satsignal-mcp 0.7.1

MCP server exposing Satsignal tamper-evident anchoring as agent-callable tools.

satsignal-mcp

MCP server exposing Satsignal tamper-evident anchoring as agent-callable tools.

Any MCP-compatible client (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, agent frameworks that speak MCP over stdio) can call Satsignal directly — no custom SDK required.

What it does

Each anchor call computes a sha256 of the input client-side and sends only the hash to proof.satsignal.cloud. The file/text/JSON bytes never leave the calling machine. The server records the hash on the BSV blockchain and returns a proof the agent can save or pass on.

Tools

Tool	Auth	What it does
anchor_file	yes	sha256 a local file, anchor the digest
anchor_text	yes	sha256 a UTF-8 string, anchor the digest
anchor_json	yes	canonicalize JSON (sorted keys, compact, UTF-8), sha256, anchor
lookup_hash	no	check if a sha256 is on-chain
verify_file_against_bundle	no	full verify — re-hash the original file, confirm it matches the bundle, chain-confirm via public block explorers. Detects file tampering.
chain_confirm_bundle	no	chain-confirm only — open a local .mbnt, extract sha+txid, confirm via lookup_hash. Fast, but does NOT detect file tampering.
verify_bundle	no	deprecated + fail-closed (v0.4) — returns deprecated_tool_blocked error directing to verify_file_against_bundle or chain_confirm_bundle. Removable in 0.5.
anchor_disclosable	yes ◇	anchor a SEALED, selectively-disclosable envelope (.txt→text-tree-v1, .json→json-ast-v1); optional one-shot reveal
create_disclosure	no ◇	redact an already-anchored source .mbnt to reveal a chosen subset (local-only — no network, no quota)
verify_disclosure	no ◇	verify a disclosure cryptographically binds to its committed Merkle root

◇ The three disclosable-* tools require Node ≥ 18 on PATH (or SATSIGNAL_NODE) — see Selective disclosure.

anchor_* tools accept dry_run: true to preview the sha256 without broadcasting. The Satsignal API itself does not honor dry_run — the flag lives in this MCP layer and short-circuits before any network call.

Folder selection

Each anchor_* tool accepts a folder property naming the workspace folder the proof lands in (defaults to SATSIGNAL_FOLDER, then the legacy SATSIGNAL_MATTER, then inbox). The request sent to the Satsignal API uses the canonical folder_slug wire field.

Legacy compat: the old input name matter is still accepted as a silent alias of folder. Sending both with different non-empty values is rejected (conflicting_alias, mirroring the server); equal values are accepted.

Selective disclosure (sealed, node-backed)

anchor_disclosable anchors a payload as a sealed, per-leaf-committed envelope (a .txt → text-tree-v1, a .json → json-ast-v1) under one Merkle root. You can then reveal any subset of leaves and the redacted view still verifies against the same on-chain commitment:

1. anchor_disclosable seals the payload and writes a source .mbnt. Hashing + the envelope build happen locally; only the root is broadcast and the master salt is never returned. storage: "mirror" (default) keeps the salt inside the source .mbnt so you can redact later from the bundle alone; storage: "blind" keeps it off the bundle. Pass reveal / reveal_names to emit a one-shot disclosure in the same call (requires mirror).
2. create_disclosure redacts an already-anchored source .mbnt for a specific audience — reveal a subset (0-based indices, or json-ast RFC-6901 pointers / text-tree slash paths), seal the rest. Local-only: no network, no quota. Run with list_only: true first to see the selectors.
3. verify_disclosure confirms a .disclosure.mbnt cryptographically binds to the committed root. verified: false is a successful result, not an error. On-chain existence is surfaced via linked_txid + root for confirmation on a BSV explorer (lookup_hash does not index sealed anchors).

A disclosure proves the revealed fields are authentic to the sealed commitment and the sealed fields are provably present-but-hidden — not authorship, that the content pre-existed the anchor, or that the content is true.

Node prerequisite. These three tools shell out to a vendored snapshot of Satsignal's JS disclosure-builder (one source of truth for the leaf / JCS / Merkle / salt crypto, so the result is byte-identical to the on-chain anchor). They require Node ≥ 18 on PATH, or set SATSIGNAL_NODE to a node binary. If node is absent the tools fail closed with node_unavailable; the other seven tools are pure-Python and unaffected.

Configuration

Env var	Required	Default
SATSIGNAL_API_KEY	for anchoring	—
SATSIGNAL_API_BASE	no	https://app.satsignal.cloud
SATSIGNAL_FOLDER	no	inbox
SATSIGNAL_MATTER	no	legacy alias of SATSIGNAL_FOLDER (still honored; SATSIGNAL_FOLDER wins if both set)
SATSIGNAL_NODE	no	node binary for the disclosable-* tools (defaults to node on PATH; node ≥ 18 required only for those three tools)

Get an API key at https://app.satsignal.cloud. The customer API (POST /api/v1/anchors, bundle download, dashboard) lives on app.satsignal.cloud. proof.satsignal.cloud is the public verifier surface and serves /lookup_hash in mirror-mode — chain_confirm_bundle works against either host, but anchoring requires app.*. v0.1.0 shipped with the wrong default and silently 404'd every anchor call.

