Verfy CLI

Guard coding-agent tool calls, scan and lock MCP tools, and sign a verifiable receipt for every call Verfy checks. Plain Python (≥ 3.10), no required dependencies, MIT.

pip install verfy                  # Python ≥ 3.10, no dependencies
curl -fsSL https://verfy-tech.vercel.app/install.sh | sh   # no Python: macOS, Linux standalone build
irm https://verfy-tech.vercel.app/install.ps1 | iex        # no Python: Windows PowerShell
pip install "verfy[fast]"          # optional: faster Ed25519 via `cryptography`

Guard Claude Code

verfy init                      # ~/.verfy: signing key (0600), starter policy
verfy hook install              # shows the change to ~/.claude/settings.json
verfy hook install --write      # saves it (a backup is kept); --project for ./.claude/settings.json

Claude Code then runs verfy hook pre-tool-use before every tool call. The agent cannot switch Verfy off through what Verfy sees: changes to the hook settings, verfy.lock, the policy, ~/.verfy or the Verfy install are denied, changes to MCP configs need approval, and so do verfy lock approve, verfy lock check --update, verfy init --force and pip uninstall verfy when the agent runs them (denied). Verfy answers deny or ask with the rule and reason, or stays silent so Claude Code's own permissions decide; it never answers allow itself. Any error becomes ask (or deny with "fail_mode": "deny"). The hook never touches the network.

Update

verfy update                    # install the newest version (standalone build, pip, pipx or uv: whichever you used)
verfy update --check            # only report; exit 1 when a newer version exists
verfy update --auto on          # once a day, when you run a verfy command, update in the background (off: --auto off)

verfy init asks which you prefer the first time; the default is manual, so Verfy never goes online on its own. The hook, the gateway and verfy sync never check for updates.

Guard MCP servers (gateway)

claude mcp add filesystem -- verfy proxy --name filesystem -- npx -y @modelcontextprotocol/server-filesystem@2025.8.21 ~/project
verfy wrap ~/.cursor/mcp.json --write      # wrap every server in a config (backup kept)

The gateway scans each tools/list answer, hides poisoned or drifted tools, checks every tools/call, can ask the user through MCP elicitation ("on_ask": "elicit"), and writes a receipt for every call. Secrets in tool results and resources (API keys, tokens, private keys in the formats the scanner knows) are replaced with [REDACTED:<rule>] before the agent reads them; the receipt keeps the hash of the original result. Set "redact_output": false to turn this off.

With "on_ask": "team" (device enrolled in Verfy Team), a call that needs approval waits in Dashboard → Approvals until an owner or admin decides, for at most "approval_timeout" seconds (default 120, 10 to 900). The request carries the tool, the rules that asked and the SHA-256 of the arguments, never the arguments. A rejection, no answer in time or an unreachable server refuses the call; the receipt records approved_by: "team:<name>" when it runs. The Claude Code hook never waits on the network, so this works through the gateway only.

Scan

verfy scan --discover                 # static check of Claude Code, Cursor, Claude Desktop configs
verfy scan --discover --live          # also start each stdio server and scan its tools
verfy scan tools.json --fail-under C  # a saved tools/list answer, for CI

Exit codes: config scan 0 ok, 1 medium, 2 high or worse; tool scan 1 with --fail-under when a server grades worse.

Lock

verfy lock status                 # 0 ok · 1 new/removed · 2 drift
verfy lock diff filesystem        # what changed, invisible characters spelled out
verfy lock approve filesystem     # review, then accept (--yes after reviewing in CI)
verfy lock add tools.json --server remote-api
verfy lock verify                 # verfy.lock is well formed and untampered

A project-level ./verfy.lock is used when present, otherwise ~/.verfy/verfy.lock.

In CI

verfy lock check --update         # start the servers in .mcp.json, review every definition, write ./verfy.lock
verfy lock check                  # 0 ok · 1 new/removed · 2 drift · 3 a server did not answer

Commit verfy.lock; a pull request that changes a tool then fails until someone reviews the diff and runs --update. Inside GitHub Actions the command also writes annotations and a step summary. The repository root has an action.yml that installs this CLI and runs the check:

- uses: actions/setup-python@v7
  with: { python-version: "3.13" }
- uses: anvarbekovjavohir277-dot/verfy@cli-v0.5.0
  with: { config: .mcp.json, lock: verfy.lock }

lock check starts each stdio server command from the config, as your MCP client would: pin package versions and pass keys as CI secrets. Remote servers are skipped.

