shield-swap-sdk
Typed Python client for the shield_swap AMM on Aleo. Sits on top of the
Aleo Python SDK's facade (aleo.Aleo): signer, record provider, proving
configuration, and network all come from the client you bind — this package
adds the DEX methods, the typed results, and the off-chain DEX API, nothing
else.
from aleo import Aleo
from aleo_shield_swap import ShieldSwap
aleo = Aleo(Aleo.HTTPProvider("https://edge.provable.com/api"))
aleo.default_account = account
dex = ShieldSwap(aleo)
pools = dex.api.get_pools() # requires a live DEX API
handle = dex.swap(pool_key=pools[0].key,
token_in_id=pools[0].token0,
amount_in=10**9).delegate() # broadcasts; spends funds
out = dex.claim_swap_output(handle).delegate() # broadcasts; spends funds
Targets the deployed shield_swap.aleo stack on testnet. Integer amounts are raw
native token units (the AMM does no decimal scaling); prices are Q128.128.
swap() also accepts strings or Decimal values for amount_in and
expected_out in token units, converting them internally with registry metadata.
For example, amount_in="1.5" means 1.5 input tokens; amount_in=1500000
means 1,500,000 base units. Returned amounts remain in base units.
Wrapped assets (ALEO/USAD/USDCx) route automatically through the swap/LP
routers — fund them with underlying records (credits.aleo / stablecoin);
you never handle wrapper records. mint stores an immutable withdrawal
address on the position NFT (defaults to the recipient) and collect always
pays it — decide the payout wallet at mint time. The off-chain API is
selected per network — https://api.testnet.swap.shield.fi for testnet,
https://api.swap.shield.fi for mainnet (override with SHIELD_SWAP_API_URL).
Install
pip install -e shield-swap-sdk # from the repo root
pip install -e "shield-swap-sdk[async]" # + AsyncShieldSwap (httpx)
pip install -e "shield-swap-sdk[mcp]" # + the MCP server
Requires aleo-sdk>=0.8.0 (this repo's SDK; imports as aleo) and Python 3.10+.
First swap example
The first-swap example creates and funds a testnet
account, swaps USDCx for ETH, and claims the output using SDK calls directly.
It uses an in-memory account and swap handle by default; ENABLE_JOURNAL optionally attaches the SDK journal.
Releases containing the example support
python -m aleo_shield_swap.examples.first_swap.swap.
The concurrent-swaps example prepares six equal USDCx records and submits six swaps at once; see Concurrent swaps for the mechanism.
Agents
AGENTS.md (generated from the SDK's docstrings — always current) is the
one page an agent needs: the five-method lifecycle, the conversation pattern,
and the building-block reference. It ships in the wheel:
pip install shield-swap-sdk
python -m aleo_shield_swap # prints the agent guide
Claude Code users get it via the shield-swap skill (packaged under
aleo_shield_swap/skills/, copy into .claude/skills/); any MCP client
can run the same lifecycle through python -m aleo_shield_swap.mcp.
How calls work
Every read returns a value immediately. Every write returns a prepared
DexCall — nothing touches the network until you invoke a terminal method:
call = dex.swap(pool_key=key, token_in_id=token, amount_in=10**9)
call.simulate() # runs locally; no broadcast, no fee
call.transact(account) # proves locally, broadcasts, pays the fee
call.delegate(account) # proves via the delegated proving service
transact and delegate return the method's typed result (a SwapHandle,
MintResult, ClaimResult, …) built from the transaction's root-transition
outputs — not a bare transaction id. Local proving downloads SNARK parameters
on first use and takes minutes for the larger entrypoints; delegate is the
practical path and requires DPS credentials on the provider
(api_key=, network_client.consumer_id).
Chain reads and writes live directly on ShieldSwap; the off-chain DEX API
is namespaced under .api, so a call site always shows whether a value came
from the chain or the service.
