CLI a user runs, with hand-curated expected.txt locking 68 check IDs across four goats — each tied to a documented challenge or CIS benchmark control. The bench workflow runs nightly on master and on every PR that touches the rule pack; uploads a goat-bench-report artifact and posts a sticky PR comment. python bench/goat_runner.py --markdown reproduces locally. See docs/goat_bench.md.

---

📤 Output formats

pipeline_check --output terminal            # rich table to stdout (default)
pipeline_check --output json                # machine-readable JSON
pipeline_check --output jsonl --output-file findings.log     # one finding per line (SIEM / jq streaming)
pipeline_check --output html --output-file report.html       # self-contained HTML
pipeline_check --output sarif --output-file scan.sarif       # SARIF 2.1.0 for GitHub/GitLab
pipeline_check --output junit --output-file junit.xml        # JUnit XML for test-runner UIs
pipeline_check --output codequality --output-file cq.json    # GitLab Code Quality (inline MR annotations)
pipeline_check --output csv --output-file findings.csv       # flat findings export for spreadsheet triage
pipeline_check --output annotations                          # GitHub Actions inline ::error annotations (no SARIF upload)
pipeline_check --output cyclonedx --output-file sbom.cdx.json # CycloneDX 1.6 build-dependency SBOM
pipeline_check --output spdx --output-file sbom.spdx.json    # SPDX 2.3 build-dependency SBOM
pipeline_check --output markdown            # PR-comment shape (GFM)
pipeline_check --output threatmodel --output-file threats.md # STRIDE threat model
pipeline_check --output both                # terminal on stderr + JSON on stdout

---

🔁 CI integration

GitHub Actions

The marketplace action wraps install, scan, gate, and SARIF upload in one step. Findings show up in the GitHub Security tab.

permissions:
  contents: read
  security-events: write   # required by upload-sarif

jobs:
  scan:
    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
    steps:
      - uses: actions/checkout@v4
      - uses: dmartinochoa/pipeline-check@v1
        with:
          pipeline: auto       # or: github, gitlab, terraform, k8s, ...
          fail-on: HIGH

Inputs (all optional): pipeline, path, fail-on, min-grade, max-failures, severity-threshold, baseline, baseline-from-git, diff-base, standard, output, output-file, upload-sarif, pipeline-check-version, python-version, resolve-remote, extra-args. Outputs: exit-code, findings-count, failed-count, score, grade, sarif-file. See action.yml for the full surface.

For PR review comments on the changed lines, see the companion pipeline-check-pr action. For a single delta-shaped PR comment ("this branch added 3 HIGH findings, resolved 1, preserved 12"), use --pr-diff.

For finer control, the manual three-step form still works:

- run: pip install pipeline-check
- run: pipeline_check --pipeline github --output sarif --output-file pipeline-check.sarif --fail-on HIGH
- if: always()
  uses: github/codeql-action/upload-sarif@v3
  with:
    sarif_file: pipeline-check.sarif

GitLab CI

security-scan:
  script:
    - pip install pipeline-check
    - pipeline_check --pipeline gitlab --fail-on HIGH --output json > report.json
  artifacts:
    reports:
      sast: report.json

Any CI system

# Gate on grade
pipeline_check --pipeline github --min-grade B

# Gate on new findings only (baseline diff)
pipeline_check --pipeline github --fail-on HIGH \
  --baseline-from-git origin/main:baseline.json

Exit codes: 0 = pass, 1 = gate failed, 2 = scanner error, 3 = config error.

Pre-commit

pipeline_check ships hook definitions for the pre-commit framework. Each hook is scoped to one provider so a Dockerfile change doesn't run the GitHub Actions scanner. Enable just the hooks for the providers your repo ships through:

# .pre-commit-config.yaml
repos:
  - repo: https://github.com/dmartinochoa/pipeline-check
    rev: v1.12.0   # pin to a release tag
    hooks:
      - id: pipeline-check-github
      - id: pipeline-check-dockerfile

All hooks default to --fail-on HIGH. Override with args: for a softer gate (e.g. args: [--fail-on, CRITICAL]).