Install

Requires Python 3.10 or newer.

pip install satsignal-mcp

The seven core anchor/verify/lookup tools are pure-Python. The three disclosable-* tools (anchor_disclosable, create_disclosure, verify_disclosure) additionally require Node ≥ 18 on PATH (or set SATSIGNAL_NODE) — they shell out to a vendored JS builder. pip/pipx cannot install Node; if it is absent those three tools fail closed with node_unavailable and the rest are unaffected.

Inspecting tool schemas

The MCP tool schemas are built inline by _tool_definitions() in src/satsignal_mcp/server.py — they are not exposed as a static module-level binding. If you need a JSON dump (for static analysis, IDE autocomplete config, or tooling that pre-validates calls), call the function directly:

import json
from satsignal_mcp.server import _tool_definitions

tools = _tool_definitions()
print(json.dumps(
    [{"name": t.name,
      "description": t.description,
      "inputSchema": t.inputSchema}
     for t in tools],
    indent=2,
))

_tool_definitions() returns list[mcp.types.Tool]; the leading underscore reflects that the function is an implementation detail of the server, not a stable export. If you build tooling against it, pin to a specific satsignal-mcp version or run the MCP server and read tools via the protocol's list_tools request — the latter is the contract guaranteed to stay stable across releases.

Claude Desktop config

Add this to claude_desktop_config.json:

{
  "mcpServers": {
    "satsignal": {
      "command": "satsignal-mcp",
      "env": {
        "SATSIGNAL_API_KEY": "sk_...",
        "SATSIGNAL_FOLDER": "case-123"
      }
    }
  }
}

Why the env block matters (host env-var binding)

MCP hosts (Claude Desktop, Claude Code, agent frameworks) typically strip or rebind environment variables at server-launch time — so a SATSIGNAL_API_KEY set in the operator's shell does NOT reliably propagate into the MCP server process. Bind the key explicitly inside the env block of the host's config (as shown above); do not assume process-env inheritance.

If anchor calls return 401 unauthorized despite the key being visible in your shell (echo $SATSIGNAL_API_KEY works), this is almost certainly the cause — check the host's config block, not the shell environment.

Verification model

Each anchor returns proof_id, txid, and proof_url — the canonical vocabulary the Satsignal API itself now emits. The proof is independent of Satsignal: anyone can fetch the bundle, verify the on-chain transaction directly against BSV, and check the sha256 matches.

Compatibility note (0.6.0, vocabulary sunset): this server sends the canonical request key (folder_slug) and reports canonical result keys (proof_id / folder_slug / proof_url); the legacy bundle_id / matter_slug / receipt_url keys are gone from tool output. Legacy inputs (matter, SATSIGNAL_MATTER) remain accepted as silent aliases. When talking to an older / self-hosted Satsignal server that still emits the legacy response keys, this server reads them as a fallback and re-emits them under the canonical names — but anchoring against a server too old to accept folder_slug requires satsignal-mcp ≤ 0.5.x.

This server exposes two verify tools with different trust assumptions — pick the one that matches what you have on hand:

• verify_file_against_bundle(file_path, bundle_path) — full verify. Re-hashes the original file, confirms it matches the bundle's claimed sha (crypto check, detects tampering), then chain-confirms via public block explorers (WoC + Bitails) that the on-chain doc_hash matches the bundle. This is the recommended path when you have the original file. Backed by satsignal-cli's verify_file (pinned as a runtime dep so a clean install gets full verify out of the box).
• chain_confirm_bundle(bundle_path) — fast chain-confirm only. Opens the bundle, extracts its claimed sha + txid, and confirms via Satsignal's /lookup_hash index that the sha was anchored at that txid. Does NOT open the original file, so a tampered original is not detected — the bundle stays self-consistent. Use this when the original file isn't available, or as a cheap pre-check.

verify_bundle in v0.3 silently aliased chain_confirm_bundle, preserving v0.2's false-PASS class on tampered originals (a host that strips tool descriptions wouldn't see the deprecation warning). In v0.4 the alias fail-closes — every call returns a deprecated_tool_blocked structured error directing the caller at the right tool. The tool remains listed so callers pinned by name get the redirect rather than unknown_tool. Full removal lands in 0.5.

Security notes

• The label, filename, and folder (sent on the wire as the canonical folder_slug) fields you pass are written into the proof and rendered on the public verifier page. They are also attacker-controllable from any agent calling this server — downstream code that reads these fields should treat them as untrusted text (HTML-escape, never embed in LLM context without an isolation boundary).
• The API key is sent as Authorization: Bearer … over HTTPS and is never logged or returned in tool output.

License

MIT.