The method surface
Chain reads (node REST API):
| Verb | Returns |
|---|---|
get_pool(pool_key) |
The pool struct from the pools mapping. |
get_slot(pool_key) |
SlotView — current tick, sqrt price, liquidity, spacing. |
get_swap_output(swap_id) |
The finalized swap outcome; raises SwapOutputNotFinalizedError until the finalize lands (and again after the claim consumes it). |
get_swap_execution(swap_id) |
The fill receipt — executed height and per-hop amounts, gross/protocol/LP fee, post-trade price. Survives the claim; None until finalized. |
get_pool_creator(pool_key) |
Who created the pool (None for pools that predate creator tracking). |
is_pool_initialized(pool_key) |
Whether the pool exists on chain. |
get_public_balances(programs) |
Each token program's on-chain balances mapping entry for an address (raw base units; absent reads as 0). |
get_private_balances(programs) |
Summed unspent record amounts per token program (needs a registered record provider). |
get_balances() |
Public + private balances in one shape, joined through the API's token registry. |
derive_pool_key(token0, token1, fee) / derive_tick_key(pool_key, tick) |
Mapping keys derived locally — no network. |
Writes (each returns a DexCall):
| Verb | What it does |
|---|---|
swap(...) |
Phase one of the two-transaction private swap: locks the input record against a blinded identity. Returns a SwapHandle — persist it if the process might die before the claim. |
claim_swap_output(handle) |
Phase two: claims the finalized output as a private record. |
create_pool(...) |
Initializes a pool for a token pair + fee tier. |
mint(...) |
Opens a position in a tick range; returns a MintResult with the position's token id. |
increase_liquidity(...) / decrease_liquidity(...) |
Resizes a position (spends the position NFT record and returns a fresh one). |
collect(...) |
Pays out tokens_owed as private records. |
burn(...) |
Closes an emptied position and removes it from the positions mapping. |
plan_rebalance(...) / rebalance_position(...) |
Close a position and mint its successor range in ONE transaction via shield_swap_rebalance_router.aleo (testnet). The plan quotes what comes back, what the new range needs, and funding vs refund per token; every amount is asserted at the execution price, so re-plan and resubmit if the pool moved. |
A swap whose input was fully consumed (amount_remaining == 0) claims
through the no-refund entrypoints (claim_swap_output_no_refund and the
router's claim_to_*_no_refund), which never mint a zero-value refund
record — claim_swap_output picks them automatically.
Quote before you swap: pass expected_out from dex.api.get_route(...) —
without it a spot estimate is used, which ignores fees and price impact.
On busy pools leave slippage headroom: prices move between quote and
finalize, and a too-tight amount_out_min rejects safely at finalize.
On-chain amounts are u128 base units; fees are microcredits. swap() converts
string and Decimal token amounts internally; integer inputs remain base units.
Two liquidity behaviors worth knowing (both verified live): mint walks
the pool's on-chain tick list to compute its insertion hints
(find_tick_predecessor) — pass tick_*_hint= only if you know better.
And when a pool side is wrapped, routed mint/increase amounts for
that side must be exactly what the range consumes (the router burns the
wrapper change record) — single-sided ranges make this deterministic;
in-range wrapped amounts depend on the live price.
DEX API (dex.api, standalone as ApiClient): get_pools,
get_tokens, get_route, get_ohlcv, get_positions, get_unclaimed,
get_pool_stats_batch, get_liquidity_distribution, the compliance reads
(get_compliance, get_token_compliance, get_pair_compliance — check
before spending on a write), cookie-session management (get_session,
refresh_session, list_sessions, revoke_session, logout,
logout_all, get_ws_ticket), and referral issuance (referral_settings,
list_referral_codes, generate_referral_codes).
Route quoting, OHLCV, and the account views are auth-gated — call
api.authenticate(address, sign) once (challenge/verify by signature, no
funds required; the session rides as httpOnly cookies + a CSRF header and
is short-lived — mint a durable ss_… token via create_api_token for
anything long-running). Authentication is the whole gate — no invite is
needed. A referral code is optional attribution: redeem_code credits
the friend who shared it (once per account), and my_referral_code returns
the code this account shares with others.