---

🛠️ Configuration

Every CLI flag can be set in pyproject.toml, .pipeline-check.yml, or environment variables. Precedence: CLI > env > file > defaults.

# pyproject.toml
[tool.pipeline_check]
pipeline = "github"
severity_threshold = "MEDIUM"

[tool.pipeline_check.gate]
fail_on = "HIGH"
baseline = "artifacts/baseline.json"
ignore_file = ".pipelinecheckignore"

Full reference: docs/config.md.

---

📋 Compliance standards

Each finding is tagged with controls from all enabled frameworks. One scan covers multiple audits.

Standard	Version	Coverage
OWASP Top 10 CI/CD Security Risks	2022	10/10 risks
SLSA Build Track	1.0	6/7 levels (413 check mappings)
NIST SSDF (SP 800-218)	v1.1	CI/CD subset
NIST SP 800-53	Rev. 5	CI/CD subset
NIST SP 800-190	2017	Container CI/CD subset
NIST CSF 2.0	2.0	CI/CD subset
CIS Software Supply Chain	1.0	CI/CD subset
CIS AWS Foundations	3.0.0	CI/CD subset
CIS Azure Foundations	2.1.0	Cloud posture subset
CIS GCP Foundations	3.0.0	Cloud posture subset
CIS Kubernetes Benchmark	1.10	Section 5 (Policies)
CIS GitHub Benchmark	1.1.0	Sections 1.1, 1.4, 1.5
PCI DSS v4.0	4.0	CI/CD subset
SOC 2 Trust Services Criteria	2017 (rev. 2022)	CC6/CC7/CC8 subset
NSA/CISA ESF Supply Chain	2022	CI/CD subset
OpenSSF Scorecard	v5	CI/CD subset
Microsoft S2C2F	2024-05	CI/CD subset
OSC&R	2024	61/86 techniques

# Explore a standard's control-to-check matrix
pipeline_check --standard-report slsa

# Restrict a scan to specific standards
pipeline_check --standard owasp_cicd_top_10 --standard nist_ssdf

Standards are pure data. Adding SOC 2 or an internal policy is one Python module. See docs/standards/.

