vdi2770
Read a VDI 2770 handover-documentation container and get back a typed model — without extracting anything to disk, without opening a socket, and without any dependencies.
pip install vdi2770
import vdi2770
box = vdi2770.read_container_file("handover.zip")
for c in box.walk():
if c.metadata_bytes is None:
continue
doc = vdi2770.build_document(vdi2770.parse_xml(c.metadata_bytes), c.where)
print(c.path, doc.ids, [k.class_id for k in doc.classifications])
handover.zip ('DOC-2024-0001',) ['03-01']
handover.zip!/pumps.zip ('DOC-2024-0002',) ['02-04']
It decides nothing
There is no is_valid() here, on purpose. Whether a container is correct is a
question about VDI 2770, and the answer depends on which supplement your customer
sent you. This library tells you what is in the file and where it is written; the
opinion is yours to supply.
If you want an opinion supplied for you, vdi2770-validate
is this library plus a rule set, as a command-line tool.
Three properties, each tested rather than promised
Nothing is extracted to disk. Members are decompressed into memory under a budget and dropped. There is no temporary directory to clean up and no path traversal to get wrong, because no path is ever joined.
Nothing is fetched. No socket is opened for any input, ever — including XML that asks for one. An entity declaration is refused outright rather than resolved-but-locally, so there is no parser setting to get wrong later.
A refusal is reported, not raised. A member that blows a budget becomes a
Defect on the container and the read continues, so one hostile file inside a
supplier archive does not cost you the other four hundred.
What comes back
read_container(data, name) returns a Container:
path |
handover.zip!/pumps.zip — the JAR convention, so it stays greppable |
kind |
DOCUMENTATION, DOCUMENT, UNKNOWN, or UNREADABLE |
members, file_names |
what is in the archive, after the budget filter |
metadata_bytes, metadata_name |
the metadata that was found, if any |
children, walk() |
inner containers, opened to three levels |
defects |
what the reader could not do, and why |
rejected |
members present in the archive but refused, and why |
near_misses |
vdi2770_metadata.xml in an archive that has no metadata — the name is case-sensitive, and silence about that is unkind |
duplicate_names |
a ZIP may carry the same name twice; readers disagree about which one wins |
build_document(node, where) returns a Document whose every node carries a
Location with the line and column it was written at, which is the reason this
package parses XML itself instead of handing you an ElementTree.
read_pdf(data) returns four facts and no verdict: is_pdf, header,
encrypted, and pdfa_claim — the last being what the file's own metadata
claims, such as "2b". Nothing here verifies that claim. Verifying PDF/A takes
a PDF/A validator, and this is not one.
Defect kinds
not-a-zip, too-many-members, unsafe-member-name, member-too-large,
suspicious-compression, archive-too-large, metadata-too-large,
metadata-unreadable, member-unreadable, nesting-too-deep,
container-budget-exhausted.
These strings are part of the public surface; a test in this package fails if the code grows a kind that this list does not name.
The last one is the only budget that spans the whole read rather than one
archive: a documentation container may legitimately hold hundreds of inner
containers, and their metadata is held for as long as you walk the tree. Ten
thousand of them, each with sixteen megabytes of metadata, is a permitted input
under every per-archive limit and about 156 GiB of memory. MAX_CONTAINERS and
MAX_TOTAL_METADATA_BYTES bound that; hitting either is reported rather than
silently truncating the tree.
Supported
Python 3.9 and up. The budgets — member count, member size, total size,
compression ratio, metadata size, nesting depth — are module constants in
vdi2770.zipread, so you can read them, and they are deliberately not
arguments, so a caller cannot turn them off by accident.
Unofficial
Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or connected to VDI, the Digital Data Chain Consortium, or IDTA. VDI 2770 is a guideline published by the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure; this is an independent reader for the container format it describes, written without access to the guideline text, which is sold rather than published. What that means for what this library can and cannot claim is spelled out in the validator's scope note.
Apache-2.0.
Release files for vdi2770 0.3.0
For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.
Source distribution (sdist)
| File | Size | Uploaded | |
|---|---|---|---|
| vdi2770-0.3.0.tar.gz | 25.9 kB | Details |
Built distribution (wheel)
| File | Interpreter | ABI | Platform | Reset |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| vdi2770-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl | Python 3 | none | any | Details |
Total release size: 46.5 kB
Release files / vdi2770-0.3.0.tar.gz
| Download URL | vdi2770-0.3.0.tar.gz |
|---|---|
| Size | 25.9 kB |
| Tags | Source |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
efb17fce79d7a5767b814e6b13c4d67d596a14dbe90159d3c552cd00a190ebb5
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
65d472d6a14c6dcb58d033fc9957bb2940f2e6e7cecae70cbf26623b5d672a82
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Aug 24, 2026.
Transparency logRelease files / vdi2770-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl
| Download URL | vdi2770-0.3.0-py3-none-any.whl |
|---|---|
| Size | 20.6 kB |
| Tags | Python 3 |
|
SHA-256 checksum How to use checksums |
0185c19cca71bce875a9008b89cf162386c9c75ae5b27f9136b9afa436fe3179
|
|
BLAKE2b-256 checksum How to use checksums |
bfe48e6bd9e26bc2359c54abdc0f57a246417efd6c50f6ff3ee660b97bd94169
|
| Upload date | |
|
Uploaded using Trusted Publishing? What is trusted publishing? |
Yes |
| Uploaded via |
twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14
|
Provenance
Provenance describes where a file came from. On PyPI, provenance is shared via attestations, which provide a verifiable record of the build or publishing details. View details, limitations and caveats.
PyPI Publish Attestation
PyPI verified that this artifact, at this checksum, originated from the publisher listed below.
Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Aug 24, 2026.
Transparency log