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ssl2

TLS interface for Python 3.14 after PEP 748, plus what a real client needs around it: typed IANA registries, a ClientHello model with a builder and a wire parser, JA3, JA4 and Akamai fingerprints, proxies, a blocking socket and an asyncio stream that run on any PEP 748 TLSBuffer, a session cache and the system trust store. Pure Python, no dependencies. The engine is a separate package, for example boring-ssl2.

uv add ssl2

ClientHello model and fingerprints

from ssl2 import (
    JA3,
    JA4,
    CertificateCompressionAlgorithm,
    CipherSuite,
    ClientHelloBuilder,
    ECPointFormat,
    ExtensionType,
    NamedGroup,
    NextProtocol,
    ProtocolVersion,
    PskKeyExchangeMode,
    SignatureScheme,
)

chrome = (
    ClientHelloBuilder()
    .supported_versions(ProtocolVersion.TLS_1_3, ProtocolVersion.TLS_1_2)
    .cipher_suites(
        CipherSuite.TLS_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
        CipherSuite.TLS_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
        CipherSuite.TLS_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_ECDSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_CHACHA20_POLY1305_SHA256,
        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
        CipherSuite.TLS_ECDHE_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
        CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_GCM_SHA256,
        CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_GCM_SHA384,
        CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_128_CBC_SHA,
        CipherSuite.TLS_RSA_WITH_AES_256_CBC_SHA,
    )
    .extensions(
        ExtensionType.server_name,
        ExtensionType.extended_main_secret,
        ExtensionType.renegotiation_info,
        ExtensionType.supported_groups,
        ExtensionType.ec_point_formats,
        ExtensionType.session_ticket,
        ExtensionType.application_layer_protocol_negotiation,
        ExtensionType.status_request,
        ExtensionType.signature_algorithms,
        ExtensionType.signed_certificate_timestamp,
        ExtensionType.key_share,
        ExtensionType.psk_key_exchange_modes,
        ExtensionType.supported_versions,
        ExtensionType.compress_certificate,
        ExtensionType.application_settings_old,
        ExtensionType.encrypted_client_hello,
    )
    .supported_groups(NamedGroup.X25519MLKEM768, NamedGroup.x25519, NamedGroup.secp256r1, NamedGroup.secp384r1)
    .key_shares(NamedGroup.X25519MLKEM768, NamedGroup.x25519)
    .ec_point_formats(ECPointFormat.uncompressed)
    .signature_algorithms(
        SignatureScheme.ecdsa_secp256r1_sha256,
        SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha256,
        SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha256,
        SignatureScheme.ecdsa_secp384r1_sha384,
        SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha384,
        SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha384,
        SignatureScheme.rsa_pss_rsae_sha512,
        SignatureScheme.rsa_pkcs1_sha512,
    )
    .application_protocols(NextProtocol.H2, NextProtocol.HTTP1)
    .application_settings(NextProtocol.H2)
    .certificate_compression(CertificateCompressionAlgorithm.brotli)
    .psk_key_exchange_modes(PskKeyExchangeMode.psk_dhe_ke)
    .grease()
    .build()
)
print(JA4.of(chrome).text)  # t13d1516h2_8daaf6152771_02713d6af862
print(JA3.of(chrome).digest)  # 5549240a5133e94d2053bfbc454228ef

Every setter also takes the code point itself, so .extensions(0, 23, 65281) and .cipher_suites(0x1301) mean the same thing; that is how a captured fingerprint arrives. Unassigned and GREASE code points still parse:

from ssl2 import CipherSuite, ExtensionType

print(ExtensionType(17613).name, CipherSuite(0x1A1A).name, CipherSuite(0x1A1A).is_grease)  # application_settings unassigned_0x1a1a True

The parser reads a ClientHello from the TLS record or the bare handshake message, strips GREASE and sets grease:

from ssl2 import ClientHelloParser

hello = ClientHelloParser.parse(client_hello_bytes)
print(hello.grease, hello.cipher_suites, hello.key_share_groups)