---

💻 CLI reference

Flag	Default	Description
--pipeline / -p	auto	auto (detect from cwd), aws, azure_cloud, gcp, terraform, cloudformation, pulumi, github, gitea, gitlab, bitbucket, azure, jenkins, circleci, cloudbuild, buildkite, drone, harness, tekton, argo, argocd, dockerfile, modelfile, kubernetes, helm, oci, scm, scm_org, gitlab_group, npm, pypi, maven, nuget, composer, cargo, gomod, rubygems, devenv, runs, gitlab_runs
--pipelines		Comma-separated multi-provider list (e.g. --pipelines github,oci). Mutually exclusive with --pipeline. Activates cross-provider attack chains (XPC-NNN) by evaluating the chain engine over the union of every sub-scan's findings.
--output / -o	terminal	terminal, json, jsonl, html, sarif, junit, markdown, threatmodel, cyclonedx, spdx, codequality, csv, annotations, both
--output-file / -O		Required with html; optional with sarif / junit / markdown / threatmodel / cyclonedx / spdx / codequality
--fail-on / -f		Fail if any finding >= severity (CRITICAL, HIGH, MEDIUM, LOW)
--min-grade		Fail if grade worse than A/B/C/D
--max-failures		Fail if > N effective findings
--fail-on-check		Fail if named check fails (repeat for multiple)
--baseline		Prior JSON report; existing findings don't gate
--baseline-from-git		REF:PATH. Resolves baseline via git show
--write-baseline		Write the current scan's failing findings to PATH as JSON. Pair with --baseline PATH on subsequent runs to gate only on new issues.
--policy		Load a named scan profile from ./policies/<NAME>.yml (or ./.pipeline-check/policies/<NAME>.yml), or one of the built-in packs (pr-gate, release-gate, slsa-l3, pci-dss, supply-chain-strict) shipped with the tool. Bundles a rule filter, standards filter, gate thresholds, and per-rule severity overrides into one profile. A local policy of the same name shadows the built-in; CLI flags and config keep overriding policy values.
--list-policies		List every discoverable policy (local files plus built-in packs) and exit.
--ignore-file	.pipelinecheckignore	Suppressions (flat or YAML with expires:)
--diff-base		Only scan files changed vs this git ref
--fix		Emit unified-diff patches to stdout
--apply		With --fix, write patches in place
--list-fixers		List every check ID with a fixer (ID SEVERITY TIER TITLE) and exit
--safety	all	Filter --list-fixers by tier: safe, unsafe, or all
--checks / -c	all	Check ID(s) or globs (GHA-*, *-008)
--severity-threshold	INFO	Minimum severity to display
--secret-pattern		Extra regex for credential scanning (repeat)
--custom-rules		YAML rule file or directory of rule files; loaded alongside the built-in catalog (repeatable)
--standard	all	Standard(s) to annotate findings with
--standard-report		Print control-to-check matrix and exit
--inventory		Emit scanned-component inventory alongside findings
--inventory-type		Glob pattern to scope inventory by type (repeatable, implies --inventory)
--inventory-only		Skip checks; emit inventory only (implies --inventory)
--ingest		SARIF 2.1.0 file from another scanner (Trivy, Checkov, Snyk, KICS, CodeQL, …). External rules become INGEST-<tool>-<rule-id> findings; chain engine re-evaluates over the union. Repeatable.
--scm-platform		SCM platform for --pipeline scm: github (full 55-rule pack), gitlab, or bitbucket (each gets the 7-rule universal subset plus a small platform pack)
--scm-repo		Repository to scan: owner/name (GitHub), group/subgroup/project (GitLab — nested subgroups OK), or workspace/repo_slug (Bitbucket Cloud)
--scm-fixture-dir		Read SCM API responses from JSON files under DIR instead of hitting the network. Useful for offline tests / CI runs without a token.
--gh-token	$GITHUB_TOKEN	Token for the GHA reusable-workflow resolver and the SCM provider's REST API calls
--resolve-remote		Follow remote uses: refs (reusable workflows + composite actions) over HTTPS. Off by default; opt in to take on the network surface.
--config	auto	Config file path (TOML or YAML)
--config-check		Validate config, exit non-zero on unknown keys
--man [TOPIC]		Extended docs (gate, autofix, diff, secrets, standards, config, output, inventory, lambda, recipes, explain)
--region / -r	us-east-1	AWS region
--profile		AWS CLI named profile
--verbose / -v		Debug output to stderr
--quiet / -q		Suppress all output; exit code only
--no-group		Render every finding on its own row. By default the terminal table collapses repeated (check_id, resource) failures into one row plus a +N similar summary line. JSON / SARIF / JUnit outputs always carry every finding regardless.
--inline-explain		Surface each finding's exploit_example (when present), no --explain CHECK_ID round-trip. Honored by terminal, SARIF (rule help), JUnit, markdown, and codequality; JSON / HTML always include it.
--version		Print version

Provider-specific path flags (--gha-path, --gitlab-path, --bitbucket-path, --cfn-template, --azure-path, --jenkinsfile-path, --circleci-path, --tf-plan, --tf-source, --cloudbuild-path, --buildkite-path, --drone-path, --harness-path, --tekton-path, --argo-path, --dockerfile-path, --k8s-path, --helm-path, --oci-manifest) are auto-detected from the working directory when omitted. The Helm provider also takes --helm-values FILE and --helm-set KEY=VALUE (both repeatable), forwarded to helm template. The SCM provider is API-only and takes --scm-platform github --scm-repo owner/name (plus --gh-token or $GITHUB_TOKEN); no on-disk path flag.

