ssl2
The TLS interface of PEP 748 for Python 3.14, and what a client needs around it: a ClientHello you can build, read off the wire and fingerprint, proxies, and a socket and an asyncio stream that run on any engine. Pure Python. The engine is a separate package; boring-ssl2 is the one for BoringSSL.
uv add ssl2
Describe a ClientHello and fingerprint it
from ssl2 import (
JA3,
JA4,
CertificateCompressionAlgorithm,
CipherSuite,
ClientHelloBuilder,
ECPointFormat,
ExtensionType,
NamedGroup,
NextProtocol,
ProtocolVersion,
PskKeyExchangeMode,
SignatureScheme,
)
chrome = (
ClientHelloBuilder()
.supported_versions(ProtocolVersion.TLS_1_3, ProtocolVersion.TLS_1_2)
.cipher_suites(
CipherSuite.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
)
.extensions(
ExtensionType.server_name,
ExtensionType.extended_main_secret,
ExtensionType.renegotiation_info,
ExtensionType.supported_groups,
ExtensionType.ec_point_formats,
ExtensionType.session_ticket,
ExtensionType.application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
ExtensionType.status_request,
ExtensionType.signature_algorithms,
ExtensionType.signed_certificate_timestamp,
ExtensionType.key_share,
ExtensionType.psk_key_exchange_modes,
ExtensionType.supported_versions,
ExtensionType.compress_certificate,
ExtensionType.application_settings_old,
ExtensionType.encrypted_client_hello,
)
.supported_groups(NamedGroup.X25519MLKEM768, NamedGroup.x25519, NamedGroup.secp256r1, NamedGroup.secp384r1)
.key_shares(NamedGroup.X25519MLKEM768, NamedGroup.x25519)
.ec_point_formats(ECPointFormat.uncompressed)
.signature_algorithms(
SignatureScheme.ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
SignatureScheme.ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
)
.application_protocols(NextProtocol.H2, NextProtocol.HTTP1)
.application_settings(NextProtocol.H2)
.certificate_compression(CertificateCompressionAlgorithm.brotli)
.psk_key_exchange_modes(PskKeyExchangeMode.psk_dhe_ke)
.grease()
.build()
)
print(JA4.of(chrome).text) # t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_02713d6af862
print(JA3.of(chrome).digest) # 5549240a5133e94d2053bfbc454228ef
Every setter also takes the number itself, so .extensions(0, 23, 65281) and .cipher_suites(0x1301) mean the same thing; that is how a captured fingerprint arrives. A value the registries do not know still has a name:
from ssl2 import CipherSuite, ExtensionType
print(ExtensionType(17613).name, CipherSuite(0x1A1A).name, CipherSuite(0x1A1A).is_grease, CipherSuite(0x1234).name) # application_settings GREASE_1A1A True unassigned_0x1234
The model refuses what cannot be sent as described: an extension listed twice, a payload without its extension, key shares out of the order of the groups. A client that pads a short hello to 512 bytes, as Android did before late 2026, is described with .legacy_padding() and padding among its extensions.
Read one off the wire
The parser takes a TLS record or the bare handshake message, drops the GREASE values and remembers that they were there:
from ssl2 import ClientHelloParser
hello = ClientHelloParser.parse(client_hello_bytes)
print(hello.grease, hello.cipher_suites, hello.key_share_groups)
Fingerprints as text
The text forms parse back, except the hashed JA4 form, which has nothing left to parse:
from ssl2 import JA4, AkamaiFingerprint
ja4 = JA4.of(chrome)
print(ja4.raw) # t13d1516h2_002f,0035,...,cca9_0005,000a,...,ff01_0403,0804,...
print(JA4.parse(ja4.raw).text == ja4.text, JA4.parse(ja4.original).text == ja4.text) # True True
akamai = AkamaiFingerprint.parse("1:65536;2:0;4:6291456;6:262144|15663105|0|m,a,s,p")
print(akamai.digest) # 52d84b11737d980aef856699f885ca86
print(JA3.parse(JA3.of(chrome).text) == JA3.of(chrome)) # True
JA3.builder() starts a ClientHelloBuilder from the JA3 fields; what JA3 does not carry, such as key shares, signature schemes and ALPN, goes in before build(). .trust_anchor_ids("44947.2.1", ...) lists trust anchor identifiers in dotted form, which the parser reads back from the wire.
