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vdi2770

Read a VDI 2770 handover-documentation container and get back a typed model — without extracting anything to disk, without opening a socket, and without any dependencies.

pip install vdi2770
import vdi2770

box = vdi2770.read_container_file("handover.zip")
for c in box.walk():
    if c.metadata_bytes is None:
        continue
    doc = vdi2770.build_document(vdi2770.parse_xml(c.metadata_bytes), c.where)
    print(c.path, doc.ids, [k.class_id for k in doc.classifications])
handover.zip ('DOC-2024-0001',) ['03-01']
handover.zip!/pumps.zip ('DOC-2024-0002',) ['02-04']

It decides nothing

There is no is_valid() here, on purpose. Whether a container is correct is a question about VDI 2770, and the answer depends on which supplement your customer sent you. This library tells you what is in the file and where it is written; the opinion is yours to supply.

If you want an opinion supplied for you, vdi2770-validate is this library plus a rule set, as a command-line tool.

Three properties, each tested rather than promised

Nothing is extracted to disk. Members are decompressed into memory under a budget and dropped. There is no temporary directory to clean up and no path traversal to get wrong, because no path is ever joined.

Nothing is fetched. No socket is opened for any input, ever — including XML that asks for one. An entity declaration is refused outright rather than resolved-but-locally, so there is no parser setting to get wrong later.

A refusal is reported, not raised. A member that blows a budget becomes a Defect on the container and the read continues, so one hostile file inside a supplier archive does not cost you the other four hundred.

What comes back

read_container(data, name) returns a Container:

path handover.zip!/pumps.zip — the JAR convention, so it stays greppable
kind DOCUMENTATION, DOCUMENT, UNKNOWN, or UNREADABLE
members, file_names what is in the archive, after the budget filter
metadata_bytes, metadata_name the metadata that was found, if any
children, walk() inner containers, opened to three levels
defects what the reader could not do, and why
rejected members present in the archive but refused, and why
near_misses vdi2770_metadata.xml in an archive that has no metadata — the name is case-sensitive, and silence about that is unkind
duplicate_names a ZIP may carry the same name twice; readers disagree about which one wins

build_document(node, where) returns a Document whose every node carries a Location with the line and column it was written at, which is the reason this package parses XML itself instead of handing you an ElementTree.

read_pdf(data) returns four facts and no verdict: is_pdf, header, encrypted, and pdfa_claim — the last being what the file's own metadata claims, such as "2b". Nothing here verifies that claim. Verifying PDF/A takes a PDF/A validator, and this is not one.

Defect kinds

not-a-zip, too-many-members, unsafe-member-name, member-too-large, suspicious-compression, archive-too-large, metadata-too-large, metadata-unreadable, member-unreadable, nesting-too-deep, container-budget-exhausted.

These strings are part of the public surface; a test in this package fails if the code grows a kind that this list does not name.

The last one is the only budget that spans the whole read rather than one archive: a documentation container may legitimately hold hundreds of inner containers, and their metadata is held for as long as you walk the tree. Ten thousand of them, each with sixteen megabytes of metadata, is a permitted input under every per-archive limit and about 156 GiB of memory. MAX_CONTAINERS and MAX_TOTAL_METADATA_BYTES bound that; hitting either is reported rather than silently truncating the tree.

Supported

Python 3.9 and up. The budgets — member count, member size, total size, compression ratio, metadata size, nesting depth — are module constants in vdi2770.zipread, so you can read them, and they are deliberately not arguments, so a caller cannot turn them off by accident.

Unofficial

Not affiliated with, endorsed by, or connected to VDI, the Digital Data Chain Consortium, or IDTA. VDI 2770 is a guideline published by the Verein Deutscher Ingenieure; this is an independent reader for the container format it describes, written without access to the guideline text, which is sold rather than published. What that means for what this library can and cannot claim is spelled out in the validator's scope note.

Apache-2.0.

Release files for vdi2770 0.3.1

For a detailed explanation of source distributions (sdists) and built distributions (wheels), please see the package formats documentation.

Source distribution (sdist)

Source distribution for vdi2770 0.3.1
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vdi2770-0.3.1.tar.gz 28.0 kB Details

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Table of built distributions (wheels) for vdi2770 0.3.1
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vdi2770-0.3.1-py3-none-any.whl Python 3 none any Details

Total release size: 50.0 kB

Release files / vdi2770-0.3.1.tar.gz

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Uploaded via twine/7.0.0 CPython/3.13.14

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Signed by GitHub Actions, verified by PyPI on Aug 24, 2026.

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0.9.7

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