Subcommands:

• pipeline_check init runs one scan against the auto-detected pipeline, writes .pipeline-check-baseline.json capturing current failing findings, and emits .pipeline-check.yml with a recommended gate.fail_on and a baseline pointer so future CI runs only block on new regressions. Prints a "top 5 to fix" summary to stderr. Pass --no-scan for the legacy commented-out scaffold, --path PATH to redirect the output, or --force to overwrite an existing file.
• pipeline_check fix-pr scans, applies the autofixers of the chosen --safety tier (safe default / unsafe / all), commits the changed files to a fresh branch, pushes, and opens the request: gh pr create on GitHub, a GitLab MR via merge_request.* push options (no token needed), or a pushed branch plus manual instructions on other hosts. --dry-run previews the patch and planned git actions without touching the repo; --no-push stops at the local commit; --allow-dirty proceeds on a dirty tree while staging only the autofix edits. Closes the gap between "patch on disk" and "PR in your inbox".
• pipeline_check explain CHECK_ID prints the full per-check reference (severity, recommendation, controls, autofix availability, related rules, attack chains). Equivalent to pipeline_check --explain CHECK_ID; the subcommand form is more discoverable and is what the smart-init top-5 summary and the gate-failure trailer point users at. Exit code 0 on a known ID, 3 on an unknown ID with a "did you mean" list.
• pipeline_check history --dir DIR renders a self-contained HTML dashboard (trend graphs + a top-N firing-rules burn-down) from a directory of past --output json snapshots. No server, no JS.
• pipeline_check fleet --repos repos.yml (or --from-org ORG) shallow-clones and scans many repositories, writing per-repo findings plus a fleet-wide digest (fleet.json / fleet.md) and a self-contained fleet.html posture graph (repos as grade-colored nodes, cross-repo CXPC-NNN chains as severity-colored edges; no JS, no CDN), re-evaluating those cross-repo chains over the union.
• pipeline_check fp-stats prints rule-to-false-positive-vote totals from the local --annotate-fp annotation file so rule authors can see which checks accumulate the most FP reports.
• pipeline_check verify-artifact REF runs the supply-chain verifiers on your PATH (cosign, slsa-verifier, gh attestation) against an OCI image or release file and reports whether its signature / SLSA provenance validates against an expected source repo and signing identity. Turns the static "you should sign" findings into a runtime pass/fail gate. Exit 0 verified, 1 verification failed, 3 no installed verifier matched the policy.