Fingerprint text forms parse back, except the hashed JA4 form:

from ssl2 import JA4, AkamaiFingerprint

ja4 = JA4.of(chrome)
print(ja4.raw)  # t13d1516h2_002f,0035,...,cca9_0005,000a,...,ff01_0403,0804,...
print(JA4.parse(ja4.raw).text == ja4.text, JA4.parse(ja4.original).text == ja4.text)  # True True
akamai = AkamaiFingerprint.parse("1:65536;2:0;4:6291456;6:262144|15663105|0|m,a,s,p")
print(akamai.digest)  # 52d84b11737d980aef856699f885ca86
print(JA3.parse(JA3.of(chrome).text) == JA3.of(chrome))  # True

JA3.builder() starts a ClientHelloBuilder from the JA3 fields; the payloads JA3 does not carry, such as signature schemes, key shares and ALPN, go in before build().

.trust_anchor_ids("44947.2.1", ...) lists the trust anchor identifiers of draft-ietf-tls-trust-anchor-ids in dotted form, which the parser reads back from the wire. CHROME_TRUST_ANCHOR_IDS is the 28 Chrome 155 requests, and TrustAnchorIdentifier.encode and .decode move between the dotted form and the wire bytes.

Configuration, credentials, trust

from ssl2 import Certificate, PrivateKey, SigningChain, TLSClientConfiguration, TLSServerConfiguration, TLSVersion, TrustStore

client = TLSClientConfiguration(trust_store=TrustStore.system(), lowest_supported_version=TLSVersion.TLSv1_3)
pinned = TLSClientConfiguration(trust_store=TrustStore.from_file("ca.pem"), client_hello=chrome)
server = TLSServerConfiguration(certificate_chain=(SigningChain((Certificate.from_file("server.pem"), PrivateKey.from_file("server.key"))),))
print(TrustStore.system())  # TrustStore(buffer=None, path=PosixPath('/etc/ssl/certs/ca-certificates.crt'), id=None)

TrustStore.system() honors SSL_CERT_FILE and SSL_CERT_DIR, then the usual Linux and macOS bundles, and reads the ROOT and CA stores through crypt32 on Windows.

Proxies

from ssl2 import Proxy

proxy = Proxy.parse("socks5h://user:secret@proxy.example:1080")  # http, https, socks4, socks4a, socks5, socks5h
print(proxy.scheme, proxy.host, proxy.port, proxy.credentials)

socks4 and socks5 resolve the destination locally, socks4a, socks5h and the HTTP schemes let the proxy resolve it, and an https proxy carries TLS inside TLS with the same client context. A refusal raises ProxyError with the proxy's reason.

Sockets and streams on any engine

import asyncio

from ssl2 import TLSSocket, TLSStream

connection = TLSSocket.connect(context, ("www.python.org", 443), proxy=None, timeout=10)
connection.send(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.python.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
print(connection.recv(4096).split(b"\r\n", 1)[0], connection.negotiated_tls_version, connection.cipher())
connection.close()


async def main() -> None:
    stream = await TLSStream.connect(context, ("www.python.org", 443), timeout=10)
    await stream.write(b"HEAD / HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: www.python.org\r\nConnection: close\r\n\r\n")
    print((await stream.read(4096)).split(b"\r\n", 1)[0], stream.negotiated_protocol())
    await stream.close()


asyncio.run(main())

context is an engine's ClientContext. A peer that drops TCP without close_notify reads as b"", the same default the ssl module has.

Writing an engine

An engine implements ClientContext, ServerContext and TLSBuffer from ssl2.interface and exposes TLSImplementation(ClientContext, ServerContext, validate_config). TLSSocket and TLSStream drive any such TLSBuffer; SessionCache stores what the engine records.

Metadata

Release files for ssl2 1.1.0

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