Check and verify

verfy check "git push --force"                       # 0 allow · 1 ask · 2 deny
verfy check --tool send_payment --args '{"amount": 500}'
verfy ledger show
verfy verify                                         # your own ledger
verfy verify --ledger receipts.jsonl --pub <key> --kid <chain> [--start-after <hash>]   # an evidence export

Verfy Team

verfy team enroll --url https://verfy.example.com --code atle_…   # code from Dashboard → Devices
verfy sync                     # upload new receipts (run from cron/CI, never in the hook)
verfy team pull                # team policy + team-approved locks
verfy team propose SERVER TOOL # ask admins to approve a changed tool
verfy team status

Only the public key is sent at enrollment. The device token is stored in ~/.verfy/team.json (0600). Receipts are uploaded exactly as signed; they contain only hashes of arguments unless you enabled receipts.include_args, in which case sync needs --allow-args.

Policy

Start from a template, or write your own:

verfy policy templates            # strict, read-only, ci
verfy policy show read-only       # print it
verfy policy use read-only        # ~/.verfy/policy.json (--project: ./verfy.policy.json, --force replaces, a backup is kept)
verfy init --template ci          # same, while setting up

• strict: anything risky is denied instead of asked, unknown hosts are blocked (package registries and GitHub are allowed), errors deny, new MCP tools are denied until approved.
• read-only: file edits (Write, Edit, ...) and write-style MCP tools (*create*, *delete*, *push*, ...) are denied; every shell command needs approval. Tool names are matched by pattern, so check verfy policy show read-only against your servers.
• ci: nobody is watching, so anything that would ask is denied; same network limits as strict.

The agent cannot change the policy itself: editing it is denied, and so is verfy policy use when the agent runs it.

JSON merged over src/verfy/data/default_policy.json. Precedence: --policy FILE, ./verfy.policy.json, ~/.verfy/team/policy.json, ~/.verfy/policy.json.

{
  "on_ask": "deny",
  "fail_mode": "ask",
  "tools": {"deny": ["github/delete_*"], "ask": ["merge_pull_request"]},
  "network": {"allow": ["github.com", "*.python.org"], "unknown": "ask"},
  "rules": [{"id": "no-prod-db", "pattern": "prod-db", "verdict": "deny", "message": "Production is off-limits."}],
  "lock": {"on_new": "ask"},
  "receipts": {"include_args": false}
}

Receipt format (verfy.receipt/1)

One JSON object per line in ~/.verfy/ledger.jsonl: v, id, seq, prev, issued_at, agent, session, action{server, tool, kind, args_sha256, args?}, decision{verdict, rules, policy_sha256, approved_by?}, outcome{status, result_sha256}, tool_sha256, kid, sig. sig is Ed25519 over the canonical JSON of all other fields; prev is the SHA-256 of the previous receipt. Writes are serialized with an OS file lock, so parallel sessions never fork the chain.

SCITT signed statements

verfy scitt export --out statements/ [--issuer URL]     # one COSE_Sign1 per receipt
verfy scitt verify statements/*.cose --pub signer.json  # COSE signature, CWT subject and the receipt's own signature

Each statement is a COSE_Sign1 (RFC 9052) with alg EdDSA, content type application/json, the key id and CWT claims (iss, sub = the receipt hash) in the protected header, and the canonical receipt as payload: the signed-statement envelope of the IETF SCITT architecture draft. Verfy does not run a transparency service or issue SCITT receipts.

Tests

cd verfy-cli && python -m unittest discover -s tests     # needs Node for the cross-engine tests

Limits

Rules are pattern matching, not a sandbox. Verfy sees only calls that pass through its hook or gateway. A receipt proves what Verfy decided and that the log was not edited, not what a tool did internally. Keep ~/.verfy/key.json private.