---

🏛️ Architecture

pipeline_check/
├── cli.py                     # Click CLI
├── lambda_handler.py          # AWS Lambda entry point
└── core/
    ├── scanner.py             # Provider-agnostic orchestrator
    ├── scorer.py              # Severity-weighted scoring (A/B/C/D)
    ├── gate.py                # CI gate (pass/fail thresholds + baselines)
    ├── autofix/               # 120 fixers (text-based, comment-preserving)
    ├── reporter.py            # Terminal + JSON
    ├── html_reporter.py       # Self-contained HTML
    ├── sarif_reporter.py      # SARIF 2.1.0
    ├── config.py              # TOML/YAML/env config loader
    ├── providers/             # One module per provider (register + go)
    ├── standards/data/        # One module per compliance standard
    └── checks/
        ├── base.py            # Finding, Severity, shared detection patterns
        ├── aws/rules/         # 71 rule-based checks (CB, CP, CD, ECR, IAM, PBAC, S3, CT, CWL, SM, CA, CCM, LMB, KMS, SSM, EB, SIGN, CW)
        ├── azure_cloud/rules/ # 50 rule-based checks (ACR, Key Vault, App Service, Monitor, Network, SQL, Storage, VM, Entra ID)
        ├── gcp/rules/         # 50 rule-based checks (Artifact Registry, Compute Engine, IAM, KMS, Logging, Network, Cloud Run, Cloud Storage, Cloud SQL)
        ├── terraform/         # AWS-parity checks against plan JSON or HCL source
        ├── cloudformation/    # AWS-parity checks against CFN templates (YAML/JSON)
        ├── pulumi/rules/      # PULUMI-001 .. PULUMI-014 — Pulumi.yaml + stack config + project source IaC static analysis (plaintext secrets, wildcard IAM, public resources, unpinned plugins, deploy-time exec)
        ├── github/rules/      # GHA-001 .. GHA-073, GHA-086..123 + TAINT-001..003, TAINT-009
        ├── runs/rules/        # RUN-001 .. RUN-007 — GitHub Actions run-history forensics via the live Actions REST API (fork-originated runs, privileged-trigger runs that fired, secrets leaked in run logs, fork runs that minted a cloud OIDC token, fork runs on a self-hosted runner, known-compromised action confirmed executing, unpinned third-party action ran with secrets)
        ├── gitlab_runs/rules/ # GLRUN-001 .. GLRUN-005 — GitLab pipeline run-history forensics via the live GitLab REST API (merge-request pipelines that fired, fork-MR pipelines that ran untrusted code, secrets leaked in fork job traces, fork pipelines that minted a cloud OIDC token, fork pipelines that ran on a self-managed runner)
        ├── gitlab/rules/      # GL-001 .. GL-050 + TAINT-004 / TAINT-008
        ├── bitbucket/rules/   # BB-001 .. BB-039
        ├── azure/rules/       # ADO-001 .. ADO-038
        ├── jenkins/rules/     # JF-001 .. JF-042
        ├── circleci/rules/    # CC-001 .. CC-038
        ├── cloudbuild/rules/  # GCB-001 .. GCB-028
        ├── buildkite/rules/   # BK-001 .. BK-017 + TAINT-005
        ├── drone/rules/       # DR-001 .. DR-022
        ├── harness/rules/     # HARNESS-001 .. HARNESS-018 — Harness CI/CD pipeline YAML (image pinning, untrusted-expression command injection, privileged steps, literal secrets in variables, pipe-to-shell, TLS bypass, host-path mounts, AI prompt injection, AI autoland, model trust_remote_code / unsafe-pickle deser, unpinned model revision, secret echoed to step log, dangerous shell idiom, supply-chain gates)
        ├── tekton/rules/      # TKN-001 .. TKN-018 + TAINT-006
        ├── argo/rules/        # ARGO-001 .. ARGO-019 + TAINT-007
        ├── argocd/rules/      # ARGOCD-001 .. ARGOCD-019
        ├── oci/rules/         # OCI-001 .. OCI-009 + ATTEST-001..007
        ├── dockerfile/rules/  # DF-001 .. DF-031
        ├── modelfile/rules/   # MODEL-001 .. MODEL-005
        ├── kubernetes/rules/  # K8S-001 .. K8S-044
        ├── helm/rules/        # HELM-001 .. HELM-017 + renders charts so the K8S rule pack also applies
        ├── scm/rules/         # SCM-001 .. SCM-055 — repo governance via the platform REST API (GitHub SCM-001..049 full pack: Actions governance + environment protection + deploy-keys + webhook security + outside-collaborator audit + private-repo fork policy + ruleset enforcement / always-bypass / PR-review / status-checks / force-push / deletion / signed-commits / stale-review dismissal / linear-history / required-workflows / code-scanning-gate / deployment-env-gate / merge-queue + auto-merge audit + tag-ruleset signing + admin-bypass-on-signing + default-scanning query-suite / paused / language-coverage; GitLab platform pack SCM-050..053: push-rule prevent_secrets / committer-check, MR discussions-resolved, MR author self-approval; Bitbucket platform pack SCM-054..055: private-repo fork policy, default-branch write-side restriction kinds; GitLab + Bitbucket universal subset SCM-001/002/006/007/008/009/017)