Trust, certificates and keys
from ssl2 import Certificate, PrivateKey, SigningChain, TLSClientConfiguration, TLSServerConfiguration, TLSVersion, TrustStore
client = TLSClientConfiguration(trust_store=TrustStore.system(), lowest_supported_version=TLSVersion.TLSv1_3)
pinned = TLSClientConfiguration(trust_store=TrustStore.from_file("ca.pem"), client_hello=chrome)
server = TLSServerConfiguration(certificate_chain=(SigningChain((Certificate.from_file("server.pem"), PrivateKey.from_file("server.key"))),))
print(TrustStore.system()) # TrustStore(buffer=None, path=PosixPath('/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt'), id=None)
TrustStore.system() is the bundle or directory the platform keeps its roots in: the usual Linux and Termux paths, the Android system store, the macOS bundle, and the ROOT and CA stores through crypt32 on Windows. iOS has no such file, so an app there passes TrustStore.from_file with a bundle it ships. Nothing is read from the environment.
Proxies
from ssl2 import Proxy
proxy = Proxy.parse("socks5h://user:secret@proxy.example:1080") # http, https, socks4, socks4a, socks5, socks5h
print(proxy) # Proxy(scheme=<ProxyScheme.SOCKS5H: 'socks5h'>, host='proxy.example', port=1080, credentials=ProxyCredentials(username='user', password='secret'))
print(dict(proxy)["port"]) # 1080
socks4 and socks5 resolve the destination here; socks4a, socks5h and the HTTP schemes let the proxy resolve it. An https proxy carries TLS inside TLS with the same client context, or with proxy_context= on connect; CONNECT is HTTP/1.1, so that context should offer only http/1.1. A refusal raises ProxyError with the proxy's reason. The handshakes are state machines over bytes, so a sans-IO caller can drive them too: proxy.handshake(destination) gives the first Step, each reply gives the next.
A socket and a stream on any engine
import asyncio
from ssl2 import TLSSocket, TLSStream
connection = TLSSocket.connect(context, ("www.python.org", 443), proxy=None, timeout=10)
connection.send(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.python.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
print(connection.recv(4096).split(b"\r\n", 1)[0], connection.negotiated_tls_version, connection.cipher())
connection.close()
async def main() -> None:
async with asyncio.timeout(10):
stream = await TLSStream.connect(context, ("www.python.org", 443))
await stream.write(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.python.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
print((await stream.read(4096)).split(b"\r\n", 1)[0], stream.negotiated_protocol())
await stream.close()
asyncio.run(main())
context is an engine's ClientContext. server_hostname= names the server for SNI and verification when the address is not that name. A peer that drops TCP without close_notify reads as b"", as with the ssl module. On a direct connection, and behind an HTTP or SOCKS proxy, the TCP socket is handed to the engine, so records move between the kernel and the TLS state without a stop in Python; behind an HTTPS proxy, over another AsyncTransport, or on Windows' default event loop, the records go through the buffer's memory BIOs instead. A time limit on the stream is the caller's asyncio.timeout.
See what happened
import logging
from ssl2 import TLSSocket, Trace
logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO, format="%(name)s %(message)s")
trace = Trace()
connection = TLSSocket.connect(context, ("www.python.org", 443), timeout=10, trace=trace)
connection.close()
print(trace) # connect 21.4 ms, handshake 38.9 ms
The ssl2 logger reports one line per connection step, such as handshake.done version=TLSVersion.TLSv1_3 cipher=CipherSuite.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256 protocol=None; DEBUG adds the proxy steps. A Trace collects the timed spans of one connection, and prints them.
Writing an engine
An engine implements ClientContext, ServerContext and TLSBuffer from ssl2.interface and exposes a TLSImplementation. TLSSocket and TLSStream drive any such TLSBuffer through its memory BIOs or, when the buffer implements attach(fileno), by handing it the socket. getpeerchain() returns the certificates the peer sent, leaf first, and SessionCache stores what the engine records.
Metadata
Release files for ssl2 3.0.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | Provenance | Actions |
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| ssl2-3.0.0.tar.gz | 40.0 kB | With provenance | Details for ssl2-3.0.0.tar.gz |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Actions Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| ssl2-3.0.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details for ssl2-3.0.0-py3-none-any.whl |
Total release size: 80.5 kB
Release files / ssl2-3.0.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | ssl2-3.0.0.tar.gz |
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| Size | 40.0 kB |
| Tags | Source |
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| Tags | Python 3 |
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| Uploaded via |
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