Privacy
The swap flow never puts your address on chain next to the output. swap
derives a single-use blinded identity from the signer's view key
(derive_blinding_factor / derive_blinded_address are exported for
verification against the TS SDK's vectors); the claim proves knowledge of the
blinding factor instead of revealing the owner.
Two conveniences trade secret material for service:
delegatesends the transaction authorization to the proving service — it can see the transaction's contents (not your private key). Prove locally withtransactif that is unacceptable.- The hosted record scanner behind
get_private_balances/aleo.records.registershares the account's view key with the scanning service, which can then see everything the account owns.
Concurrent swaps
A private trade spends one record, so trades submitted at the same time need separate input records and separate blinded identities.
Record management on the facade covers the records. Build the Aleo client
with record_management=RecordManagementConfig(enabled=True, store=...) and
every swap reserves its input record before proving. When two automatic
selections pick the same record, the swap that loses the reservation moves to
the next eligible record from the same scan, smallest first, before any proof
is built. An explicit token_record is never replaced, and proving or
broadcast errors are never retried.
A swap journal covers the identities. ShieldSwap.from_profile() or
dex.journal = Journal(path) issues each swap its own blinded identity and
keeps the handle needed to claim the output.
Trades need one covering record each. dex.plan_inventory(token, target)
plans the joins and splits that reshape the token's underlying records, and
dex.rebalance_inventory(...) executes them one confirmed transaction at a
time through aleo.inventory:
from pathlib import Path
from aleo.inventory import InventoryTarget, RecordManagementConfig
from aleo_shield_swap.journal import Journal
aleo = Aleo(Aleo.HTTPProvider("https://edge.provable.com/api", network="testnet"),
record_management=RecordManagementConfig(enabled=True))
aleo.default_account = account
dex = ShieldSwap(aleo)
# One journal per account and network, outside version control: it holds the
# claim secrets and hands each concurrent swap its own blinded identity.
dex.journal = Journal(Path.home() / ".shield-swap" / "testnet" / str(account.address) / "swaps.jsonl")
plan = dex.plan_inventory("USDCx", InventoryTarget(records=4, min_record_amount=100_000, distribution="balanced"))
result = dex.rebalance_inventory("USDCx", InventoryTarget(records=4, min_record_amount=100_000, distribution="balanced"))
quote = dex.quote(token_in="USDCx", token_out="ETH", amount_in="0.1")
handles = [dex.swap(quote).delegate(wait=False) for _ in range(4)] # or on a thread pool
Record coordination is off by default. Without it, concurrent swaps must be
given disjoint token_record inputs or run in sequence. The
concurrent-swaps example runs the whole flow on
testnet, with a file-backed reservation store and the recovery steps after an
interruption. The SDK's record management section
covers the journal, stores, and reconciliation.
Async
AsyncShieldSwap / AsyncApiClient mirror the sync read, swap and claim
surface method-for-method on aleo.AsyncAleo (install the [async] extra).
The liquidity verbs (create_pool, mint, increase_liquidity,
decrease_liquidity, collect, burn, rebalance_position) and the
journal-bound helpers (from_profile, onboard, status, swap_many,
collect_all, get_positions) are sync-only for now — the exact list is
pinned by tests/test_async_parity.py:
from aleo_shield_swap import AsyncShieldSwap
dex = AsyncShieldSwap(async_aleo)
handle = await (await dex.swap(pool_key=key, token_in_id=token,
amount_in=10**9)).delegate()
Agent tools and MCP
shield_swap_tools() returns JSON-schema tool definitions for the whole method
surface; dispatch_tool(dex, name, args) executes one. For MCP hosts, the
[mcp] extra ships a stdio server over the same definitions:
ALEO_PRIVATE_KEY=APrivateKey1... python -m aleo_shield_swap.mcp
Omit ALEO_PRIVATE_KEY for a read-only server. See the module docstring for
the full environment (ALEO_ENDPOINT, ALEO_NETWORK, DPS credentials).