        ├── scm_org/rules/     # ORG-001 .. ORG-013 — GitHub organization-wide governance via the REST API (org-wide 2FA requirement, default member repository permission, Actions allow-list, default workflow token permission, Actions-can-approve-PRs review bypass, org secret scoped to all repos, private-repo forking allowed, member public-repo creation, self-hosted runner group exposed to public repos, new-repo push-protection default, webhook insecure transport, new-repo Dependabot security-updates default, org ruleset not enforced); complements scm (one repo) with org-level posture
        ├── gitlab_group/rules/ # GLGRP-001 .. GLGRP-006 — GitLab group-wide governance via the REST API (group-wide 2FA requirement, project forking outside the group allowed, project sharing outside the group hierarchy allowed, default branch protection disabled for new projects, group webhook over insecure transport, group CI/CD variable exposing a secret with a weak control); the GitLab analog of scm_org
        ├── npm/rules/         # NPM-001 .. NPM-020 — package.json + package-lock.json + .npmrc supply-chain hygiene + curated compromised-package registry + files-field secret-leak detector + broad-files-field publish-blast-radius detector + cooldown gate + OSV advisory lookup + single-publisher / provenance / untrusted-ref / OpenSSF-Scorecard / new-publisher-takeover behavioral signals + overrides/resolutions source-redirect + .npmrc registry-repoint
        ├── pypi/rules/        # PYPI-001 .. PYPI-021 — requirements.txt + pyproject.toml supply-chain hygiene + curated compromised-package registry + cooldown gate + OSV advisory lookup + index-URL credentials + --trusted-host + build-system requires pinning + dynamic-dep deferral + custom-source HTTP + direct-artifact-URL / repointed-index / find-links / no-binary + PEP 740 provenance gap + provenance non-release ref + low upstream OpenSSF Scorecard
        ├── maven/rules/       # MVN-001 .. MVN-018 — pom.xml + settings.xml supply-chain hygiene + curated compromised-package registry (Log4Shell / Spring4Shell / Text4Shell) + cooldown gate + OSV advisory lookup + settings.xml plaintext server credentials + repo URL embedded credentials + build plugin / extension floating versions + Maven Wrapper distributionSha256Sum verification + lifecycle-bound command-running plugin (build-time RCE) + gradle allowInsecureProtocol + settings.xml private-key plaintext passphrase + distributionManagement release repo accepting SNAPSHOTs
        ├── nuget/rules/       # NUGET-001 .. NUGET-019 — *.csproj + NuGet.config + dotnet-tools.json supply-chain hygiene + curated compromised-package registry + cooldown gate + OSV advisory lookup + cleartext-feed-credential detector + packageSourceMapping wildcard detector + signatureValidationMode enforcement + tool-manifest version pinning + source-URL-credentials detector + Central-Package-Management VersionOverride enforcement
        ├── composer/rules/    # COMPOSER-001 .. COMPOSER-014 — composer.json + composer.lock + auth.json supply-chain hygiene + curated compromised-package registry + floating require constraint + HTTP repository + repo URL credentials + minimum-stability dev / alpha / beta floor + scripts curl-pipe-shell hook + config.allow-plugins wildcard + auth.json sibling credential leak + config.secure-http downgrade
        ├── rubygems/rules/    # GEM-001 .. GEM-013 — Gemfile + Gemfile.lock + .bundle/config supply-chain hygiene + curated compromised-gem registry (rest-client 2019 / strong_password 2019) + floating gem constraint + HTTP source + source URL credentials + git/github source mutable ref + multiple top-level sources (dep-confusion) + path: source in production + .bundle/config credential leak + dynamic Gemfile detection + Bundler plugin install-time exec + per-gem :source override + insecure git transport (git:// / http://)
        ├── cargo/rules/       # CARGO-001 .. CARGO-014 — Cargo.toml / Cargo.lock supply-chain hygiene + curated compromised-crate registry
        ├── gomod/rules/       # GOMOD-001 .. GOMOD-012 — go.mod / go.sum supply-chain hygiene + curated compromised-module registry
        └── custom/            # YAML rule loader + predicate engine