Generated bindings
The contract surface is pinned, not hand-written: codegen/ holds the
deployed program source, its ABI, and the DEX API's OpenAPI document.
_generated.py (program structs + entrypoints via aleo.codegen) and
_api_models.py (API response models) are built from those pins. When the
deployed contract or API drifts, rerun codegen/regen-abi.sh /
codegen/regen-openapi.sh and reconcile.
Tests
python -m pytest # hermetic tier — no network
python -m pytest -m live # read-only against the REAL testnet + DEX API
python -m pytest -m "live and slow" # spends real testnet funds (DPS proving)
ALEO_DEVNODE_UNPROVEN=1 \
python -m pytest -m devnode # full AMM lifecycle on a local aleo-devnode
The devnode tier deploys the vendored shield_swap.aleo stack and drives
pool creation, liquidity, swaps, and burn end-to-end, hermetically. It needs
the aleo-devnode binary (ALEO_DEVNODE_BIN or on PATH) and skips
otherwise. Deployments are proofless (dummy verifying keys — the devnode
skips certificate verification); ALEO_DEVNODE_UNPROVEN=1 extends that to
executions and is the fast path (~5 minutes). Without it, executions are
fully proven locally: expect SNARK parameter downloads and key synthesis on
first use.
The record inventory suite (tests/integration/test_record_inventory_live.py,
-m "live and slow") keeps six equal USDCx and ETH records in the
ALEO_E2E_PRIVATE_KEY account, trades one explicit round trip, then submits
six swaps at once in each direction with automatic record selection and
reopens the journal to check recovery. Each run sells 0.6 USDCx forward and
buys it back, so the account ends the run down the pool fees of twelve trades
plus the network fees the delegated prover pays. A run takes tens of minutes
and keeps its journals under .shield-swap/inventory-e2e/testnet/<address>/.
SHIELD_SWAP_INVENTORY_RECORDS (3 to 16) and SHIELD_SWAP_INVENTORY_SWAP_USDCX
(default 0.1) set the batch size and the amount per trade. Run it alone:
another trader on the same account competes for its records and blinded
identities.
Compliance
Swaps and liquidity actions prove in zero knowledge that the addresses taking
part are not on a freezelist. Two kinds of list apply. Shield Swap's own list
(shield_swap_freezelist.aleo) screens the signer when a swap output is
claimed, and the signer, the position's recipient, and its withdrawal address
when a position is minted, collected, or rebalanced. Each ARC-22 stablecoin
that trades through a wrapper (USDCx, USAD) screens the signer when its
records are wrapped and the receiving address when they are unwrapped, against
the stablecoin's own list.
The SDK builds these Merkle exclusion proofs locally and passes them as private inputs of the transaction. The programs check the Merkle paths inside the transaction proof, and their finalize compares each reconstructed root with the root stored on chain. The network verifies that an address is absent from a list without seeing the address or the paths.
Proof generation is on by default. Leave compliance_proofs unset and call
the methods as usual:
dex.mint(pool_key=key, tick_lower=lo, tick_upper=hi,
amount0_desired=a0, amount1_desired=a1)
dex.claim_swap_output(handle)
Functions that take compliance proofs
Each bundle is one [MerkleProof; 2] input: two Merkle paths proving that one
address is absent from one list. The counts are input slots on the entrypoint
the call resolves to, including the placeholder slot of a wrapper that ignores
proofs (credits).