Adding a new check is a one-file change. Adding a new provider is three files. See docs/providers/ for the full pattern.

---

🐍 Python API

Embed pipeline-check in your own tooling without subprocess + JSON parsing. The top-level surface is small and stable across minor releases:

from pipeline_check import Scanner, Severity, score

scanner = Scanner(pipeline="github", gha_path=".github/workflows")
findings = scanner.run()

critical = [
    f for f in findings
    if not f.passed and f.severity is Severity.CRITICAL
]
result = score(findings)
print(f"score={result['score']} grade={result['grade']}")

Public surface: Scanner, Finding, Severity, Confidence, ControlRef, score, ScoreResult, Chain, ChainRule, evaluate_chains, list_chain_rules, available_providers(), available_standards(), load_custom_rules(), LoadedCustomRules, CustomRuleError, __version__. Anything reached through pipeline_check.core.* is internal and may move between releases.

---

☁️ Lambda deployment

Pipeline-Check can run as an AWS Lambda for scheduled scans. Run pipeline_check --man lambda for packaging, IAM permissions, event payload shapes, and SNS alerting.

---

🔌 Extending

New check: Drop a module in checks/<provider>/rules/ exporting RULE and check(). The orchestrator auto-discovers it.

New provider: Subclass BaseProvider, register in providers/__init__.py. Available via --pipeline <name> immediately.

New standard: Add a Python module under standards/data/ with a STANDARD object. The CLI and reporters pick it up automatically.

See docs/providers/README.md for the full contract.

---

🔐 Verifying a release

Every tagged release publishes two attestations.

PyPI PEP 740 attestations are produced at publish time and visible on the project's PyPI page (pypi.org/project/pipeline-check/). pip install and recent uv versions pick these up automatically; no extra tooling needed. This is the recommended surface for most users.

SLSA Build L3 provenance is generated by the slsa-framework/slsa-github-generator reusable workflow running in GitHub's isolated builder, signed via Sigstore using a short-lived OIDC token. Starting with v1.0.4 the provenance file (pipeline-check.intoto.jsonl) is uploaded as a workflow run artifact rather than attached to the GitHub release (the repo runs with immutable releases on, which the SLSA generator's release-asset upload step can't co-exist with). Use this path when you need the stronger build-time guarantee that the wheel came from this repo at the tagged commit, in CI, by this project's workflow.

# 1. Install slsa-verifier (one-off).
go install github.com/slsa-framework/slsa-verifier/v2/cli/slsa-verifier@v2.7.0

# 2. Find the release.yml workflow run that built the version you want.
TAG=v1.12.0
RUN_ID=$(gh run list \
  --repo dmartinochoa/pipeline-check \
  --workflow release.yml \
  --status success \
  --json databaseId,headBranch,event,headSha \
  --jq "first(.[] | select(.headBranch == \"$TAG\" or .event == \"workflow_dispatch\")).databaseId")

# 3. Download the wheel and the matching provenance file.
gh run download "$RUN_ID" \
  --repo dmartinochoa/pipeline-check \
  --name dist \
  --name pipeline-check.intoto.jsonl

# 4. Verify. slsa-verifier checks the attestation's Sigstore
#    signature, the source repo, and the source tag against the
#    builder's claims.
slsa-verifier verify-artifact dist/pipeline_check-*.whl \
  --provenance-path pipeline-check.intoto.jsonl \
  --source-uri github.com/dmartinochoa/pipeline-check \
  --source-tag "$TAG"

# 5. Once verification passes, install the verified wheel directly.
pip install dist/pipeline_check-*.whl

A passing verification means: the wheel was built by this project's own release.yml workflow, at the tagged commit, in GitHub's isolated SLSA builder, and the bytes you have on disk match the ones the builder signed. Skip this step and you trust PyPI, the network, and every cache in between.

---

🤝 Contributing

PRs welcome. See CONTRIBUTING.md for dev setup, the test / lint / mypy commands CI runs, the rule-addition workflow, and the commit / PR conventions. Project-wide conventions (American English, generated docs, release process) live in CLAUDE.md. Security issues: follow SECURITY.md, not the public issue tracker.

---

📜 License

MIT. See LICENSE.