| Method | Type | Bundles | Subjects, in input order |
|---|---|---|---|
swap() |
SwapProofs |
0 to 1 | The signer, for a wrapped input token |
claim_swap_output() |
ClaimProofs |
1 to 3 | Shield Swap signer, then the wrapped output receiver and the wrapped refund receiver when there is a refund |
mint() |
MintProofs |
3 to 5 | Wrapped token senders, then Shield Swap signer, recipient, and withdrawal address |
increase_liquidity() |
IncreaseProofs |
0 to 2 | Wrapped token senders |
collect() |
CollectProofs |
2 to 4 | Shield Swap owner and withdrawal address, then wrapped token receivers |
rebalance_position() |
RebalanceProofs |
2 to 6 | Funded wrapped token senders, wrapped token receivers, then Shield Swap owner and withdrawal address |
Shield Swap slots use the AMM list. Wrapped-token slots use the underlying
stablecoin's list, found through that program's imports
(test_usdcx_stablecoin.aleo imports test_usdcx_freezelist.aleo). Senders
are the signer. Claim receivers are the signer too; collect and rebalance
receivers are the PositionNFT's withdrawal address. Within each group side 0
comes before side 1, a plain side has no slot, and a rebalance keeps its
receiver slots even when a side has no refund. A multi-hop swap adds no slot
for its intermediate hops. decrease_liquidity() and burn() take no proofs;
swap_many() and collect_all() always let the SDK build them.
Automatic generation
Before each call the SDK works out the entrypoint, the slots, and the address
each slot screens, then reads each list's current root
(freeze_list_root[1u8]) once, so a mint's three Shield Swap bundles share
one root. When a root changed since the last call it downloads the published
tree from GET /programs/{id}/compliance/freeze-list, checks that the tree
ends in that root, builds each witness, and checks that the witness
reconstructs the root. Trees and witnesses stay in memory per client, list,
and root, so while a root is unchanged nothing beyond the root is read. An
empty list uses the empty-tree witness without a download.
A frozen address raises FrozenAddressError, and a missing root or a
published tree that does not match the root raises FreezeListError, in each
case before anything is proved or a fee is paid. A wrapped token whose
underlying program the registry cannot name raises ValueError; passing
token0_program= (or the matching argument) names it. The cache holds at
most 16 lists and 256 addresses per list and does not survive a restart.
dex.freezelist is the resolver, an aleo.FreezeListProofs:
dex.freezelist.exclusion_proof(address, program) returns one bundle for any
address and list, dex.freezelist.resolve(contexts) fills a list of
ComplianceProofContext values, and dex.freezelist.clear() drops the
cached trees. dex.amm_freezelist_program names the AMM list for a
non-standard deployment.
Optional proof inputs
compliance_proofs takes a ComplianceProofs value: the method's tuple of
bundles in input order, or None. Each bundle is an encoded [MerkleProof; 2]
string, a MerkleProofPair, or a (MerkleProofInput, MerkleProofInput) tuple;
MerkleProofInput takes siblings as ints or "...field" literals. The count
is checked against the route the call resolves to before anything runs, and a
mismatch raises ValueError naming the slots the route expects. The same
bundle may fill several slots when the list and the address match.
wrapper_proofs=, the earlier single-string argument, still fills every
wrapped-token slot while the Shield Swap slots are built by the SDK. It cannot
be combined with compliance_proofs. A supplied bundle bypasses the root read
and the witness check, so its freshness is the caller's responsibility.
from aleo_shield_swap import MerkleProofInput, MerkleProofPair
dex.swap(pool_key=key, token_in_id=usdcx, amount_in=10**6,
compliance_proofs=(sender_bundle,)) # one wrapped input
dex.mint(pool_key=key, tick_lower=lo, tick_upper=hi,
amount0_desired=a0, amount1_desired=a1,
compliance_proofs=(signer_bundle, recipient_bundle, withdrawal_bundle)) # plain pool
pair = MerkleProofPair(MerkleProofInput(siblings=(0,) * 16, leaf_index=1),
MerkleProofInput(siblings=("0field",) * 16, leaf_index="1u32"))
dex.collect(pool_key=key, amount0_requested=x, amount1_requested=y,
compliance_proofs=(pair, pair, usdcx_receiver_bundle)) # token0 wrapped
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